Avodah Mailing List

Volume 26: Number 162

Tue, 11 Aug 2009

• 1. Re: School Tuition + Fundraising (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 2. Re: Ben Sorer Umoreh (Akiva Blum)
• 3. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Meir Shinnar)
• 4. Re: School Tuition + Fundraising (Elazar M. Teitz)
• 5. Re: School Tuition + Fundraising (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 6. some halachot of moser (Daniel Eidensohn)
• 7. Re: School Tuition + Fundraising (Stuart Feldhamer)
• 8. Re: School Tuition + Fundraising (rabbirichwol...@gmail.com)
• 9. Re: Halachah, Mussar, Qabbalah (Micha Berger)
• 10. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (David Riceman)
• 11. Re: Tzeni'us and gender roles (Chana Luntz)

[Mod note: I let this conversation continue because of the bit about
mesayei'ah. We can't just discuss school payment structures on Avodah --
that's what Areivim is for! -micha]

Rabbi Akiva: :-)
> But I've heard arguments that under certain circumstances, the
> "scholarship donation" very well might be. Similarly, I have vague
> recollections (it was decades ago) that I was able to deduct the
> afterschool fees.
> Akiva Miller"

I was told many times
If any fee is required then it's not deductible, since it legally is
tuition. (That includes required journal ads). We had required scrip
one year (about $5000-$6000). One could BUY one's way out of course,
so it was not 100% coerced.

And if people are deducting required fees - then we cross from lack of
yosher into various forms of cheating. (No P'saq intended)

Arguably, schools that wink at this might be guilty mamash of mesaya
lidvar aveira.

Now if the scholarship is mamash voluntary it IS deductable. We do know
people who opted out their last year from this "voluntary" scholarship -
knowing that the school could no longer pressure the parents

KT
RRW

Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org 
> [mailto:avodah-boun...@lists.aishdas.org] On Behalf Of Daniel Israel


Akiva Blum wrote:
> >See Sanhedrin 71a. Hagohos haBach learns that it is intrinsically 
> >impossible.
> 
> The loshon in the gemara is "lo hayah, v'lo l'asid lihiyos."  It 
> would seem to me that pshat in the gemara is that it is impossible. 
>   If it is merely unlikely, how could the gemara know that it won't 
> ever happen in the future?
> 
> The Bach simply gives a sevarh why it is impossible.
> 

But the Gemara then brings two more cases with the same "lo hayah, v'lo l'asid
lihiyos" and both of them are cases which would be extremely unlikely, but not
necessarily impossible.

Akiva

me
>
> : You adopted this argument, and out of this Brisker argument developed
> : a far reaching theory of modesty - and one practical implication of
> : this is the consequence for women - and positions such as maharat.
RMB
> I didn't really extend RHS's argument as much as shift it. RHS argued in
> Brisker terms of chalos, and thus stating it directly in the language
> of pesaq (although one shouldn't confuse a parashah sheet essay with
> a teshuvah). I was adopting in more Telzher terms, or perhaps more
> accurately outright mussar terms, and therefore was stating in terms of
> the need for a "political pesaq" to preserve Jewish norms. The difference
> in worldview between a Brisker and myself meant that the notion was
> severely recast in translation from RHS's statement to mind.
>
> FWIW, I think the practical implication on men is far greater. Because
> it implies that men, who already occupy leadership positions, are called
> upon to make sure that their leadership is really warranted. Do they
> bring something to the table that others can't or aren't, or is much of
> it a pursuit of kibud?
I understand the desire to preserve Jewish norms, and agree that there
has to be a discussion.  However, we have to be sure that in order to
preserve Jewish norms, we do not destroy other norms......
That has certain specific meanings.  First, there is the issue of our
limited ability to issue general gzerot in the post talmudic area.
This has specifc issues for the notion of political psak - because
political psak is essentially such a gzera - extending the limits
beyond the text -  and as such, is one that is only valid for one's
own community - not in general.  Furthermore, stating it as a
political psak immediately concedes  that the problem is not intrinsic
with the issue at hand - otherwise one would could do a real psak - an
but with broader goals - and here the quesiton is what those goals
are.

But the second is that the Jewish norms involved have to be authentic
Jewish norms.  I understand the novelty in pulbic roles for women -
but you are basing your opposition on a norm that is not a Jweish
norm, and even created out of whole cloth. TO
> : Objections.
> : ? ? ? a) This model of modesty is one that in practice is not followed by
> : the general Jewish community. (I and many others have pointed out many
> : examples)
RMB
> I don't consider this relevent.
It is extremely relevant - because it argues that the opposition is
not based on classical Jewish norms as understood by the community -
it is invented for the sake of the opposition - and is as much a
novelty as what it is trying to oppose  (Indeed, a stronger case can
be made for a political psak against the norm that you are proposing -
becuase, as argued later, such a norm is destructive to the Jewish
community..)Oppposing one change because one wants another change is
legitimate - but it is hardly persuarsive as preserving of our norms.

> : ? ? ? b) Not only is it not followed in practice, it is not viewed as an
> : ideal that we are unable to fully implement, and there is literature
> : against it.
>
> This I think is due to an oversimplification of my position. As is this:
> : ? ? ? c) Not only is it not viewed as an ideal, it actually represents an
> : ideal that is profoundly immoral, dangerous to the Jewish community,
> : and of foreign origin. ?((t is this last point that made the
> : discussion so heated - and I confess that I find it difficult to
> : understand how someone so morally sophisticated and sensitive adn
> : Micha could adopt such a position)
>
This is not an oversimplicfication.  In pubilic policy terms, it it is
the actual, practical implication of your policy.

> And the bottom line about what's missing from RMS's depiction of my
> position is that I agree with:
> : ? ? ? d) Even if one were to accept this definition of modesty with its
> : restrictions as an ideal, it actually doesn't solve the issue of
> : women's roles - because the underlying issue of public roles for
> : women, such as yoetzet halacha, to'enet, high school tanach teacher,
> : or maharat (all revolutions in some form or other), is not satisfying
> : the base need for public adulaton of the individual - as viewed by
> : some of the critics - but satisfying a communal need that has been
> : identified by its leaders. ?The question then becomes of what are the
> : needs of the community.
>
> Very much so. I'm saying that such decisions need an active encounter
> with the change, and a real assessment of pros vs cons. I am saying that
> while RHS presented the notion in Brisker terms, the idea of tzeni'us /
> anavah / avoiding kibud is an identified and significant "con".

It is not a con for tzedaka dinners, it is not a con at weddings, it
is not a con for any other aspect of Jewish life  - and the one place
where one can argue (I think wrongly, as in previous go rounds), that
it is codified - that is, for asking shliche tzibbur to daven - it is
routinely ignored because of tircha detzibbura - suggesting that it
does not take much public need to over ride this.  My argument is not
an oversimplification of your argument - it merely points that no
matter how sophisticated the position, putting an extra barrier in
front of public service - even one as well intentioned with good
mussar reasons - ends up making it more dificult for people to do
public service, and fewer will - and therefore has not been a Jewish
value (it seems far more of a Christian ideal...)

You find this new value compelling - and if everyone were like you, it
might not be destructive of public enterprise - but our history, and
nature of public practice

> Also, that this worldview is diametrically opposed to the western one
> where significance is too often identified with prominence. And third,
> that much of feminism derives from this identification as well.

Besides the fact that signficance and prominence have an
identification in tradtional Jewish sources as well (as RDR
documented..), I think you are misrading the issue (and misreading
feminism).
The issue is not prominence but participation - being part of.the community.

> So the question for every step that changes the role of women, from Beis
> Yaakov to seminaries to yoatzot to WTGs to Maharat, is whether we can
> define an offsetting pro. And moreso, a positive associated with that
> claim that doesn't presume the conclusion.

You haven't defined a con.

>
> And so, it's not placing personal development ahead of the kelal until
> one decides that the con of pursuing kibud outweighs the pro of serving
> the kelal -- and I never said anything remotely like that!

It is the natural implciation of your position

> Rather, I said that one must actually identify a pro of equal import
> to the negative of making major societal changes to accomodate a value
> directly derived from a person's right to assume prominence.

I agree that one has to identify a pro to justify social and religious
changes.  What I disagee with is the nature of the con - as well as
what you assume the proposed social changes are.

Again, a con that does not figure realistically (even if it is a value
- over which we disagree) in any practical decision making (even
though it clearly could) in any other area is not one thqt is one that
I worry about - the pro I can identify (and that RCL also identified)
are clearly of gerater weright than most of the pros that routinely
overweigh this value.

This does not mean that one has to accept the pro - but you have
misidentified the con.
I would add that viewing the primary issue of the right of the
individual to prominence betrays teh focus on the individual t - but
is an utter misread of the situation.  A woman who invites her
teacher, say, to read the ketuban under the chuppa is not looking for
prominence - is looking for particiaption of her representative - not
because her teacher is a publicity hound (or that RHS is a publicity
hound for reading the ketuba when he is honored).  A better model is
the classic one of rabbanim allowing semicha of korbanot to women for
nachat ruach - recognizing that sometimes, participating and being
part of the action (even if only secondary) is important.



> (This being the distinction between encountering an idea and accepting it,
> this time on the side of whether one grapples with tzeni'us or simply
> follows it, rather than on the side of confronting moderinity rather
> than assuming it as a given.)
>
> It is unsound to say that we should accomodate rather than work to
> remove a desire for Maharatot because there are women who feel they
> belong in the role and women who feel they want to turn to someone in
> that role. That circularly presumes that the religious desires involved
> are positive ones -- the very notion under question!

The issue is not women who feel that they belong in the role  - but a
community that thinks that they need women in the role. That is the
major distinction.  Again, one can argue against hthe changes - but
you are again focusing on the individual rather than the community.

> Speaking of which, I feel to see the distinction recently posted by
> RJJB in the name of RMT:
>> That's the R' Tendler expansion on RMF's letter that theoretically
>> allows women's tefillah groups. RMF allowed them if the motivations of
>> the women were pure, not driven by feminism. RMT clarified that this
>> was pure theory, that RMF didn't believe such women could exist.
>
> Isn't that a false dichotomy? Let's assume, since we have no reason not
> to, that the motives are purely religious. (It's unfair to assume we're
> dealing with women who care more about making some feminist point than
> tefillah.) However, those motives are based on a particular worldview. If
> the worldview is suboptimal, then the purity of the motive doesn't redeem
> it from being consequentially suboptimal.
First, suboptimal is different from trafe.  Second, the issue is to
develop religiously - and the question is, how do you develop
religiously, given one's background.  One can argue (a la mussar) for
a complete reworking of the individual first - but one can also argue
that for a given individual of a given background, a certain approach
will achieve the desired religious effect better.


>
> On Sat, Aug 1, 2009 at 11:46pm BST, Rn Chana Luntz replied to my post:
> : So, I was asking you to do that - and specifically about the change that has
> : gone on in the lives of young women -prior to their marriage. ?As I tried to
> : indicate, the reality is in non charedi circles, young women are spending a
> : decade or two post puberty but prior to marriage. ?Obviously at least the
> : first two to four years of that is indeed forced upon us (depending on the
> : dina d'malchusa dina of wherever it is you live - in England you need to be
> : 16, but other parts of the world differ). ? Please explore whether the rest
> : is indeed forced upon us? ?Do the pros of later marriage outweigh the cons?
> ...
>
> Yes, this determination has to be made. (You invoked my children, but
> that just demonstrates that you don't have children of that age yourself,
> yet. My daughter came back from sem, and all I can do is give points of
> information, not make decisions.)
>
> I find this and your post in general off-topic, since there are different
> pros and cons with each change. Saying that we need more yoatzot doesn't
> mean we need Maharatot, and saying that girls need more role models of
> their own geneder doesn't imply we need more of either.
>
> The Maharat is a unique invention in that it intentionally shadows
> the rav in both education and future job. It is on those criteria in
> particular that I question its net positive value. If the woman would be
> a yoetzet, or give classes to the women in shul with no more a title than
> Nechamah Leibowitz's, would anything be lost? Would she be any less of
> a crush-proof (for the girls and single women in her class) role model,
> any less of a contributor?

If the main issue is one of kavod, why does it matter whether the
maharat shaodws a rav or not, if both are public positions with
kavod????  YOur argument here suggests that you see that there are
other issues involved - and I do agree that there are other issues -
but they are not what you identify as kavod

> learning pragmatic halakhah due to this change in metzi'us.
>
> On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 02:55pm EDT, R David Riceman joined the conversation:
> : I think one of the problems here is, in the mythical saying of Tonto,
> : "Who do you mean by we, paleface?" In the mythical past all Jews in one
> : small town followed the same customs and consulted the same Rabbi. ?Ever
> : since 19th century Warsaw, if not earlier, and certainly nowadays in the
> : US and Israel, we live cheek by jowl with lots of different types of
> : Jews as well as non-Jews. ?Expecting conformity beyond halachic norms
> : strikes me, in our context, as both unjust and absurd.
> ...
>
> And yet, we're discussing a societal change. I see only three outcomes
> for the future of American O on this question: either we accept the
> institution of Maharatot, we do not, or we end up two movements.

That mat be a self fulfilling prophecy.  However, on this basis, the
question is just as much whether one community should accept
maharatot, versus whether the other community should reject them - and
if the only argument is a polilical psak based on a value that is
clearly not of significance - this is more an indictment of the
rejectionists....

> (BTW, I'm not that pale.)
>
> ..
> : women.
>
> As above, I think the advantage of RHS's formulation that it's not about
> "man lecturing woman". It has as much to say to someone like myself, who
> manages to work bragging about my teaching gigs into more conversations
> than necessary -- as you yourself pointed out earlier in this thread.
>
> Second, I am nervous when I hear someone turning this into a gender-war
> thing, that turning to a rav for hora'ah is somehow related to abusive
> men who use gender norms to self-justify their controlling natures

HOwever, basing the disucssion on a admitted political psak on a value
that is not utilized anywhere else in halacha is exactly proof for
this proposition.......

Again, one can make legitimate arguments against the innovation of
women's roles.  I think that those opposed have to come up with
alternative, realistic solutions to the real changes of the community,
but that is a different discussion.  However, the discussion based on
an invented model of  tzeniut is not, IMHO, a tenable argument, and
does suggest " abusive men who use gender norms to self justify their
controlloing natures" - which is so completely out of character for
RMB that this discussion puts me at a loss..

Meir Shinnar

 

 
 . 
R' Rich Wolpoe described the following fee structure of our schools as being somehow lacking in yashrus:

>Instead of asking for a lump sum - say $10,000, you sometimes get
> $500 journal ad
> $1500 "scholarship" donation
> $500 registration
> $2000 "scrip" obligation (worth $100)
> $500 raffle
> Etc.
> And finally the remainder is the "tuition"
> But any "honest" accountant will tell you it's all tuition
> and none is deductible.
> So what's the point? 

     There are several points, and there is no lack of yashrus to any of
     it.  Indeed, as the head of a school which charges many of the above
     (not the raffle and the scholarship obligation), I take the accusation
     personally.
     To take the above examples: the journal ad, scholarship donation and
     raffle are generally "give or get" obligations; that is, the parents
     are expected to solicit them from family, friends or business
     associates. As such, if they choose to contribute the money
     themselves, it is as legitimately tax-deductible to them as it would
     be to whomever they would solicit it from.  The "scrip" obligation is
     a true zeh nehene v'zeh lo chaseir: the parent is obligated to
     purchase a certain amount of scrip (actually, supermarket gift
     certificates) which can be used at full face value; the school
     purchases them at a 5% discount.  Some parents prefer to pay the
     school its 5% profit rather than purchase the scrip.  Neither the
     purchase, nor the payment in lieu of purchase, is tax deductible.	As
     has been pointed out, these are usually per-family, rather than
     per-student, obligations, in recognition of the fact that having more
     children does not give a parent more avenues for soliciting fu
 nds, and does not increase supermarket spending proportionally to the number of mouths to feed.
     Registration fees are separate from tuition because they are
     non-refundable if the family decides to send a child to a different
     school.  It is imposed not only to defray the costs involved to the
     school, but to prevent parents from holding places in more than one
     school.  They would have no compunctions about doing it if it would
     not cost them; meanwhile, the school is making decisions about teacher
     hirings, room assignments, etc., based on the number of registered
     students -- assumptions which entail cost and effort, and which could
     prove incorrect if students could be withdrawn.
     There is also a book and activity fee charged, the latter to avoid
     having to collect fees for every class trip or activity.  None of
     these various fees is tax-deductible any more than is tuition.
     One reason for separating the fees is because there is no scholarship
     available for them.  They represent costs assessed to all parents
     alike.  It is only on the actual tuition portion -- the cost of
     instruction -- that scholarships can be applied for.
     It also happens to be "minhag ham'dina."  College bills have a
     plethora of fees over and above tuition (albeit without the
     fund-raising obligations), and I have yet to hear anyone claim that it
     is somehow immoral of them to do so.
EMT
 
____________________________________________________________
Need cash? Click to get a loan.
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When shuls charge dues and extra for seats on yamim noraim that's different

Many people go away for yamim noraim and therefore are not necessarily
stuck buying seats. The fee is separate.

RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

R' Breitowitz has an excellent shiur on the subject - he does miss a 
number of sources but conceptually it is very good.

http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/717269/Rabbi_Yitzchak_
Breitowitz
/On_the_Topic_of_Mesira 


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REMT:

"The "scrip" obligation is a true zeh nehene v'zeh lo chaseir: the parent is
obligated to purchase a certain amount of scrip (actually, supermarket gift
certificates) which can be used at full face value; the school purchases
them at a 5% discount.  Some parents prefer to pay the school its 5% profit
rather than purchase the scrip. "

I don't want to comment on the rest of the post, some of which I agree with
and some of which I don't, but this bears further examination. You say that
zeh nehene v'zeh lo chaseir. If I'm interpreting you correctly, you think
that essentially, the store is giving the school a charitable donation
(which no doubt they are taking a deduction for). The parents are paying for
what they would have paid for anyway, and the reason why it's good for the
school is that the stores, out of the goodness of their hearts, are giving
the school a 5% discount on the certificates.

However, this only works if the parents are actually planning on shopping at
the stores regardless. Maybe the parents had no interest in shopping at
those stores, and now they're essentially being forced to do so. Why would
they not want to shop there? Hypothetically speaking, maybe their prices are
on average 10% higher than the large supermarkets that don't accepts the
scrips. If that's the case, then the stores' motivations make a lot of
sense. They win, the school wins, and the parents lose out.

Of course, the parents can just decide to pay the school the 5% profit, and
some no doubt do this not out of the goodness of their hearts, because they
say, "why should we and the school both profit (zeh nehene v'zeh lo
chaseir), I want only the school to profit", but because it isn't worth it
to them economically. In effect what you've done is set another economic
obligation on them, and I don't see why this should be in any way separate
from the tuition burden.

Stuart

 

 

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REMT
> There are several points, and there is no lack of yashrus to any of it

The point was intended to elicit introspection. Reflection, and to see
if complex tutitio documents and tactics were in effect obscuring a
straightforward WYSIWIG approach.

There was no intention to attack individuals nor to put people on
the defensive.
The point was to highlight how tricky techniques might engender or
encourage tricky people. I think "immoral" is a bit too strong.

Is pricing $1.99 - as a psychological ploy - immoral? Not imho. But it
is a form of gamesmanship in the sense of Eric Bernes usage - "Games
People Play".

I remember a raffle many years ago. The first prize was a lottery ticket
for a Million dollar lottery. But the unwary might have been easily
befuddled to think that the first prize itself was the million dollars.

KT
RRW
Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 11:55:25AM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: First, I note that your post is not about conflating halacha with
: minhag, or conflating halacha with chumra. If that's what you were
: writing about, I would understand the distinctions which you're trying
: to clarify. But that's NOT what your post is about. Your post is about
: conflating halacha wih mussar, and halacha with kabbala. And that's
: where you've lost me.

The way you phrase it, I'm even more confused. I understood the conflation
of mussar/qabbalah/machashavah with halakhah as being about minhag, or
choice of pesaq, or personal hanhagah. (The same three options I raised
when I proposed that "chumrah" is a homonym for three different things.)
Those are the ways that thought touches practice, no?

But that's not why I replied, since I think that would just be restating
an aspect of RAM's point.

Rather, it's because I recently found the following in my Google Reader
<http://hirhurim.blogspot.com/2009/08/inducing-labor.html>, "Inducing
Labor" by R' Aryeh Enkin. It, like the teshuvos is summarizes, relates
such aggadic concepts as mazal, time of saqanah (and protection when
the birth is at it own time), etc... into a discussion of whether it's
permissable to induce labor in cases where there is no danger to mother
or child.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I long to accomplish a great and noble task,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it is my chief duty to accomplish small
http://www.aishdas.org   tasks as if they were great and noble.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                              - Helen Keller

Micha Berger wrote:
> FWIW, I think the practical implication on men is far greater. Because
> it implies that men, who already occupy leadership positions, are called
> upon to make sure that their leadership is really warranted. Do they
> bring something to the table that others can't or aren't, or is much of
> it a pursuit of kibud?
>   
This is a very weird paragraph.  You started with a definition of tzniut 
which purports to be gender neutral.  You deduce that women should be 
forbidden to have public offices, and that men should do introspection 
before accepting them, and then you conclude that this is harder on men 
than on women.  But the difference which I find glaring is that you let 
individual men determine their own choice, but you make the choice for 
women.

I think this is the heart of the problem, but I'll comment on a couple 
of side issues.

> (You invoked my children, but
> that just demonstrates that you don't have children of that age yourself,
> yet. My daughter came back from sem, and all I can do is give points of
> information, not make decisions.)
>   
It seems to me that you are missing RCL's point.  Surely by the time you 
sent your daughter to seminary she was old enough to marry (I just 
looked it up on the web, which is not necessarily reliable, but in NJ 
she can marry at 17 with parental consent, and at 16 with the consent of 
a judge).  We homeschool, and our only child is a boy, so I don't 
actually know, but surely there are Jewish high schools in NJ which 
encourage children to marry as soon as possible.  Why didn't you send 
your daughter to one of those high schools and then marry her off, 
rather than send her to a school which encourages further education at a 
seminary?
> And yet, we're discussing a societal change. I see only three outcomes
> for the future of American O on this question: either we accept the
> institution of Maharatot, we do not, or we end up two movements.
>   
"Movement" is an ambiguous word; we use it to describe both Hassidus and 
Reform.  I don't see that there would be a huge problem if there were 
some Jews who were shomer mitzvos but ordained women rabbis, even when 
the rest of us didn't.  In the absence of contrary history it should be 
less of a problem than some Jews davening shacharis lechatchila at 10 AM 
even though the rest of us don't.

David Riceman

 
RMB writes:

> Yes, this determination has to be made. (You invoked my children, but
> that just demonstrates that you don't have children of that 
> age yourself, yet. My daughter came back from sem, and all I can do is
give 
> points of information, not make decisions.)

I don't have children of that age myself yet, but I am certainly expecting
it to be exactly the same for my children.  But that is because of a
conscious choice on my and my husband's part, to raise them within a modern
orthodox community and not a charedi one.  I am also fully expecting that if
and when shidduchim questions come up, *they* will the be the primary point
of call for such discussions, and I will indeed give no more than points of
information, if that.

But those I know who have chosen to raise their children within a more
charedi framework are dealing with the matter very differently.  The primary
contact point with the shadchan is them, the parents.  They are the ones who
talk primarily to the shadchan, they are the ones who seem to be given the
lists of names first, they are the ones who do the investigations (via
phoning up Roshei Yeshivos and other contacts).  Now the people I know do
seem to have reasonably good communication with their offspring, and they
take what it is that their offspring say they want very seriously (looking
eg for somebody who is "lively" or "wants to live in Israel" or "has the
right connections with the kollel in which he wants to learn" or whatever it
is that their offspring regard as very important).  But, the description of
only giving "points of information", not making decisions is a vast
underdescription of their role.  The reality is that the shidduch candidate
may never even know about a potential other candidate if the parents decide
not to pursue that person.  

Now the people I know find themselves in this role because they made a
positive and active choice to site themselves within the charedi community,
not within the modern orthodox one - it is a direct outcome of some definite
choices that they made, including the choice of elementry school for their
children (eg Beis Ya'akov).  

That is not to say that one's offspring may not have similar choices.  A
person, certainly from the modern orthodox community, can look for and find
as a shidduch somebody who wants to move rightward, they can make equivalent
choices for their children, including of schools, and they seem to then find
themselves pretty much in the charedi system.  Although as the schools gets
more and more oversubcribed, I think it is becoming harder, and part of the
hysteria about getting one's child into the right school has a lot to do
with the questions that are then asked by parents on the other side of the
shidduch system many years later.  After all, when presented with lists of
eligibles, the initial winnowing is most easily done by institution.

If however, the system fails initially, ie months and years pass without a
shidduch being successfully concluded, my impression is (and remember I am
describing this from the outside) that there is then a move to deal more
directly with the young person in question (by then they are older, after
all), along with offering them people who are considered more "flawed" by
the system.  This might possibly be able to be used a way of moving out of
the system.  If the person turns down all the offers of shidduchim that come
their way, until they are old enough that people stop really going to the
parents and they move into a different system, where they are the primary
contact, they may also be able to find someone who is on the fringes or
thinking along a different derech. 

But within this system, clearly there is an understanding that this is the
ideal, ie this is the right way for shidduchim to be made.  And people very
clearly buy into the school system because they buy into the shidduch system
(and hence they buy into the demands of the school system, which may
included things like, for example, getting rid of their television set or
internet connection, if they had one in the first place, or changing their
dressing style, in order to get into the school system, in order to get a
higher ranking within the shidduch system).  While those of us who are
choosing more modern orthodox schools for our children are, inter alia,
doing this because we do not buy into this system, and expect and hope that
our children will develop more autonomy.  Now, to the extent you switch your
children from a more right wing school to a more modern orthodox school, you
are highly likely to change the way that marriages are concluded for your
children, ie you may end up effectively opting out of the pure shidduch
system.  And if done for the happiness of the child, you are putting a
premium on personal autonomy and happiness (perhaps even over that of other
children) that other parents would not (and it is very doubtful that
historically such a choice would have been made, absent modernity).  And it
needs to be acknowledged that one of the consequences of that choice, is in
the vast majority of cases, later marriages for one's children.

> I find this and your post in general off-topic, since there 
> are different pros and cons with each change. Saying that we need more 
> yoatzot doesn't mean we need Maharatot, and saying that girls need more
role models of
> their own geneder doesn't imply we need more of either.
> 
> The Maharat is a unique invention in that it intentionally shadows
> the rav in both education and future job. It is on those criteria in
> particular that I question its net positive value. If the 
> woman would be a yoetzet, or give classes to the women in shul with no
more 
> a title than Nechamah Leibowitz's, would anything be lost? Would she be
any less of
> a crush-proof (for the girls and single women in her class) 
> role model, any less of a contributor?
> 
> But in general, each such decision is unique. You're grouping them all
> together as though the pros of education for college-bound 
> women are the same as the pros of some of those Jewishly educated women 
> becoming toanot leBD legeirushin. If I were to address the other questions

> you raise, my original point would be lost in the volume of the numerous 
> issues in each.

I don't think I was grouping them together.  I certainly barely touched on
yoetzet (which is, after all, a role that only comes into play after
marriage).  Nor did I mentione toanot at all.  What I specifically focussed
on, throughout my postings, was the fact that, as a consequence of
modernity, women are getting married later, ie you have single women around
at ages and in numbers you never had before.

Now some of those women are in seminary and some of those women are not.
And I have tried to discuss both groups, but primarily the latter.
 
> BY had a simple pro-vs-con -- either educate the girls who 
> were getting a secular education, or lose them to yahadus. Very 
> straightforward. The CC, BTW, phrased his endorsement in pesaq terms --
that learning what
> was necessary to be a shomeres Torah umitzvos is defined in part by
> this reality, and thus the original pesaq is now broader than just
> learning pragmatic halakhah due to this change in metzi'us.

Well yes and no.  You are right about the original Beis Ya'akov.  But the
*seminaries* ie the *post high school educational system* is not what the CC
was describing.  He was describing providing girls with an elementary or at
most an early high school education.  What we have today is unquestionably
an extension, in fact quite a major extension, on what the CC was dealing
with.  And it is certainly not clear that if you abolished all post high
school seminaries, you would lose girls to yahadus.  Do you *really* believe
that?  Especially if you beefed up the shidduch system I was describing
above, so as to enable the majority of girls to marry during their last few
years of high school.  So what I was trying to describe was the way that the
seminary system has morphed from that envisioned by the CC.  

But while this was a tangental part of my posting, I was primarily
discussing the situation of those not in seminary and not in marriage.
These are mostly college bound women, women in the workplace, women home
from seminary etc.  A yoetzet, as it is currently produced, has nothing to
say to these women - the subject on which they are trained and knowledgable
is completely inapplicable to them.  Your Nechama Leibotwitz's do not, in
general, give classes to women in shul - except as a guest lecturer.  There
are no funds to support such a person.  Mostly those sort of people are
increasingly to be found operating out of women's seminaries -which is where
they primarily teach (and where they feel more comfortable, they are
fundamentally scholars, and this is a better environment for a scholar).

But your very suggestion is interesting.  Are you advocating creating a paid
position in which a woman without a title will give lectures to women in
shul?  It will need to be supported by the community of course, out of
community funds, the same way that a rabbi is.  But if you didn't happen to
know a local candidate for such a position, how would you advertise it?
"Wanted, woman to give classes to women at shul X - salary $$$".  Does this
deal with your concerns - ie if we advertised for a woman to fulfil this
role without a title?  RKB tried to suggest that such women should be called
yoetzot - ie to extend that role.  But that seems to fundamentally change
(and undermine) what a yoetzet actually is.  A yoetzet is somebody a woman
can go to with intimate nidah questions, knowing that that person has had
training in both medical and halachic aspects of hilchos nida - it seems to
me to be fundamentally confusing and problematic to make it a more general
term.


And let's focus for a moment on what a Rav of a community generally does.
Many in fact have been predicting the demise of the community Rav ,due to
everybody going off to yeshiva and sem, and hence having more of a
connection with their rosh yeshiva than with their local Rav or an
environment where people prefer to run off to a known gadol.  However, they
don't actually seem to be dying, and if you look at what they actually do,
one can see why. While a Rav may sometimes sit on a beis din, that is not
his fundamental role, nor is it generally required.   The Rabbi's job is,
more than anything else, to be the primary contact for and to inject a bit
of yiddishkeit into the lives of baalabatim who may have nowhere else to go.
So, he gives a sermon on shabbas (and at barmitvahs and weddings and
funerals) which hopefully makes his listeners think.  He gives shiurim at
times when the community can find a few minutes to learn or to be inspired.
He provides guidance from a yahadus point of view on everything from grief
to joy to marital problems.  He is available when his community rings up in
a panic because the milky spoon has gone into the meaty pot or because the
are bothered by a haskafic problem or because something in their life has
gone badly wrong.  Ideally he also gives mussar and helps in midos growth
and provide a moral example. So long as you have baalabatim, you need a Rav.

And what I was trying to focus on was, what about the needs of single women
in such a community.   Is this woman that you have proposed will give
classes at the shul without a title also going to fulfil any or all of these
roles to the women?  For example, if the women are busy working all week,
and only make it to shul on shabbas, are you proposing that we should split
the shul, and while the Rav gives his drasha to the men, this woman should
talk to the women (or is she only going to give the occasional class at
inconvenient times or is she going to alternate with the Rav)?  Should this
woman's phone number be freely available, the way a Rav's traditionally is?
Or is it more important that these single women use the Rav for the phone
call type connections?  Does it matter if they feel unable to do so?  What
level of qualifications do you want to have on a woman applying for the job
?  Does it matter?  If the term Maharat meant doing all these things, with
an indication of basic halachic knowledge, would that satisify your concerns
(it would seem to satisfy RKB's, ie assuming the intention was meant clearly
not to be about gender equality, but to cater for the needs of women that
are identified as being currently being indequately met)?  Or is it too
dangerous to let the gender equality genie out of the bag?   Do you are
agree there are needs there that are not being met?  If so, how do we deal
with them?  And that goes back to my basic question, have you (and I)
according to you, made a mistake by putting our children into a modern
orthodox educational system that means they will not accept the shidduch
system as designed by the charedi world with the consequence of relatively
late marriage?

RMB writes:

> As above, I think the advantage of RHS's formulation that 
> it's not about "man lecturing woman". It has as much to say to someone
like 
> myself, who manages to work bragging about my teaching gigs into more 
> conversations than necessary -- as you yourself pointed out earlier in
this thread.

I fully understand that that is how it speaks to *you*.  What I was trying
to get you to see, however, is that is not how it speaks to everyone.  There
are other messages that can be derived from this.

> Second, I am nervous when I hear someone turning this into a 
> gender-war thing, that turning to a rav for hora'ah is somehow related to
abusive
> men who use gender norms to self-justify their controlling natures.

Not quite sure what you are getting at here - because I don't see any
discussion about turning to a rav for hora'ah - which is very personal and
hopefully taylored with abusive men.  I did discuss problematic dynamics
between single women and a rav, but I was at no time suggesting that the rav
was, or was likely to be, abusive.  The issue I did raise was about the
public stressing of the fundamental importance of the mida of tznius over
and above other midos to a general audience and whether this has dangers
(cons, as you would call it) as well as pros, that need to be thought about,
given the reality of the community we are dealing with.  

> : And I agree with RMB's example about OCD and the fact that 
> Torah observance
> : itself is open to abuse.
> 
> My example was actually about extra-halachic customs in hand 
> washing. I thought that some Qabbalah-based practice is closer to our case
than
> asking about din. After all, we can't ask questions about the 
> viability of following a halakhah.

But handwashing is indeed din - d'rabbanan perhaps, but din unquestionably.
The quabbalistic practices only add weight to the din.  But on the subject
of washing, lets take what always strikes me as even more difficult from an
OCD perspective than handwashing - how about checking for chatzizos before
immersion in a mikvah?  I do not have OCD tendencies, but that is the one
scenario that always strikes me as liable to bring out any such tendencies
anybody might have.  After all (especially if you are talking about tevilas
nida) we are talking about an issur kares if the dip is not done correctly,
and while (if you know something) you might be able to fall back on OK
b'dived on d'orisa principles, that is not exactly the l'chatchila approach
- and not the approach anybody with even the mildest form of OCD is going to
be able to take.

So I confess that if I was a kala teacher, or teaching hilchos nida (which I
*don't* let me stress), I would be very wary of laying it on too thick about
checking for chatzizos and stray hairs, and bits of skin (dandruff?) and
lumpy bits, etc etc. Because I could so easily see women getting so uptight
about it that they might struggle to get into the mikvah at all.  I am not
saying that one should not teach this, clearly one has to teach it, it is
indeed din after all, and yet I worry about dangers of emphasis  -especially
the kind of emphasis that one might get from a public lecture on taharas
mishpacha - and even though anybody stressing the point is not thinking
about OCD at all, but about those who are perhaps too sloppy in their
checking.  But maybe you disagree, and we should not be concerned with the
miut.  But if you are concerned with the miut, and not encouraging it, it is
probably worth exploring what it is that the miut uses to boost their
pathologies, and what sorts of things play into that.  On domestic violence,
for example, there is a wealth of literature about what are considered to be
risk factors (despite the common trop that domestic violence occurs amongst
all facets of society) and hence if one was seriously concerned about
reducing it, one might want to think about what might operate to reduce
those risk factors.  Not that these are exactly that easy, one of the ones
that pops up repeatedly is poverty, and we know exactly how easy it is to
eliminate that.  Which is why the debate is way more complicated than it has
appeared on Arevim (ie it can't be just Torah versus general society, one
has to look at whether the typical Torah lifestyle contains additional risk
factors (such as poverty) which perhaps adherence to Torah operates to
mininimise, which is a far more complicated equation).

This is only a sideline, as I have tried to indicate, in the same way that I
have generally tried to look at the pros and cons of early marriage, with
out reference to the fact that it too sometimes pops up as a risk factor for
domestic violence.

> Tir'u baTov!
> -Micha

Regards

Chana



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