Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 86

Wed, 24 Mar 2010

• 1. Re: Selling whiskey/bourbon (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 2. selling whiskey (Eli Turkel)
• 3. Re: Selling whiskey/bourbon (T6...@aol.com)
• 4. Re: kitniyot (T6...@aol.com)
• 5. Re: kitniyot (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: torah u-madda (T6...@aol.com)
• 7. Re: torah u-madda (Rich, Joel)
• 8. Re: Democracy and the Beit Din (Arie Folger)
• 9. Re: torah u-madda (Micha Berger)
• 10. Democracy and the Beit Din (Chana)
• 11. Re: Selling whiskey/bourbon (David Riceman)
• 12. selling whiskey/bourbon (Eli Turkel)
• 13. Re: Selling whiskey/bourbon (kennethgmil...@juno.com)
• 14. Re: Selling whiskey/bourbon (Micha Berger)

R' Micha Berger asked:

> Personally, I don't get the whole minhag of not selling
> chameitz gamur, but shopping after Pesach at a store that
> did. What, it's less ha'aramah to rely on his sale than
> on my own?

I had this same question a few years back. RMB is framing the question as comparing "his sale" and "my sale", and that's why it doesn't make sense.

But instead, frame the question in terms of "what problem do I run into
when selling my chometz before Pesach", and "what problem do I run into
when purchasing his chometz after Pesach". Now it is an entirely different
picture, because the former is an issur d'Oraisa of owning chametz on
Pesach, and the latter is an issur d'Rabanan of using/eating chametz
she'avar alav haPesach.

So what we have now is a fairly typical application of the concept of being
more machmir on d'Oraisos than on d'Rabanans, and while he won't sell his
own chametz gamur, he has no compunctions against buying/eating the chametz
gamur which someone else did sell.

I suppose it is okay to refer to "not selling chametz gamur" as a "minhag",
but referring to "not selling personally but shopping at such stores" as a
minhag is much trickier, because the latter cannot be expanded to be on a
community-wide basis. (If everyone avoids selling chametz gamur, there
would be no stores to buy sold-chametz from.)

Anyone who wants to adopt this practice of not selling chametz gamur would
be well advised to avoid owning any sort of food distribution business
which deals with chametz. Ironically, my understanding is that that's
exactly the group of people for whom Mechiras Chametz was originally
designed.

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Home Improvement Projects
Click here to find experienced pros to help with your home improvement project.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2131/c?cp=JvHgPnsgXF-sG6Uvln3pkwAAJ
z3zeK-F0bLcqGb51B0rOTOKAAYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADNAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAShAAAAAA=

<<Personally, I don't get the whole minhag of not selling chameitz gamur,
but shopping after Pesach at a store that did. What, it's less ha'aramah
to rely on his sale than on my own? Or do most of us not have stocked
pantries for which switching to and from Pesach isn't a hefsed meruba?>>

If one worries that the sale is not valid because of haarama or other reasons
then one would not sell only items that can lkead to a Torah prohibition.
"Chametz she-aver alav hapesach" is only a fine and so we would allow haaramah
even for chametz gamur.

The reason for selling whiskey for most of us is hefsed meruba. At
$40+ for a bottle
of a single malt scotch throwing out a few bottles is significant.
A friend of mine (in humor) said he would have a party right before
Pesach to get
rid of all his scotch.

In any case I was always taught that the origin of selling chametz was because
of all the Jews in Eastern Europe in the liquor business.


-- 
Eli Turkel

 

From: Micha Berger _micha@aishdas.org_ (mailto:mi...@aishdas.org) 

>>  Personally, I don't get the whole minhag of not selling chameitz gamur,
but  shopping after Pesach at a store that did. <<





>>>>>
Speculation:  Selling the food in a store or warehouse is more of a  "real" 
sale than selling half a box of cereal in your kitchen cupboard.
 

--Toby  Katz
==========

--------------------
 




-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20100323/941baae9/attachment-0001.htm>

 

From: Zev Sero _zev@sero.name_ (mailto:z...@sero.name) 

>> Cottonseed is  completely out of the question, because it grows on a
tree, and everyone  agrees that tree fruit are not included.  <<-- 
Zev  Sero                    
 
 


>>>>
I have no problem using cottonseed oil on Pesach but I wonder if it's true  
that it "grows on a tree."  It grows on a bush that dies (?) maybe like a  
banana?  If you could eat cotton would the bracha be ha'eitz or  ha'adamah?
 

--Toby  Katz
==========

--------------------
 




-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20100323/69b6354b/attachment-0001.htm>

T6...@aol.com wrote:  
> From: Zev Sero z...@sero.name <mailto:z...@sero.name>

>> Cottonseed is completely out of the question, because it grows on a
>> tree, and everyone agrees that tree fruit are not included.
                 

> I have no problem using cottonseed oil on Pesach but I wonder if it's 
> true that it "grows on a tree."  It grows on a bush that dies (?) maybe 
> like a banana?  If you could eat cotton would the bracha be ha'eitz or 
> ha'adamah?

Ha'etz.  It's a tree.  Tzmar *gefen*.  Nothing to do with a banana plant,
which is not in any way a tree.

-- 
Zev Sero                      The trouble with socialism is that you
z...@sero.name                 eventually run out of other people?s money
                                                     - Margaret Thatcher

 

From: Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com>
>> I attended  yesterday the annual torah u-madda conference
some partial notes

First  talk was from Rabbi Vitman rav hamachshir of Tnuva. He discussed
how today's  food business is heavily dependent on using bacteria ....
The third talk was  from R. Rabinowitz RY of Maale Adumim. ...
. There are now devices driven by  electric
currents in the brain. 
A practical application to to moving a  prosthesis by thought waves.
Is this a melacha or not? ....


The symposium at the end was on intelligent design with all  the
speakers coming out against it
as not being scientific


--  
Eli Turkel

 
>>>>>
 
Sounds like a fascinating and thought-provoking symposium.
 
Right at the end there, though, you have a good example of what's wrong  
with TuM.  They care way too much about what is and isn't "science" and  they 
believe that science has an exclusive claim on "truth."
 
[A] It may be that the universe is the product of Intelligent Design --  
that the Creator set it up to develop along certain lines.  
 
Two other possibilities are:  [B] Bereishis is literally true and  there is 
no "design" -- just instantaneous creation.  The world was created  in 
seven days, evolution is a totol hoax, the universe is only 5000 years old,  the 
scientists are wrong about everything and don't know what they're talking  
about.
 
[C] There was no Creator and no Creation, the universe just "is."   This is 
what Science believes.  Is this also what TuM believes?
 
I think that MO try to distance themselves from Intelligent Design because  
they know that ID is viewed with utter disdain by the scientific  
community.  Well I have bad news for them.  Es vet zey gornisht  helfen.  The 
Scientists whose approval they crave view them as one of the  lowest forms of life, 
barely above the worms known as Charedim.
 
--Toby Katz
==========

--------------------
 


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20100323/fdb74d64/attachment-0001.htm>

Sounds like a fascinating and thought-provoking symposium.
========================================
jr-agreed
================================================

Right at the end there, though, you have a good example of what's wrong
with TuM.  They care way too much about what is and isn't "science" and
they believe that science has an exclusive claim on "truth."
================================
jr-wadr, no. iiuc they believe that the reality we percieve through the
senses that hkb"h gave us to experience his world, must be reconciled with
the reality that hkb'h	revealed to us at sinai
=========================================


[C] There was no Creator and no Creation, the universe just "is."  This is what Science believes.  Is this also what TuM believes?
========================================
jr-iiuc no, see above
=============================================

I think that MO try to distance themselves from Intelligent Design because they know that ID is viewed with utter disdain by the scientific community.
===========================================
jr-no,iiuc they are trying to see if ID meets test 1 (perceived reality
constraint) - if not, then can't accept just because it would be easier to
reconcile with 2
=======================================================


   Well I have bad news for them.  Es vet zey gornisht helfen.	The
   Scientists whose approval they crave view them as one of the lowest
   forms of life, barely above the worms known as Charedim.

--Toby Katz
==========
 jr-iiuc they crave only the approval of hkb"h in doing what they understand to be his ratzon.  I am not mkabel the statement about "scientists" as a group
ckv"s
Joel Rich
--------------------



THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE 
ADDRESSEE.  IT MAY CONTAIN PRIVILEGED OR CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION THAT IS EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.  Dissemination, 
distribution or copying of this message by anyone other than the addressee is 
strictly prohibited.  If you received this message in error, please notify us 
immediately by replying: "Received in error" and delete the message.  
Thank you.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20100324/7c1e9e48/attachment-0001.htm>

RMM wrote:
> Indeed. If one BD determines that the eidim of another BD were
> invalid eidim, or that the mikvah was not kosher, or that the milah
> was not kosher, etc. etc., then indeed, the giyur may be revoked.
> But if the second BD is basing itself on fallacious readings of the
> Gemara, such as by ignoring the sugya (or baraita? - I forget)
> about the ger who rises from the mikvah and immediately joins
> a passing troupe of idolaters, and yet whose giyur is valid - then
> this second BD's revocation is valueless and irrelevant. If the
> second BD is ignoring how many poseqim were willing to convert
> the non-observant (Rabbi Benzion Uziel, Rabbi D. Z. Hoffman,
> Rabbi Isser Yehuda Unterman), and pretending that these
> poseqim didn't exist, then that second BD's revocation is nothing.
> Or as Rabbi Henkin's article in Hakirah showed, the laws of Hoshen
> Mishpat do not in any way permit Rabbi Sherman's conclusion that
> Rabbi Drukman is an invalid dayan; IIRC, Rabbi Henkin concluded
> that even if Rabbi Drukman's opinions are all wrong, he would still
> be a valid dayan according to Hoshen Mishpat. But if the second
> BD has real basis for annulling the conversion, such as by saying
> that the eidim were not shomrei shabbat, then this revocation is
> valid.

You are confusing three issues. There is (1) the issue of the
implications of the halakhah of ger she'hazar le-suro (a convert who
reverted to his pagan ways, even soon after conversion), (2) the right
of people to hold views against those of some posqim, even bedi'avad,
and (3) the propriatey of the method of R' Scherman disqualifying R'
Druckman retroactively, and hence also retroactively disqualifying all
the latter's conversions, even those where higher standards were
upheld.

Re: (1): we don't interpret Talmud in a vacuum, but through the lens
of the posqim. The consensus seems to have established itself that we
distinguish between cases where there is a presumption that the
conversion was good and the convert only afterwards decided to sin,
and where the convert converted with the full intention of sinning.
Unless one is willing to ignore qabalat 'ol mitzvot (see point 2
below), we must then reasonably interpret the evidence of what the
convert may have been thinking at the time. If one says, on Thursday
morning, befeh male, that he will keep Shabbat, and he holds a
management meeting the next Friday evening, complete with powerpoint
presentation, it is obvious that much preparation had gone into his
transgression of Shabbat, and that at the time of his assurance that
he will keep Shabbat, he was lying through his teeth. The invalidation
of such a convert is not the disavowal of the previous beit din's
ruling, but a statement of fact that there is serious evidence that
the prospective convert fooled the system. The convert is being
invalidated, not the acts of the beit din.

(2) Since when is halakhah a matter of the lowest common denominator?
Against historical practice? So some recent major rabbinical figures
have been willing to do less than stellar conversions. That doesn't in
and of itself overturn centuries of practice. Those who argue for a
more lenient regime bear the onus of convincing the others. In matters
relating to yu'hassin, as well as in all matters impacting more than
one's own community, there is a long standing tradition of seeking
consensus. And there is no consensus that conversions without qabalat
'ol mitzvot (whatever that may mean, which is admittedly subject to
some disagreement) is valid even bedi'avad. If a beit din wants to
insure reasonable acceptance, it may not need to seek to adhere to
100% of views, but it should seek to rely on enough views. It is hard
to put numbers on these things, but you will readily recognize the
significance of, say seeking 85%-90% acceptance.

(3) R' Henkin (rightly IMHO) criticized the retroactive
disqualification of R' Druckman as a dayan and the therefore automatic
retroactive disqualification of all his conversions, including those
performed according to more widely accepted standards. However, there
is nothing in this argument to oppose the disqualification of
individual converts based on a determination that they never intended
to fulfill more than a tzivyon mitzvot, if even that.

Thus, the correctness of (3) does not imply that either (1) or (2) is correct.
-- 
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Burgeoning Jewish Life in Central Europe
* Raising Consciousness by Dressing Babies Outrageously
* 25 Jahre zu lebenslang fuer den Moerder des Herrn Gerstle
* From Skinhead to Orthodox Jew

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 05:46:50AM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
: iiuc they believe that the reality we percieve through the senses
: that hkb"h gave us to experience his world, must be reconciled with the
: reality that hkb'h revealed to us at sinai
...
: iiuc they are trying to see if ID meets test 1 (perceived reality
: constraint) - if not, then can't accept just because it would be easier
: to reconcile with 2

Again, ID makes no claims about perceived reality beyond R' Aqiva's mashal
of a well calligraphied poem showing signs of an author, not an ink spill

An O Jew could reject ID as non-science, but not as non-truth. It's an
iqar emunah that the universe was designed. (Not even RMShapiro's book
would allow us to call someone who questions that "Orthodox".)

: iiuc they crave only the approval of hkb"h in doing what they understand
: to be his ratzon. I am not mkabel the statement about "scientists"
: as a group

Actually, science is predicated on belief in a Borei uManhig. If not in
one's own conscious belief system, in one's cultural baggage.

Look who advanced science, the Moslems and then the Xian west. In fact,
among the Greeks, even there the advances came from people like Aristotle
who believed that the universe reflected the Intellect of a Creator.

Otherwise, why expect order and unifying principles at all?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "As long as the candle is still burning,
mi...@aishdas.org        it is still possible to accomplish and to
http://www.aishdas.org   mend."
Fax: (270) 514-1507          - Anonymous shoemaker to R' Yisrael Salanter

RMM writes: 
> A beit din is a community institution, and presumably, just as the
> parnasim are appointed by the people, so too the dayanim.

This premise is false.

I discussed this at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol27/v27n006.shtml#11  .
While there is an *alternative* option for the appointment of dayanim (and
for that matter parnasim) based on appointment by the people, that is not
the primary mechanism.  The primary mechanism is via the melech or nasi or
the Sanhedrin.

> If taxes levied by a Jewish community are somehow contrary to the
> Torah (I don't know what exactly this would mean, but just bear with
> me),

Not sure how one can bear with you when you are positing the impossible.
There is a concept called hefker beis din hefker which allows for the
removal of property from people even if improperly. Ie it may be wrong but
it works and the property is no longer theirs.  Similarly there are
extensive discussions regarding the kings's powers of which this may form
one.  Again I discussed this, albeit briefly at the bottom of the post I
refer to above.

 then the taxes may surely be ignored, and if dayanim are not
> worthy of being trusted to uphold the Torah, etc., then their rulings
> are to be ignored. As the Gemara says in Sanhedrin daf zayin, a false
> dayan is like an asherah.

Again this is a hugely complicated subject, which you cannot learn out from
one small piece of aggadita.  There are purely Torah sourced powers and then
there are powers sourced from din melech, which allow for a lot more
discretion.  There are questions of issur v'heter, dinei nafashos and dinei
mamonos and they are all different.  Dinei mamonos has, as I indicated
above, a universally applicable get out, that makes it binding even if
against Torah law.  Dinei nafashos are subject to the melech's general power
and right to keep order by whatever means necessary, which allows for an
incredibly wide range of powers if the proper procedures for appointment
have been followed. Admittedly the width of the powers of the king is itself
subject to machlokus in the gemora and subsequently.  That leaves questions
of issur v'heter.

> Ein shaliah b'davar `averah dictates that if the dayanim or parnasim
> violate the Torah, that their non-Toraitic rulings or policies are not
> binding on anyone. A beit din has power only to rule according to the
> Torah, but not against the Torah. No matter who you are, the Torah is
> our constitution, and no one, no matter how powerful or influential,
> has power to contradict it.

Again, not so straightforward.  Assuming we are now talking only about issur
v'heter I have seen arguments from rishonim for both sides.  The easier case
is where a rav or dayan tells you something is assur when it is mutar.
There is a lot of discussion about whether an issur then attaches to the
chefetz (assuming a chafetz like a chicken).  It may depend on whether they
are toeh in a dvar mishnah or not.  Even this is not so simple.
Even more difficult is the case where a rav tells you something is mutar
when in fact it is assur.  If you rely on his word, whose aveirah is it, his
or yours?  Do you have responsibility to go and second guess him or have you
discharged your responsibility by going to ask somebody who, as far as you
are aware, is reputable?  

> A taqana or gezera is valid only if the people accept it and turn it
> into minhag ha-maqom, and so no dayan or beit din has the power to
> foist unpopular laws on the people. Also, if a layman promulgates a
> new minhag and the people accept it, then it is a binding minhag
> ha-maqom, even though no dayan promulgated it. Also, if the minhag
> violates the Torah, then it is null and void, regardless of whether a
> layman or dayan promulgated it. In the end, only the Torah-true (or
> Torah-false) nature of the ruling or minhag or taqana or gezera, and
> the people's acceptance, matter, and not the personality of the
> promulgator.

Again this strikes me as a vast oversimplification.  Usually the first is
phrased in the reverse, a takana or gezera falls away if it becomes clear
that the people are unable to endure it not that any ratification formal or
informal by the people is needed.  There is no formal mechanism for a layman
to promulgate a minhag, and it would seem that it needs some form of
recognition by the Torah authorities before it becomes accepted as a minhag.
Our history is absolutely littered with rulings and minhagim that violate
the Torah.  Some of them (ie when done by Torah authorities) are deemed
horas sha'ah (see for example the Rashba I quoted in the post I refer to
above).  Some of them the authorities spend a lot of time grappling with the
fact that there seems to be a minhag that violates the Torah.  Sometimes
they rail against it, sometimes they seem to find some sort of
accommodation.  It doesn't necessarily mean the minhag goes away (an example
I am thinking about off the top of my head is the minhag, codified in the
Rema, that women should not make brachos, bench or daven when they have
their periods.  The Magen Avraham duly jumps up and down and says how can
you have a minhag that has no basis and which violates the Torah obligation
on women to bench and make Kiddush.  And the later codes such as the Mishna
Brura and the Shulchan Aruch HaRav agree.  And it is probably reasonably
fair to say that today this minhag has possibly disappeared.  But how do you
explain the Rema and what seems to have been occurring in Ashkenaz for
centuries!  Note by the way that the Chatam Sofer finds an accommodation
with it, bringing a reference to Nach and  quoting the Ramban al haTorah on
Rachel Imanu, which suggests to me that in Hungry at least it was extant
until much later).  Of course sometimes such a minhag prompts a
reinterpretation of the Torah that would seem to be contrary to the way it
was previously understood but which then gets accepted as normative.  And
there are many thousands upon thousands of other examples which to my mind
makes this kind of summary way too simplistic.

> Michael Makovi

Regards

Chana

Micha Berger wrote:
> It is impossible for the minhag to work as a minhag. The economy doesn't
> work. It fails as a Categorical Imperative.
>   
Not all minhagim fit this paradigm.  Take glatt, back in the day when 
Jewish butchers sold mainly to Jewish consumers, so that every treifah 
was a monetary loss, and back in small towns where they slaughtered one 
or  two cows a week.  As I understand it, those are the conditions under 
which the custom originated, and when the meat wasn't glatt the people 
who were makpid simply didn't eat meat that Shabbos.  But extend the 
custom to an entire kehillah and the economics fails.

David Riceman

: >Personally, I don't get the whole minhag of not selling chameitz gamur,
: >but shopping after Pesach at a store that did. What, it's less ha'aramah
: >to rely on his sale than on my own? Or do most of us not have stocked
: >pantries for which switching to and from Pesach isn't a hefsed meruba?
:
Actually my gripe is the opposite. In Bnei Brak many places do in fact
not buy from stores that sold their chametz before Pesach.
Sounds like one is being machmir at someone else's expense.
What else can these stores do?

-- 
Eli Turkel

R' Micha Berger wrote:

> I'll try one more time, and then give up.

Please don't! Let's work together, to find the root of the problem.

> If the minhag were economically viable, the storeowner would be
> able to keep it. And if it's not economically viable, the minhag
> doesn't stick.

I suspect that "the minhag" you're referring to is the combined practice of not seeling one's own chometz, but buying from as store that does.

My suspicion is that there is no such "minhag". Some/many individuals may
follow such a practice, but I don't think there's any community composed of
people, all of whom follow the practice you've described. In fact, I think
you've *proven* that such a community cannot exist. Rather, all communities
are composed of three groups in varying proportions: (1) Those who have no
qualms about mechiras chometz at all, (2) Those who neither sell their own
chametz gamur nor would buy such after Pesach from one who did, (3) Those
who would not sell their own but do buy from one who did.

> My not selling my own chameitz gamor therefore serves no purpose,
> once my world HAS TO contain people who do not do the same.

It serves the purpose of protecting you from a possible violation of owning
chametz. I really don't know why this bothers you. How do you relate to the
general principle of being machmir on oneself but meikil for others?

Does it bother you that an Ashkenazi who lives in a mixed neighborhood
might sell kitniyos on Chol Hamoed to Sefaradim? A good portion of his
parnasa comes from people who are actually eating things that he would not
eat on Pesach! [Rhetorical question:] What purpose is served by his
avoidance of eating kitniyos, if he is enabling others to eat it?

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Diet Help
Cheap Diet Help Tips. Click here.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL2131/c?cp=yYCaHaLbX_IlsuYjEpjO8AAAJ
z3zeK-F0bLcqGb51B0rOTOKAAYAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADNAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYQAAAAAA=

On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 10:36:25PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
: Similarly, it stands to reason that water added to grain before it ferments
: becomes part of the fermented product and therefore itself chametz, and
: can't be counted as something that dilutes the chametz.

This seems to contradict what you said earlier. The water added after
decasking is after fermentation. Would that not make it a second
ingredient from the mash, and thus taaroves?

I wish to remove wine from the conversation, because mezigas hakos means
that wine *requires* dilution to be yayin, and thus the whole question
is different than for adding water to other substances.

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 05:12:28AM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: But instead, frame the question in terms of "what problem do I run
: into when selling my chometz before Pesach", and "what problem do I run
: into when purchasing his chometz after Pesach"...

This would justify a hanhagah tovah, a chumerah, whatever you want to
call it. But a minhag has to be "shehatzibbur yakhol laamod ba" -- not
viewed only in terms of personal considerations.

This is why I invoked the Categorical Imperative. (For those who don't
remember / weren't here when we discussed its relationship to halakhah,
that's Kant's attempt to define morality as "Act only according to that
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law.")

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 08:20:12AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
: Not all minhagim fit this paradigm.  Take glatt, back in the day when 
: Jewish butchers sold mainly to Jewish consumers, so that every treifah 
: was a monetary loss, and back in small towns where they slaughtered one 
: or  two cows a week.  As I understand it, those are the conditions under 
: which the custom originated, and when the meat wasn't glatt the people 
: who were makpid simply didn't eat meat that Shabbos.  But extend the 
: custom to an entire kehillah and the economics fails.

Umm, that was an entire kehillah. As you write, the loss was absorbed so
it seems they could manage. The fact that 100 mi away in some other town
someone else would have eaten the meat doesn't change the feasability of
the minhag. It's not today, when economic and social groups span large
swaths of a continent.


On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 01:55:22PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
:> I'll try one more time, and then give up.

: Please don't! Let's work together, to find the root of the problem.

Now that more people chimed in, rather than the same repetition of the
same positions of REMT, Zev and I failing to understand each other, I
did.

:> If the minhag were economically viable, the storeowner would be
:> able to keep it. And if it's not economically viable, the minhag
:> doesn't stick.

: I suspect that "the minhag" you're referring to is the combined practice
: of not seeling one's own chometz, but buying from as store that does.

I mean the minhag of not selling one's chameitz *gamur*.

: My suspicion is that there is no such "minhag". Some/many individuals
: may follow such a practice, but I don't think there's any community
: composed of people, all of whom follow the practice you've
: described...

This started when I looked up what the star-K said about selling
whisk[e]y. They refer you to footnote 1, which reads, "Some individuals
sell this chometz, others do not. One should follow his family custom."

That's when I asked how this works as a minhag. If it were stam a
personal chumrah, that's a different story.

ALTHOUGH, I have a different problem there...

If you show any reluctance WRT selling chameitz on Pesach, what's the
quality of your intent when selling taaroves? If you carry around fears
that the sale isn't real, that it's haaramah, is the qinyan really chal
or did you create problems of asmachta the moment you chose to be
choseish?

:> My not selling my own chameitz gamor therefore serves no purpose,
:> once my world HAS TO contain people who do not do the same.

: It serves the purpose of protecting you from a possible violation of
: owning chametz. I really don't know why this bothers you. How do you
: relate to the general principle of being machmir on oneself but meikil
: for others?

See above about the difference between "being machmir", which is much
easier to get out of in future years, doesn't bind your wife and
children, etc.. and the star-K telling you to follow minhag avos.

If it's your *minhag* then doesn't it have to fit the rules for minhag?
Such as being viable for a community to follow, minhag yisrael kedin,
not treated as lifnim mishuras hadin [for those who have it], etc...

Here the "minhag" only works for me because I know the storeowner is
relying on a loophole (hefsed meruba) 


Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Take time,
mi...@aishdas.org        be exact,
http://www.aishdas.org   unclutter the mind.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Rabbi Simcha Zissel Ziv, Alter of Kelm


------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 27, Issue 86
**************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."