Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 138

Fri, 17 Jul 2009

• 1. Re: best v. worst (harveyben...@yahoo.com)
• 2. best v. worst (M Cohen)
• 3. Re: best v. worst; (Liron Kopinsky)
• 4. Re: best v. worst; (harveyben...@yahoo.com)
• 5. Re: best v. worst; (Liron Kopinsky)
• 6. Re: shabbas/yom tov invites... (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 7. Re: Categorical imperative (Yitzhak Grossman)
• 8. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 9. shabbas/yom tov invites... (Chana Luntz)
• 10. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (T6...@aol.com)
• 11. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Arie Folger)
• 12. Re: best v. worst; (Rich, Joel)
• 13. Re: Categorical imperative (David Riceman)
• 14. Re: Categorical imperative (Micha Berger)
• 15. Re: best v. worst; (Micha Berger)
• 16. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Micha Berger)

rmc:
the 3 main svaras l'hatir are:

1. you're inviting them to actually stay over (and have the beds for them), 
it's their decision to drive home (therefore at worst only m'sayaia)
hb: what about for a lunch meal??? 
2. Mehhalelin alav shabbat ahhat kedei sheyishmor shabbatot harbe
hb: isn't that only for saving a life (physical) and not nec the potential spiritual life of a yid/yidden???
3. if you didn't invite them, they would be driving this shabbos anyway 
(by inviting them, they will actually be doing less driving)

hb: not nec true imo; they might not be driving at all; they may take a
walk to the park, or stay at home and watch football or play ping pong or
read, or whatever.....besides shy should it be on your head that they
>>definitiely drive (definite aveira); acc. to your svara, if someone
were "going" to murder someone else, then why not sell them the handgun???
(they would end-up buying it from someone esle regardless......)

btw, there are poskim who allow invites to a notfrum Jew who will drive
only on YT (where driving is only a rabbinic prohibition of molid
 aish)

Mordechai Cohen


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HB:
> 2. if someone invites a fellow Jew to a meal on shabbos or Yom Tov to 
> his/her house/Shul/bar mitzvah, etc, knowing full-well 100% they will 
> drive either to the meal or from the meal, are they being lifnei 
> iver??? and if not (what I have usually heard) then why not???

the 3 main svaras l'hatir are:

1. you're inviting them to actually stay over (and have the beds for them), 
it's their decision to drive home (therefore at worst only m'sayaia)

2. Mehhalelin alav shabbat ahhat kedei sheyishmor shabbatot harbe

3. if you didn't invite them, they would be driving this shabbos anyway 
(by inviting them, they will actually be doing less driving)


btw, there are poskim who allow invites to a notfrum Jew who will drive
only on YT (where driving is only a rabbinic prohibition of molid aish)

Mordechai Cohen

The best that can happen in the short term is that the person won't drive to
a treif restaurant, followed by driving to a movie (halavai it was "only" a
movie they were driving to) and then driving home. All the while doing many
many other issurei d'oraisa.

Spending time at a shabbat meal even in the short term provides a mechanism
to have less chillul shabbos.

 if we examine the best case v. the worst case of having invites
> over......the conclusion should be clear that it is best to avoid having
> another jew make an aveira (midoraisa) versus possible benefits of
> midorobbana mitzvas at best....
>
>
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rlk:
The best that can happen in the short term is that the person won't drive
to a treif restaurant, followed by driving to a movie (halavai it was
"only" a movie they were driving to) and then driving home. All the while
doing many many other issurei d'oraisa.

Spending time at a shabbat meal even in the short term provides a mechanism to have less chillul shabbos.

hb: according to this reasoning, if someone is going out to eat a
cheesburger (not on shabbas) one should instead go out and purchase treif
meat for him, put cheese on it, and then have him/her make a bracha on it;
one could then say........"at least he'll be making a bracha on the food" 
what happened to the entire concept of "mitzva ha'ba b'aveira"???h



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I'm not even talking about mitzvah ha'bah b'aveirah (which only applies to
mitzvot assei). I mean in the pure chillul shabbos sense, the person will
violate less melachot spending Friday night at a Shabbos meal than they
would doing whatever it is that they normally do.
[Kaveat, if the person is not going to drive and be mechallel shabbos
anyway, maybe you shouldn't invite them.]

Kol Tuv,
~Liron

On Thu, Jul 16, 2009 at 4:35 PM, <harveyben...@yahoo.com> wrote:
  what happened to the entire concept of "mitzva ha'ba b'aveira"?
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R' Harvey Benton asked:

> 1. if someone were to set a hammer and nails (or a
> skillsaw/electric drill, etc.) in front of a person with a
> pile of 2x4's on shabbas/yom tov; would that person be
> over on lifnei iver???

My guess is that the mere presence of such items, without some sort of motivation to build something, would not be a problem. But I don't know.

> 2. if someone invites a fellow jew to a meal on shabbas or
> yom tov to his/her house/shul/bar mitzavah, etc, knowing
> full-well 100 % they will drive either to the meal or from
> the meal, are they being lifnei iver??? and if not (what i
> have usually heard) then why not???

I have never heard that this is not lifnei iver. I *have* heard that the
influence on him, and the possibility of his developing a better
relationship with Hashem, might override the prohibition. But not that the
prohibition is absent.

Akiva Miller

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On Thu, 16 Jul 2009 09:06:52 -0400
David Riceman <drice...@att.net> wrote:

...

>  He attributes it to an amoraic interpreter of the Mishna (as I thought 
> I'd said).  Is this not another example of "Rishonim expound[ing] Divine 
> command theory"?

I do not consider the fact that he attributes a doctrine that he
considers fundamentally wrong to Talmudic sages equivalent to
"expounding" that theory.

Yitzhak
--
Bein Din Ledin - http://bdl.freehostia.com
A discussion of Hoshen Mishpat, Even Ha'Ezer and other matters

R' Meir Shinnar wrote:
> In the MO community, the move for a long time has been away
> from the large shuls with hazzanim to the Young Israel
> model of participatory davening.  While for some this
> reflects an issue of showing off, as a communal model the
> values that this shift reflected (and still reflects) is
> the value the community puts on participation - that
> everyone can play a role.

Everyone can play a role, but far too many people assume roles that are
above them. It could easily be argued that the move from chazzanim who are
learned and know the details and rules of what they are doing, to any
member who has a half-decent voice and follows the rules printed in the
siddur, is a very regrettable thing.

Participation is great, but what's wrong with participating from one's
seat, with an attentive and heartfelt response to Borchu or Kedusha or with
whatever singing that the shul might do?

What is the difference between showing off and simply fulfilling one's
role? I would suggest (based on the things Moshe Rabenu did while being
described as an "anav") that the difference is in whether one merely does
his job, or whether he does things which are not appropriate for him.

Akiva Miller


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RHBwrites:

> 1. if someone were to?set a hammer and nails (or a 
> skillsaw/electric drill, etc.) in front of a person with 
> a?pile of 2x4's on shabbas/yom tov; would that person be over 
> on lifnei iver???
> ?
> 2. if someone invites a fellow jew to a meal on shabbas or 
> yom tov to?his/her house/shul/bar mitzavah, etc,?knowing 
> full-well 100 % they will drive either to the meal or from 
> the meal, are they being lifnei iver??? and if not (what i 
> have usually heard) then why not???hb

And then RRW replied in relation to 2.

> This is an easy "slamdunk"
> 
> Before inviting - simply ask a Rav! Only a Poseiq can weigh 
> all the halachic pros and cons in each given situation

However, I didn't take this question as being about what to do in a
practical situation.  I took this question as asking about the parameters of
lifnei iver.  What the questioner seems to be asking is - how can it be that
anybody ever allows for invitions - what about lifnei iver?  And for that
one needs to explore the parameters of lifnei iver.

The key thing to mention about lifnei iver is that the biblical form of
lifnei iver does not apply in situations where the person could manage to do
the averah without the help of the other.  This is normally phrased in terms
of the one side and two sides of the river as per Avodah Zara 6b and passing
the wine to the nazir, but in many ways that is a complicated example, and
it may be easier to see it in terms of the discussion in Baba Metzia 75b.

In Baba Metzia 75b the discussion is about the numbers of different issurim
a person is over in relation to ribus - the lender is over on six issurim
including lifnei iver, the borrower is over on three issurim including
lifnei iver, but the guarantor and the witnesses are only over on one issur,
which does not include lifnei iver.  And Tosphos comments there that the
reason it is phrased like that is because if the lender and the borrower
would have been prepared to go ahead with the ribus transaction without a
guarantor or witnesses, then lifnei iver does not apply, even though in fact
there is indeed a guarantor and witnesses to this loan, it is only where the
lender and/or borrower would not be prepared to go ahead with the ribus
transaction without the guarantor or the witnesses that the guarantor or the
witnesses is over on biblical lifnei iver. This is despite their presence
clearly strengthening the loan and making it more desirable (Note btw, that
even where there is no biblical lifnei iver, there may be an applicable a
rabbinic form, mesaya lei, but the parameters of that get even more
complicated - and that is not the question asked).

So, in case 1. you first have to assertain - would the person have been able
to obtain the hammer and nails (or whatever) without your help?  If he
would, then you are clearly outside the biblical form of lifnei iver - it is
a straightforward application of the Avodah Zara 6b and the one side of the
river, two sides of the river discussion.  Even if he could not though, it
is not necessarily so clear that it is the same case as that of the nazir.
A nazir is forbidden to touch wine, so by passing him the wine he is clearly
going to be over on an issur - there is nothing he can do with wine that is
permitted.  On the other hand here it is of course possible (although
perhaps unlikely) that the person will ignore the 2x4's and use the hammer
to open some nuts for immediate consumption (and we must be able to think of
a similar permissible application for the nails).   I am assuming here that
the use of the hammer and nails on the 2x4s by the person would constitute
the issur d'orisa of bone - if it does not, and for some reason you are in
d'rabbanan territory, than the biblical form of lifne iver is not going to
apply in any event.

So this is where it gets complicated  vis a vis inviting the fellow Jew over
for a meal.  Can you be sure that the fellow Jew would not have driven his
car without your invitation?  If you are sure of that, ie the only reason he
would be driving his car is because of your invitation, you may get to
lifnei iver territory. But if he always goes out for a meal by driving on
Friday nights, and the question is whether he goes to a restaurant or to
your house (leaving aside complications about whether there are more issurei
d'orisa violated if he goes longer or shorter distances), then you cannot be
said to be over on biblical lifnei iver because he would have done the
averah anyway.  And even if you are pretty confident that he would not have
driven his car without your invitation it is not really the same as either
the nazir or the ribus case (or even the hammer case), because you are not
providing him with the means to do the issur.  He owns the car anyway, he
could take it into his head to drive anyway (even if he doesn't usually).
What you are providing to him is, at most, the *motivation* to do the issur
(a nice meal at the end of it), rather than the means.  

In addition, if you offer him the option of staying over with you (or
somebody within walking distance) and arriving before shabbas, (or he is in
fact within walking distance, even if you happen to know he is not the type
to walk anywhere) then it is hard to argue that lifnei iver is being
violated.  In the classic cases of lifnei iver, there is nothing a nazir can
do with wine except be over on an issur.  A loan with ribus is a loan with
ribus, no matter how you cut it.  But here, the meal itself is not assur, -
only the means of getting there is. If there are permissible ways of getting
to the meal, the fact that you know he has opted for one of the
impermissible ones does not mean that you have led him down that path.  

So there are lots of doubts on whether you actually have a biblical form of
lifnei iver here.  And note that many people hold that a safek in a d'orisa
turns it into a d'rabbanan and a safek safeka, ie two different kinds of
doubts make it mutar (this is standard Rav Ovadiah Yosef type analysis).
That is why it is probably sensible to get all the doubts weighed up - and
why RRW's advice vis a vis a practical situation and asking a Rav is
advisable.  But merely from the analysis you can see why most people hold
that one is unlikely to have a full fledged biblical form of lifnei iver
operating in this case.

Regards

Chana

From: "Chana Luntz" _ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk_ 
(mailto:ch...@kolsassoon.org.uk) 

>>Let  us just think for a moment about what it means to be either a 
litigant
or a  witness in any court system.  Basically, the aim of the other side is
to  demonstrate that any opponent is, in the case of a monetary case, a liar
and  probably a thief...., 
 

The whole exercise is, has to be, one of public humilation....   
....any sensible man would
logically avoid having to be a witness or a  litigant.... And that is
why we have halachos that compel witnesses to come  to court.

It is in this framework that the gemora on Shavous 30a  discusses the fact
that women do not generally come to court, even as  litigants ....
And it also implies that this is the basis for the exclusion of
women as  witnesses....
 
What this seems to allow is for women, for the most part, to
avoid cross  examination and public humilation in a court setting.>>



>>>>
That is exactly what my father said about women being  witnesses, that the 
halacha protects their dignity.  He added that their  ne'emanus is not in 
question, as a woman's word is trusted in matters of  critical  halachic 
importance like taharas hamishpacha and kashrus.
 
For those who are new to Avodah I will mention that my father was R'  
Nachman Bulman, zt'l.  This Shabbos, 26 Tammuz, is his seventh  yahrzeit.  Still 
sadly sadly missed.
 
--Toby  Katz
==========



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R'nCL wrote:
> But, and I think this is where RAF above is misunderstanding RMS, RMS above
> is talking about being an advocate (lawyer) in the court system (and the
> secular court system at that). ?Being a lawyer is a very very different kind
> of situation to being either a litigant or a witness.

Based on RMS' reaction to my post, I don't think I misunderstood him.
He mentioned that women surely aren't barred from court, and I pointed
out that there is/are (a) maamar(ei) 'Hazal that say(s) the opposite.
I did not attempt to analyze whether or not we are presently bound by
those maamarim, or whether they depend on societal norms or whatever;
that exercise I left to him and other participants to the "Tzeni'us
and gender roles" thread, which I enjoy reading without getting
actively involved ;-).

> Let us just think for a moment about what it means to be either a litigant
> or a witness in any court system. ?Basically, the aim of the other side is
> to demonstrate that any opponent is, in the case of a monetary case, a liar
> and probably a thief, and if we are talking about more serious cases - rape
> and the like, that those disputing are liars and, in the case of victims,
> possibly sexually immoral as well.
>
> The whole exercise is, has to be, one of public humilation. ?Whether that
> humilation is attempted primarily by the lawyer for the other side (as in
> common law jurisdictions) or by the judge, as in more inquistorial systems,
> because there has to be an attempt to get at the truth, probing and
> humiliating questions need to be asked.
<SNIP>
> It is in this framework that the gemora on Shavous 30a discusses the fact
> that women do not generally come to court, even as litigants - preferring to
> send others to represent them (which it would seem halachically they are
> permitted to do) on the basis of of the principle kol kavuda bas melech
> penima.  And it also implies that this is the basis for the exclusion of
> women as witnesses - see eg Tosphos there (although of course this is from
> a pasuk, so no reason need really be given, so even that one cannot say for
> definite).  What this seems to allow is for women, for the most part, to
> avoid cross examination and public humilation in a court setting.

Beautiful hypothesis. However, lacking strong proof, you should keep
in mind that you may or may not be right. Data point: the maamar
'Hazal I quoted from Rashi states melamed she-ein la-isha *reshut*
ledabber bifnei ha-ish.

According to your beautiful theory, the maamar should have taught:
"she-ein ha-isha *tzerikha*" or "*'hayyavet,*" "le-dabber bifnei
ha-ish."

Kol tuv,
-- 
Arie Folger,
Latest blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Barukh She-Amar Elucidated
* The Anatomy of a Beracha
* Basic Building Blocks of Jewish Prayer

imo...
1. the Worst that can happen if someone drives on shabbas is .......being mechalel shabbas!! (mi'doiraisa).
2. The Best that can happen if someone attends a shabbas meal (in the
short-term) is 1. making kiddush (mi'dirabannan), 2. a woman/women lighting
shabbas candles (if they get there early enuf (also mi'dirabbonan); 3.
breaking bread with family/friends and making a bracha on the bread
(midirobonnon) and; 4. benching (mi'dirabbon as to the exact loshon...)

Imo, if we examine the best case v. the worst case of having invites
over......the conclusion should be clear that it is best to avoid having
another jew make an aveira (midoraisa) versus possible benefits of
midorobbana mitzvas at best....
==================================
I haven't been following the thread but it occurs to me that the shikul
hadaat required might be more of an analysis of the probability of the
total range of possible outcomes weighted by the  "long term benefit" of
each- much like the decision on medical procedures that I've seen in the
sh"ut literature.


She-nir'eh et nehamat Yerushalayim u-binyanah bi-mherah ve-yamenu



KT
Joel   Rich

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Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
> I do not consider the fact that he attributes a doctrine that he
> considers fundamentally wrong to Talmudic sages equivalent to
> "expounding" that theory.
>   
It's not that he attributes it; it's that he explains it.  Webster's 
(2nd edition): "expound : 2. to explain".  In none of the definitions of 
expound is there any implication that expounding implies accepting.

David Riceman

On Fri, Jul 17, 2009 at 08:26:56AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
: >I do not consider the fact that he attributes a doctrine that he
: >considers fundamentally wrong to Talmudic sages equivalent to
: >"expounding" that theory.

: It's not that he attributes it; it's that he explains it.  Webster's 
: (2nd edition): "expound : 2. to explain".  In none of the definitions of 
: expound is there any implication that expounding implies accepting.

Things are getting a little sad when it boils down to diyuq halashon in
my Avodah post.

What I was trying to say is that there are rishonim who consider Divine
Command Theory (DCT) compatible enough with Yahadus to be worth invoking
and explaining. "Expounded" as RDR wrote.

But actually, historically speaking, it's hard to find a rishon who
actually promoted DCT. This need for rationality is something that
distinguishes us from our daughter religions, and I think that shows up
here too. I don't think even Rashi holds of DCT, despite his explanation
of this shitah in the gemara that al kan tzippor is because the din is
gezeiras hakasuv.

I actually think there are three relevent maamarei chazal.

1- The one already raised, condemning the Shatz who attributes shiluach
haQen to Hashem's Rachamim. Megillah 25a

2- The rhetorical question of why HQBH should care whether we slaughter
a beheimah from the front or the back of the neck. Bereishis Rabba 44:1

Interestly, both divorce the taam hamitzvah from tzaar baalei chaim.
This might be significant.

The Rambam uses these gemaros to show that while mitzvos in the large have
reasons, the details are often arbitrary. We needed a rite to elevate
how we kill animals, that's more significant than what the rite is. If
HQBH said that we should shecht from the back of the neck we could
ask why not the front? Or had he told us to take a pepper on Sukkos,
we could ask why not an esrog?

I think there is a leshitaso there with the Rambam's position on
hashgachah. Nature is hashgachah minis, not on each individual. Halakhah
too is a set of rules, and therefore is also addressing the big picture
and not the details. In both cases the Rambam takes it for granted that
a set of global

The Ramban argues that it's a gezeirah on us because shiluach haQen is
about developing /our/ rachamim, not an expression of HQBH's. This is
reading the BR, which explicitly says the difference is for the sake of
our middos, back into the gemara in Megillah. I would say the Ramban is
also leshitaso. His whole concept of qadeish es atzmekha bema shemutar
lakh means that there is a definition of qedushah that goes beyond that
which was specifically commanded.

If someone has the time to explain the Maharal's discussion in Tif'eres
Yisrael pereq 6, I would be thrilled. (I'm a bit spread thin right now,
behind schedule in other learning.) He discusses this machloqes and
presents his own shitah.

3- The third maamar's connection is less obvious. Histaqeil beOraisa
ubarei alma. Zohar Ber' 134a

It allows a solution to the Euthypro Dilemma, in which Plato has Socrates
ask young Eythyphro:
    Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious
    because it is loved by the gods?
Or, in a Jewish rephrase:
    Did Hashem command this particular mitzvah because it is morally
    right, or is it morally right because God made it a mitzvah?

If we assume the reisha, then were are limiting Omnipotence, we're saying
that there is this thing called morality that even HQBH is dubject to.

If we assume the seifa, which is DCT, we have the problem that it
makes HQBH's decision of what is good arbitrary. This second horn of
the dilemma is obten asked without reference to Plato: Had HQBH said
"tirtzach", without the "lo", would murder have been moral?

The only reason why we consider murder inherently immoral is because of
how people and the olamos were made. HQBH could have created a system
in which dying is a major tovah to the person.

IOW, one can very well use this maamar to say that murder is immoral
because the Torah said so. But unlike straight DCT we would add: ... and
therefore the world was created so that "lo sirtzakh" is what the souls
in it prefer as well.

In chasing the link to <http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/divine-c.htm> I learned
that this resolution is pretty much that proposed by Clark and Pootenga
(2003) based on Equinas. Except that while they say the two fit together,
they place the universe as logically prior to the Divine Command, rather
than the other way around.

Which is pretty much into the resolution I gave in earlier
Avodah discussions of the Euthyphros, eventually blogged at
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2007/05/hashem-and-morality.shtml>:
    I would argue that HQBH created the world with a tachlis, a purpose,
    He placed each of us in it with a tachlis, and what is righteous
    is righteous because it is in accordance with furthering that
    tachlis. This fits Rav Hirsch's etymology for "ra", being related
    to /reish-ayin-ayin/, to shatter. It also explains why the word
    "tov" means both good in the moral sense (not evil) as well as
    in the functional sense (not ineffective, as in "a good toothpaste
    prevents cavities"). To prepare the menorah's lamps is called "hatavas
    haneiros -- causing the functional usability of the lamps." Moral
    tov derives from the functional tov. Hashem chose "Do not steal"
    over "Take whatever makes you happy" because that's what makes us
    better receptacles. We might have remained with two definitions of
    tov (and of "good") -- functional and moral. According to this line
    of reasoning, "good at its job" is the underlying meaning of tov in
    the moral sense of the word as well.

    So yes, HQBH did choose good vs evil without being subject to
    external constraint, and yet still the choice was not arbitrary.
    Socrates gave Euthyphro a false dichotomy -- there was a third
    choice. Hashem has a reason, but that reason wasn't conforming to
    a preexisting morality....

If one says that the Torah is "The Human Soul: A User's Manual", my
blogged answer would be just like the "histaqeil beOraisa" version,
except that HQBH created the soul to fit the manual, rather than the
other way around.

I suggest reading the whole discussion there, but one point intrigued me.

Robert Adams (1987) noted that if we phrase DCT in the negative, we can
avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. IOW, "Any action is ethically wrong if and
only if it is contrary to the commands of a loving God" (pg 132). It
allows one to have a morality that includes everything HQBH requires as
being moral by definition and yet has room for qedushah bemah shemutar
lakh. AND it has an incredible resonance with "mah desani lakh", also
defining duty in the negative.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Feeling grateful  to or appreciative of  someone
mi...@aishdas.org        or something in your life actually attracts more
http://www.aishdas.org   of the things that you appreciate and value into
Fax: (270) 514-1507      your life.         - Christiane Northrup, M.D.

On Fri, Jul 17, 2009 at 08:22:17AM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
: I haven't been following the thread but it occurs to me that the shikul
: hadaat required might be more of an analysis of the probability of the
: total range of possible outcomes weighted by the "long term benefit"
: of each- much like the decision on medical procedures that I've seen in
: the sh"ut literature.

It's a machloqes acharonim, with different kiruv organizations having
different practices in this regard. Many will take a "don't ask don't
tell" policy to make it clear to the talmid that they're implicitly
encouraging driving as a least-of-evils thing.

(The C driving responsum totally failed to understand the concept
of halakhah ve'ein morin kein. Therefore, their allowing someone who
otherwise wouldn't ever do anything Jewish to drive to synagogue on
Shabbos became in the minds of the people (1) reason not to bother looking
for a house near their synagogue, and (2) blanket "permission" to drive.)

When explained to me, the machloqes revolved around RJR's point. But
since one is discussing policy for a program, rather than individuals,
the shiqul hadaas becomes about what's true for most of the people they're
trying to reach, and not assessing an individual. IOW, the machloqes isn't
only about the application of "mechalelin alav shabbas achas", even among
those who say it does apply in principle, there is also a question of the
metzi'us and the likelihood of the Shabbasos harbei.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
mi...@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (270) 514-1507         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

On Tue, Jul 14, 2009 at 07:09:46PM +0100, Rn Chana Luntz wrote:
: RMB writes:
: > The line is subtle, and probably the subject of machloqes. My 
: > own opinion is that tzeni'us is not drawing attention to 
: > oneself, more of a mode of interaction with others, whereas 
: > anavah is realizing that one is part of Hashem's bigger plan 
: > rather than thinking I'm in charge. (Thus the connection to 
: > other ayin-nun words like answering, reacting, etc...)

: You ask me to further define tznius in accordance with common practice.

: I think that part of the issue is that there are two distinct meanings of
: tznius in common understanding:

This is a shift of topic. "In accordance with common practice" and
"in common understanding" are two different things. What I asked for
was a justification for the claim that common practice indicates there
is a different shitah in tzenius, and it's that shitah which we are
following.

Common understanding is blurry and doesn't really make the point.
Removing common understanding to just talk about nidon didan,
the following:
: (A) as the opposite of pritzus.  Pritzus is inappropriate sexuality, and
: tznius is the opposite of that.

is not relevent.

: (B) the use of tznius in tzanua laleches - which is a lot closer to anavah -
: in fact this is often translated as walking humbly with one's G-d.  The
: b'tzina, the privacy part of this, is not the public action, but the
: dedication of the heart toward G-dliness, rather than towards external
: reward.

: I can understand the desire by RHS (and others, Getzel Ellinson tries to do
: the same thing) to unite these two separate definitions...

But he doesn't touch (A) at all! He is saying that hatzneiach lekhes is
gender neutral, it's "just" that men have far more occasions where our
pursuit of anti-farhesia (tzenius-B) is overriden by something else.

(A note only the Mesorah crowd would appreciate: Since "anti-" ends in
a vowel, the word is "farhesia", not "parhesia".)

I therefore don't see how the rest of your paragraph applies:
:                           While RHS's formulation may appeal to the Western
: mind, which sometimes struggles with the idea that there is inappropriate
: sexuality - or at least inappropriate expression of sexuality, I don't think
: it is right or true to source....

He says noting about anti-peritzus / tzenius type A. Neither in accord
with the Western mind nor in opposition.

FWIW, I personally would propose a unifying definition -- peritzus is
the ultimate in drawing attention to oneself for a non-productive (in
fact counterproductive) purpose. But that's tangential since only
one end of the linkage is relevent.

:> But the line isn't my point. Whether it's an issue of 
:> tzeni'us or of anavah, it would still mean that accomodating 
:> feminist aspirations in the synagogue is actually enabling 
:> the further spread of middos that don't fit the Torah's ideal.

: Again, I have a basic problem with the whole thesis that the ban on women
: having aliyos has anything to do with tznius or anavah.  The gemora says
: quite straightforwardly that the reason why women cannot have aliyos is
: because of kovod hatzibbur....

And now we reach what was obviously a basic inability for me to make
my point clearly.

So, a step back.

There are two levels of issue: halachic and sociological.

The halachic issues can well rule out women having aliyos, or being
dayanim, or whatever else. (And do.) I'm not addressing that.

Say one believes that there is no concept of "rabbi" today, and therefore
a woman should be able to call herself "rabbi" as much as a man. It's
just a statement about knowledge and ability, and not different in kind
than my relying on my wife's kashrus decisions in the kitchen (only in
degree).

I'm arguing that even if that is what I concluded, with no specific issur
involved there are reasons that have the force of halakhah not to make
such changes.

When making a change in how we worship, one has to decide if it's a
step forward or a step away from the Torah's goals, do we accomodate or
resist? Because this is an innovation, sociological and aggadic issues
actually effectively become halachic prohibitions. RYBS would call this
prohibiting for political reasons. Although that usage I think abuses
the word "political" and puts an unnecessarily negative sound to it.

I am only dealing with these beyind-the-specifically prohibited issues.
And my argument is that it's a step away from the Torah's ideal, and
therefore we lack the permission to make the innovation.

So RMS doesn't have to worry that by my giving a weak argument I may be
giving away the farm to someone who can dismiss it. My argument is in
addition to the halachic one, not instead of it.

I think part of the confusion was that I used the words hutrah and
dechuyah, putting people in a halachic mindset. I think another part is
that at least on of the other participants in the conversation doesn't
really believe in the idea of values that need to be addressed beyond
halakhah. The issue I'm raising may be outside of his worldview, or
perhaps on the very borders.

Given that, now I can discuss the specific element of that ideal that I
am raising, that of tzeni'us in the (B) anti-farhesia sense of the word.

On Thu, Jul 16, 2009 at 10:45:23AM +0100, Chana Luntz wrote:
: But synagogue is not supposed to be quiet worship, and quiet worship is only
: one of a number of idealised forms of worship...

Isn't the idea of tefillah betzibbur to be part of the corporate entity
of the tzibur rather than only being an individual (which you could do
without the tzibbur)?

...
: The problem with the person pushing for a place at the bimah or the rabbi's
: shtender is not because these do not involve quiet worship.  The problem
: with the person pushing is because *pushing* is generally all about *I*, not
: about HaShem - and, worship, is supposed to be, to state the obvious, all
: about Hashem.

I think the problem has subtle nuances between the extremes you give. And
this touches upon R"Dr Meir Shinnar's point about others second-guessing
motives.

On Tue, Jul 14, 2009 at 02:44:47PM -0400, R' Meir Shinnar wrote:
: I would argue that the problem of tzeniut is one of seeking the limelight
: for the sake of being in the limelight - not of getting or being in the
: limelight....

By saying that there is an element of X in the decision, one isn't
excluding elements of Y. A person who is used to confusion "really
accomplishing something" with activities that get more attention will
want to serve HQBH in a more blatant way. Not because they are thinking
about themselves rather than Hashem. But because of a misconception
about what work is important.

She's a conceptual daughter of the woman who chose a career because being
at home wasn't fulfilling. Okay, the work could be more frustrating,
or the company not taxing your intellect might get to you. But this
notion that you aren't accomplishing as much being a stay-at-home mom
is both common in the general population (beyond the eiruv) and false.

Given that she internalized elements of that error, she wants to serve
HQBH in important -- ie more recognizable by others -- ways.

And what I'm arguing about tzeni'us is that this error brings us away
from where the Torah wants us to go. It is a definition of value that
reflects not knowing the internalizing the whole anavah-tzenius axis
of values.

Yes, this already happened in her workplace. And for that matter,
between man's "bezei'as apekha tokhal lekhem" and his numerous mitzvos
asei shehazman gerama, man has so many cases where he puts aside his
pursuit of tzenius that many of us lose sight of it altogether.

Until now, women have been able to maintain kol kevudah bas melekh
penimah. Do we have reshus to create more situations that defy that?

Nu, so I see the argument that yoatzot create greater shemiras taharas
hamishpachah, so that particular modification has more pros than cons.
And having the power of a Rn Jungreis on the kiruv scene also has more
pros than cons. (What I meant by saying "dechuyah", but am now phrasing
differently.) The loss on the tzeni'us front is more than offset by
something else.

RnCL objected in this later email because:
: The attitude is a problem.  But you are then going on to confuse the
: attitude with the object. It is the classic alcoholics  attitude...

Not really, because the burden of proof rests on the innovator. I'm
saying that the status quo has advantages, and am not suggesting new
bans.

We're talking about having sufficient pro vs con to justify the
construction of new religious insitutions. Saying that other violations
of that con exist in situations reasons beyond our control doesn't
change that.

Returning to RnCL's first email:
: The issue is much more fundamental than that.  "Lo kum b'yisroel k'Moshe
: od."  Reasonably fundamental principle could we say?  But you are
: disagreeing with that. You are saying that Moshe would have been greater if
: he had not had to have a public role...

I'm saying his tzni'us would have been greater, and perhaps that means
that even the anav mikol adam would have been even more of an anav.

Pro-vs-con assessment meant that at times you pay the price because
you're getting something far more valuable in exchange.

Returning to RMS's email, he quoted me and replied:
:> Mah beinaihu? Is not tzeni'us one middah among the set we call "having
:> good manners"?

: it isn't that zniut isn't good manners, it is that the focus is on manners
: rather than zniut....(and the proof is that we don't enforce zniut in the
: ways that RJR has suggested or in multiple other ways)  - it just isn't a
: value in communal life..

I wasn't trying to set up tzeni'us vs manners, but middos vs manners. I
don't think "manners" exists in the Jewish worldview. They are an
artificial subdivision of middos.

Notice that all this means that if someone can show that the payoff
exceeds the price in tzeni'us, my adaptation of RHS's argument has no
pragmatic outcome.

But saying they're acting lishmah doesn't accomplish that, if their
lishmah is based on a perception of the world that we're supposed to
discourage.

:-)BBii!
-Micha

(Off-topic PS: while I tend to write "haShabbos", I write "Hashem"
rather than RnCL's "HaShem". To my mind, "haSham" would be a reference
to G-d's name. The modern qinui is a word bifnei atzmah whose etymology
is the+name and I don't want to draw attention to the original pieces of
the word. Doesn't 100% work, since there are binyanim like "Lashem". I
mention this because it has to do with the topic of when does a qinui
get promoted into a sheim.)

-- 
Micha Berger             A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
mi...@aishdas.org        as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org   other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507      matters?              - Rav Yisrael Salanter


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