Avodah Mailing List

Volume 27: Number 152

Wed, 28 Jul 2010

• 1. Re: Mitzva or Hechsher Mitzva (Micha Berger)
• 2. Re: Mitzva or Hechsher Mitzva (Prof. Levine)
• 3. Re: Mitzva or Hechsher Mitzva (Micha Berger)
• 4. Re: Rishonim and Chazal (was One Opinion) (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: toras hachasiddus (Micha Berger)
• 6. Re: sevara vs. psak (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: sevara vs. psak (David Riceman)
• 8. Re: sevara vs. psak (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: Rishonim and Chazal (was One Opinion) (Micha Berger)
• 10. zecher lechurban (Eli Turkel)
• 11. yehareig v'al ya'avor (Micha Berger)
• 12. Re: yehareig v'al ya'avor (Micha Berger)
• 13. Re: kosher cabbage (Shoshana L. Boublil)
• 14. Re: sevara vs. psak (David Riceman)
• 15. Re: zecher lechurban (Poppers, Michael)
• 16. Re: zecher lechurban (Rich, Joel)
• 17. Re: anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism" (Micha Berger)

On Thu, Jul 22, 2010 at 11:01:28AM +0300, Danny Schoemann wrote:
:> Do you kosher your own meat and poultry?  I certainly do not,
:> yet it is a mitzva.

: No it's not - and there's no Brocho when doing so. It's forbidden to
: eat blood, so you somehow have to remove it from the meat before
: eating it.
: Maybe it's a Hechsher Mitzva.

Or maybe it's a mitzvah makhsheres, rather than a chiyuv.

We discussed this possibility a number of times in the past. RSShkop
(and repeated by RDLifshitz in shiur) teaches of a middle ground between
the mitzvah chiyuvis and mitzvah qiyumis.

Not too likely with this example, which seems to be a clearcut stand-alone
lav.

However, I also do not slaughter my own chickens. There one has both
the lav of eating a tereifah (Rambam lav #181) or neveilah (lav #180),
as well as an asei (#146) of shechitah. The Raavad classifies it as a
mitzvah materes.

However, when RYL adds:
:> According to your logic one should become familiar with
:> doing this so that one can do the mitzvah.

If hafrashas terumah took the skill and practice that shechitah took,
I would also delegate it to another. But it doesn't. It's complicated,
but can be learned in a single sitting.

And I don't avoid meat due to my lack of shechitah skills; I delegate
it to someone else. The parallel would be going to COSCO to buy fruit
that someone in the know can perform hafrashas terumah for you -- and
thus still getting some sechar for terumah uma'aser, as well as being
able to direct one's business to supporting another Jew.

As it stands, hafrashas terumah is well worth the cost/benefit ratio,
IMHO.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Despair is the worst of ailments. No worries
mi...@aishdas.org        are justified except: "Why am I so worried?"
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507

At 01:20 PM 7/27/2010, Micha Berger wrote:
>As it stands, hafrashas terumah is well worth the cost/benefit ratio,
>IMHO.

But based on what I have sent out from the article at 
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/rmjBroydeTerumah.pdf  there is no 
need to do this, so what are you accomplishing when if comes to 
hafrachas Terumah.  True, you are supporting the economy of 
EY,  which I agree is no small thing, but which, as others have said, 
one can do in other ways.

Again,  at the end of this article the author states, "Particularly, 
since fruits and vegetables are currently obligated in teruma and 
ma'aser only rabbinically, even in Israel proper, the presence of 
these many factors is enough to eliminate completely the obligation 
outside of Israel."

YL



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On Tue, Jul 27, 2010 at 01:33:54PM -0400, Prof. Levine wrote:
> But based on what I have sent out from the article at  
> http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/rmjBroydeTerumah.pdf  there is no  
> need to do this, so what are you accomplishing when if comes to  
> hafrachas Terumah...

Actuallym, he cites a machloqes. Very relevent to the Litvaks among us,
the AhS requires taking maaser. And others might be inclined to follow
RAYK or the CI. Even the SA (YD 33:12) doesn't clearly permit fruit
outside EY bizman hazeh w/out hafrashah, as the Tzevi leTzadiq appears
to limit this heter to cases where final processing was outside EY.

R' Isur Zalman Meltzer's heter relies on the assumption that much of
the crop is owned by non-Jews, an assumption I wouldn't count on today.

IOW, RMJB brings strong grounds to pasqen lehaqeil, but he doesn't say
it's open and shut.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             None of us will leave this place alive.
mi...@aishdas.org        All that is left to us is
http://www.aishdas.org   to be as human as possible while we are here.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Anonymous MD, while a Nazi prisoner

On Mon, Jul 26, 2010 at 06:52:00PM -0400, R Zvi Lampel wrote on Ramban
and rainbows:
> I have written an essay challenging this. The fact is, the Ramban (as
> well as the Ibn Ezra before, and Rav Saadia Gaon even previously) has a
> Midrashic source for his position. Please follow this link.
> file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/BOBBY/My%20Documents/The%20Ramban,%20Chazal%20and%20The%20Rainbow.htm

That link won't work, unless you happen to have such a file on your
Windows computer's "My Documents" folder. Try this:
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/The%20Ramban,%20Chazal
%20and%20The%20Rainbow.htm>
(reduced to <http://bit.ly/9qDOEq>)

The file he refers to in the "Ramban and Chazal - Bilaam" post is at
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/Ramban%20on%20Bilaam.doc

On Mon, Jul 26, 2010 at 10:17:12PM -0400, Zvi Lampel wrote:
>
>
> Ramban and Chazal---Bilaam
>
> The Ramban (B'Midbar 22:20) quotes the Ibn Ezra's commentary explaining  
> Hashem's original instruction to Bilaam not to go to Balak, and His  
> subsequent reversal, telling him to go. The Ibn Ezra says it is akin to  
> Hashem's acquiescence when the Bnei Yisroel asked to have men spy the  
> Land of Canaan, despite the fact Hashem has already guaranteed their  
> success in conquering it. The Ibn Ezra explains that once one refuses to  
> follow Hashem's original instruction, Hashem instructs one to act in  
> accordance with his choice.
>
> In both cases---that of the spies and that of Bilaam---the Ramban denies  
> that the explanation could be "that G-d would reverse His word because  
> of a person's stubbornness." And he further objects to the idea that  
> Hashem would then punish anyone for following through with what He had  
> given him permission to do, as is what happened in both cases. The  
> Ramban says "/Challilah/" to this idea.
>
> *At this point, the Ramban inserts: And they say in a Midrash that in  
> the way a person wants to go, in it "/moleechin oso/." --which  
> apparently supports the Ibn Ezra's thesis: That once a person chooses a  
> certain path despite Hashem's disapproval, Hashem accomodates him to  
> follow that way.*
>
> * *
>
> *The Ramban, however, does not retract his position. In fact, he goes on  
> to expound his explanation opposing the Ibn Ezra's thesis---and  
> ostensibly opposing the Chazal he cited, offering no alternate one.*
>
> * *
>
> The apparent opposition alone is a problem, considering the Ramban's  
> usual use of Chazal as authoritative, both as support for himself and as  
> basis for fierce rejection of other views---repeatedly some of Ibn 
> Ezra's!
>
> But furthermore, Ramban's _placement_ of the Midrashic citation in his  
> presentation is incomprehensible. The sequence does not flow: One would  
> expect that citation of Chazal to appear either before or after the Ibn  
> Ezra's explanation, to show support; or after the Ramban concludes his  
> explanation, as a concession to the Ibn Ezra (which is indeed the way  
> commentators on the Ramban explain it---although they fail to explain  
> why the Ramban then continues to discredit the idea promulgated by the  
> Ibn Ezra and ostensibly the Chazal). Instead, after citing the Midrash,  
> the Ramban then goes on to expound upon his opposing explanation.
>
> (The Ramban explains that in the matter of the spies, the people's  
> innocent and valid intention was to plan the conquest strategy; and he  
> explains that Bilaam as well was acting quite appropriately, declaring  
> that nothing could absolve him from following G-d's orders, and seeking  
> G-d's advice as to how to respond to the second contingent Balak sent  
> him. And Hashem's instructions were consistent: From beginning to end,  
> He did not want Bilaam to curse the Israelites; but He absolutely did  
> want Bilaam to accompany the second contingent---if they would desist  
> from the demand that he curse the Israelites---to bless the Israelites.  
> Bilaam's sin was that when he reported G-d's message to Balak's men, he  
> suppressed the qualification G-d gave him, and created the false  
> impression that G-d acquiesced to cursing the Israelites, and the  
> blasphemous idea that G-d changes His mind and decides one day to keep  
> the Israelites from being cursed, and decides the next to allow it.)
>
> Now, often the Ramban holds that the /peshat/ of a passage does not  
> follow the Chazal, and that the Chazal knew this, but were merely using  
> this passage as a literary device upon which to peg their teaching---the  
> teaching with which the Ramban of course agrees. But here, the Ramban  
> has strongly objected to the teaching itself---without offering an  
> alternate Chazal in his support!
>
> By my use of the words "apparently" and "ostensibly," you may already  
> have an idea where I'm heading.
>
> *The reason we see a disconnect between the /Chazal/ and the Ramban's  
> placement of it in his commentary, is that---influenced by Rashi and  
> popular usage---we think the /Chazal/ is saying what the Ibn Ezra  
> holds*. But the Ramban, I propose, does not understand the /Chazal /that  
> way. He understands it the way the Meiri (/Makkos/ 10b) does: simply  
> that G-d grants us free will. The fact that G-d did not simply make  
> Bilaam unable to get up in the morning, but gave him instructions---to  
> refrain from cursing Israel, and to commit to blessing Israel---shows  
> that G-d allows people even with the worst of intentions to exercise  
> their free will. "/molichin oso/" should not be translated, "they lead  
> him," but "they give him the ability to go."
>
> The Ramban's citation of the Chazal is not a support of the Ibn Ezra,  
> but an introduction to his own explanation. One can entertain the  
> possibility that the Ramban introduced it knowing that the Ibn Ezra took  
> it the way he did. But regardless, he cites it as a support for his own  
> opposing understanding based, he believes, on a more reasonable  
> theology. In effect, he is saying, "Now, there is a Chazal that sheds  
> light on how to understand these passages. Do not take it as the Ibn  
> Ezra does; the correct understanding of it is as follows..."
>
>
> Zvi Lampel


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Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It's nice to be smart,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it's smarter to be nice.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - R' Lazer Brody
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Tue, Jul 27, 2010 at 07:41:52AM -0700, Saul.Z.New...@kp.org wrote:
: http://chabad.org.il/Magazines/Article.asp?ArticleID=6993&;CategoryID=1416 
: in reference to this sicha from 1953,  at  points  gimmel and daled  ,  i 
: found  interesting  the  concept  that  'nikve'ah hahalacha  ktorat 
: hachassidut'  and  that  there is no dissention possible  after  psak 
: halacha...

Makes sense to me. Sepharadi pesiqa is binding on Sepharadim, and Ashkenazi
pesaq on Ashk. Once the Chassidim are established as a distinct qehillah,
why shouldn't their rabbanim insist that their pesaqim are binding on
their own?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
mi...@aishdas.org        you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org   happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Dale Carnegie

On Wed, Jul 21, 2010 at 05:34:04PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> We need to back up a minute. Hazal are talking about psukim (actually
> phrases or even words or letters)...


If this is so, then Chazal are talking about separate issurim. Our case
is which servara explains the issur, so that we know how to legislate for
new sitations. Their case is a single incident, and knowing which issur
was violated, if any. Different diagnoses, same prognosis. And therefore
I really see little parallel at all.

Our basic disjoin is that you are paralleling different derashos to
different sevaros, and I'm saying it's different issurim.


The Rambam's general mehalekh is that there is one truth, and it's our
job to find it. Building proof for this general mehalekh is lengthy.
One of his more explicit statements is where he denounces the method
he used in his early days in peirush hamishnayos of approaching shas
through the understanding of the geonim rather than with a clear
mind and understanding. The Rambam writes that he is breaking with
someone (the Rif?) on this issue.

See also RRW's post at <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol27/v27n024.shtml#02>,
althoug I use the above letter to argue that this isn't Ashk vs al
Anadalus in general -- it's a Rambam thing in particular.

....
> So, no. Given those assumptions (and ignoring the Shach momentarily)
> a court can condemn a murderer only by using 13 different sevaros.

I also have a question WRT capital cases.... If the dayanim can't
agree which pasuq he violated, what kind of hasra'ah did he get? How
could multiple pesuqim count -- only one is punishable?

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is capable of changing the world for the
mi...@aishdas.org        better if possible, and of changing himself for
http://www.aishdas.org   the better if necessary.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Victor Frankl, Man's search for Meaning

On 7/27/2010 2:04 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> If this is so, then Chazal are talking about separate issurim.
It seems to me that you need to understand this gemara in the context of 
the sugya in Eiruvin (13b) about being metaher a sheretz in 48 different 
ways, and in the context of H. Mamrim 2:1 which says that a Sanhedrin 
can freely overrule a prior Sanhedrin's deductions from the 13 middos.  
Halacha is much more fluid than you seem to think it is; multiple 
sources will imply tohorah (or guilt), and one can draw multiple 
deductions from a single pasuk.
> Our basic disjoin is that you are paralleling different derashos to
> different sevaros, and I'm saying it's different issurim.
>    
I don't think this distinction is real.  In order for sevaros to be 
different they must have different halachic consequences, in which case 
they represent different issurim.
<<The Rambam's general mehalekh is that there is one truth, and it's our
> job to find it. Building proof for this general mehalekh is lengthy.>>
>    

But there's evidence against this as well; see Hakdamah L'PHM ed. Kafih 
p. 11 s.v. "hahelek hashlishi", see H. Mamrim 2:1 (cited above), and see 
MN II:11, to pick three examples from three of his major works.
> I also have a question WRT capital cases.... If the dayanim can't
> agree which pasuq he violated, what kind of hasra'ah did he get? How
> could multiple pesuqim count -- only one is punishable?
>    
See H. Sanhedrin 12:2.

David Riceman

On Tue, Jul 27, 2010 at 03:58:58PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> On 7/27/2010 2:04 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>> If this is so, then Chazal are talking about separate issurim.

> It seems to me that you need to understand this gemara in the context of  
> the sugya in Eiruvin (13b) about being metaher a sheretz in 48 different  
> ways, and in the context of H. Mamrim 2:1 which says that a Sanhedrin  
> can freely overrule a prior Sanhedrin's deductions from the 13 middos.   

Yes, but here the issue is different pesuqim VS different ta'amim.
If you say the matter is pesuqim, then it's not a new derashah of the
same pasuq.

Eiruvin 13b discusses the erudition and brilliance of R' Meir in being
able to find multiple -- and even conflicting -- sevaros. Then of
Sumchus, an anonymous talmid chakham from Yavneh and of Ravina.

There is no discussion of actually presenting these conflicting
sevaros in order to reach a conclusion.

You started with the sugyah on Sanhedrin 33b-34a, about finding reasons
for zekhus, and then of a dayan who changes his mind. Rav is quite clear
that the actual vote is zekhus vs chayav.

Then R' Yochanan says that two who vote zakai because of different
pesuqim -- only one is counted. Not because two sevaros can't both be
valid (as you write, look at Eruvin 13b), but because each ruled out
a different issur. One must be wrong IF we are assuming he is only
standing trial for one of the two issurim -- wrong in the sense of
addressing the wrong topic.

The sevara for recording why someone is mechayev is entirely different
-- determining if we need another halanas hadin. The reason we apply
for mezakim wouldn't apply (not that we need it anyway) because one
reason lechayeiv is sufficient to find someone punishable, while a
mezakeh needs to eliminate every grounds for punishment.

I'm arguing that the Rambam's take is different from the above because
he believes in Aristotilian logic, and the Greek notion of searching
for truth, rather than seeing halakhah as a process of interpretation
and thus amenable to multiple right answers.

Going to what the Rambam actually does say, H' Sanhedrin 10:5. He
is elaborating 10:1, that you can't have a dayan find someone guilty
because his fellow dayan convinced him. (And that's why 10:6 continues
with the din that the greatest dayan can't speak first -- shema yismekhu
hashe'ar al daato.) We aren't counting separate sevaros, because if that
were two then 1 ta'am from different pesuqim would count as separate
sevaros. Rather, we're making sure each dayan reached his conclusion
independently.

> Halacha is much more fluid than you seem to think it is; multiple  
> sources will imply tohorah (or guilt), and one can draw multiple  
> deductions from a single pasuk.

Written like someone who hasn't read my last few blog entries. <g>

As for multiple deductions from one pasuq - yes. But I'm talking about
multiple of the 613 from the same phrase.

...
> I don't think this distinction is real.  In order for sevaros to be  
> different they must have different halachic consequences, in which case  
> they represent different issurim.

I don't know about that. Someone could be oveir on koseiv beshabbos,
while different dayanim have different sevaros about how what he did
qualified.

> <<The Rambam's general mehalekh is that there is one truth, and it's our
>> job to find it. Building proof for this general mehalekh is lengthy.>>

> But there's evidence against this as well; see Hakdamah L'PHM ed. Kafih  
> p. 11 s.v. "hahelek hashlishi", see H. Mamrim 2:1 (cited above), and see  
> MN II:11, to pick three examples from three of his major works.

Actually, I see the cited Yad as further demonstrating the point.

Leshitas haRambam, interpretation of the law requires determining
original intent. The only new intent can be a new original intent --
drift in meaning of existing law isn't an option. Thus, he has far more
new law being constructed which Rashi or the Raavad could understand
as being a new understanding of existing law. Which explains why the
Rambam believes derashos are created by BD.

(I don't see what the Moreh's discussion of the spheres has to do
with it.)

>> I also have a question WRT capital cases.... If the dayanim can't
>> agree which pasuq he violated, what kind of hasra'ah did he get? How
>> could multiple pesuqim count -- only one is punishable?

> See H. Sanhedrin 12:2.

Are you citing the fact that 12:2 doesn't mention stating which avreirah
and which pasuq is being violated? Just that it's an aveirah and what
the onesh is? I was under the impression thatnot knowing which pasuq
he's about to violate is the textbook hasra'as safeiq. Makkos 6a
and Tosafos there explaining why hasra'ah needs to be a gezeiras hakasuv
if the entire point is misvara -- to rule out shogeig before meting out
punishment.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             I long to accomplish a great and noble task,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it is my chief duty to accomplish small
http://www.aishdas.org   tasks as if they were great and noble.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                              - Helen Keller

On Mon, Jul 26, 2010 at 06:52:00PM -0400, R Zvi Lampel wrote:
> (a) Chazal did not have a single viewpoint on the matter, which left it  
> open to analysis (between the viewpoints offered) for an original  
> suggestion or, better yet, as the Rambam explains,
>
> (b) Chazal's principle that "the world follows its natural course,"  
> based upon the /posuk, "/There is nothing new under the sun," is so  
> over-arching that it outweighs the opposing /shitta/ implied in the  
> /Ahvos/ /mishnah/.

I suggested over a decade ago a broader version of (b). That new
approaches in aggadita and parshanut were valid if there was any
mesoretic basis, and only invalid if suggested for reasons other than
issures raised internal to Torah.

I'm afraid to go into detail, lest it causes us to revisit the
issue of whether one may believe in a limited version of the mabul.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             A sick person never rejects a healing procedure
mi...@aishdas.org        as "unbefitting." Why, then, do we care what
http://www.aishdas.org   other people think when dealing with spiritual
Fax: (270) 514-1507      matters?              - Rav Yisrael Salanter

<<The only one of these that appears to be consistently practiced (or
even widely known about) is the glass under the chuppa - and what do
we do the instant the glass is smashed, symbolising the churban? We
shout "mazel tov"! >>

In the halacha emails of ROY he objects strongly to saying mazal tov
at the breaking
of the glass.

BTW that is the reason some break the glass in the middle of the
ceremony rather than
at the end. Others sing "im eskachech" to explicitly connect the breaking of
the glass to the churban


-- 
Eli Turkel

On Tue, Jul 27, 2010 at 03:15:14PM -0500, Steven J Scher asked on
Areivim:
> Does yehareig v'al ya'avor necessarily mean that these issurim are
> worse than others? ...

Avos 2:1, Rebbe's second statement in the mishnah, "vehevei zahir..."
<http://he.wikisource.org/wiki/%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A0%
D7%94_%D7%90%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%91_%D7%90>
(shortened to <http://bit.ly/drKJwv>). That link also has the Bartenura
and Tosafos YT on the mishnah. The latter makes a chiluq worth looking at.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

The question presumes that there is only one axis to measure mitzvos
on. On the contrary, an issur can be worse in one way, but the other
issur might be worse in another.

Also, I am not sure the answer is always the same regardless of
context. For a person who times the shofar blasts to make shur his
shul's teqi'os match the shevarim-teru'ah, perhaps the priorities
are different than for someone who isn't such a medaqdeiq, but
actively chases opportunities to give tzedaqah.

As for these particular three... why are they more previous than life
itself? And given that
    typical aveirah X < value of life < YVAY,
isn't there at least one very important way in which they are "worse"?

The Maharal holds that these three aveiros are each the worst violation of
one of the amudei olam in Avos 2:1. That life is to be forfeited because
committing one of them means taking an axe to the entire foundation of
life itself.

Here's how I blogged it
<http://www.aishdas.org/asp/2008/08/three-desires.shtml> (the post
itself is a comparison of different shitos all of which discuss
man as having three basic kinds of desire):
    [The Maharal] continues to explain that that if existence is based
    on three principles, then any act which takes an ax to one of these
    pillars should not be committed even under pain of death, existence
    itself would have a lower priority. Idol worship is obviously the
    antonym of avodah. Murder is the ultimate denial of chessed. The
    Maharal explains the link between Torah and sexual immorality:

        The glory of the Torah is that it is separated from the physical
        entirely. There is nothing that can separate man from the physical
        but the Torah of thought. The opposite is sexual immorality,
        which follows the physical [chomer] until one is thought of like
        an animal or donkey [chamor], it is a creature of its flesh's
        desires, in all things physical.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             If you won't be better tomorrow
mi...@aishdas.org        than you were today,
http://www.aishdas.org   then what need do you have for tomorrow?
Fax: (270) 514-1507              - Rebbe Nachman of Breslov

> From: T6...@aol.com
> Subject: Re: [Avodah] kosher cabbage

[SLB writes] 
RTK wrote:
> Produce grown in a shmittah  year raises a host of other questions,
> besides terumos uma'asros, giving greater force to the statement quoted
> in Rav
> Schwab's name, "If you buy a pound of Israeli tomatoes you buy a pound
> of
> problems."  (Something like that.)
[del]
> I sort of feel the way Prof Levine does, that I lack the knowledge and
> 
> experience to handle Israeli fruits and vegetables, so on the rare
> occasion
> that  I see Israeli oranges or peppers in the supermarket, I avoid
> buying them.

[SLB writes] It says "Ki HaMitzva HaZot Asher Anochi Metzvecha HaYom Lo
Nifleit He Mimcha VeLo Rechoka..." (Devarim 30:11). To me this means that
anytime a mitzvah is associated with a situation where people avoid it -
then something is wrong.

When I teach Hilchot Niddah, I make sure that women realize how truly simple
the basic halachot are.  THAT is what Hashem said.  OTOH, our grandmothers
had no problem koshering meat, but I doubt many younger women know how to do
it.

If eating fruits and vegetables from Israel has become something that a
highly intelligent person such as Prof. Levine finds it complicated - than
there is something very wrong either with the education system - or with the
chumrot and current halachic system.

Hilchot Terumot and Ma'aserot are targeted at every regular Jew who had a
few trees in his garden or a plot of land with some vegetables in it.  If
it's so complicated that a regular person can't do them, then we are
probably misinterpreting something here.

It worries me that people are more willing to abandon some halachot rather
than figure out where our understanding has so changed that we find them
difficult.

Shoshana L. Boublil

On 7/27/2010 3:58 PM, David Riceman wrote:
> But there's evidence against this as well; see Hakdamah L'PHM ed. 
> Kafih p. 11 s.v. "hahelek hashlishi", see H. Mamrim 2:1 (cited above), 
> and see MN II:11, to pick three examples from three of his major works.
I should also have pointed to Marvin Fox's essay "The Doctrine of the 
Mean in Aristotle and Maimonides" reprinted in Buijs' collection 
"Maimonides: A Collection of Critical Essays".

David Riceman

In Avodah V27n151#1, RJD wrote:
> I once heard Rabbi A Kimche (of London) point out that the shulchan
> aruch (OC 560:1-2) brings a series of things we're supposed to do
> nowadays to remind us of the destruction of Yerushalayim - (1) leaving
> an area of the home unpainted, (2) making a point of not putting out
> all one's fine vessels on the table at once, (3) women not wearing all
> their jewellery at once [as in actively omitting to put an item on]
> and (4) a chatan placing ash on his forehead. (He continues with
> others in simanim 3-5).
> The Rema then adds that in some places, they have the minhag to break a glass under the chupa.
> The only one of these that appears to be consistently practiced (or
> even widely known about) is the glass under the chuppa - and what do
> we do the instant the glass is smashed, symbolising the churban? We
> shout "mazel tov"! <
Who says Am Yisrael do not "consistently practice" reminders 2 (which, BTW,
seems more accurately translated as leaving an open table slot [i.e. no
place setting] when making a s'udah for guests) and 3?	I can't speak to
#3, but don't we consider leil Seider as an exception to the "norm" of the
zeicher you listed as #2?  As for #4, those who follow Maran without
exception may want to chime in; RMA's language implies to me that there are
many chuppah-time minhagim among Am Yisrael, with the common thread being
(and this, I think, is the key point and the common thread bichlal) "k'dei
lizkor es Y'rushalayim."  So long as the z'chirah (e.g. shviras kos) is
heartfelt, a subsequent return to simchah via "Mazal Tov!"s, etc. is IMHO
appropriate. Thanks. 

All the best from 
-- Michael Poppers via BB pager

 
(He continues with others in simanim 3-5).
> The Rema then adds that in some places, they have the minhag to break a glass under the chupa.
> The only one of these that appears to be consistently practiced (or 
> even widely known about) is the glass under the chuppa - and what do 
> we do the instant the glass is smashed, symbolising the churban? We 
> shout "mazel tov"! <
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On Thu, Jul 22, 2010 at 10:50:55PM -0400, T6...@aol.com wrote:
:> Which was  created separately from every other animal.

: It was different from every other animal in its  ability to speak and 
: express its thoughts in words, but its feelings and  "thoughts" were those 
: of any other even slightly intelligent animal.  Even  a dog would have 
: something of the same "thought" -- or rather, emotion of surprise --
: if an owner to whom it had always been loyal, and who had always
: treated it well, suddenly started kicking and beating the dog one  day.

To which R Simon Montagu added on Fri, Jul 23, 2010 at 03:02:00AM -0700:
: Yesh mishna mesaya`t lach: It is explicitly "pi ha'aton" which was created
: specially, not the donkey herself.

I don't recally think a diyuq in lashon in an aggadita about an
exceptional donkey is grounds for conclusions about the rest of the
animal kingdom.

People don't just have the mechanics of speech beyond that of the animals.
We have souls of the type "medaber". Even the sign-language speaking
apes are not medaberim. So whatever is meant by the donkey's mouth being
created before the rest of the donkey, and distinct from the animal
kingdom, it doesn't undo this model of types of soul which grows to be
ubiquitous among the rishonim.


The question is how dibbur, in the sense of identifying human beings
with the term "medaber", and the "nishmas chayim" of Bereishis with the
Targum's "ruach memalela", describes something distinct to humans and
not to Koko the gorilla and her ability to use ASL?

:>: b. The calf who ran away because it didn't want to  be 
:>: shechted....

:> Still, where do you see that the calf was aware of its own  thoughts 
:> in this story?

: Who said anything about the animal being aware of its own  thoughts?  

That's the whole point of the thesis I'm positing -- that animals aren't
aware of their own thoughts, and thus don't suffer. They respond to pain,
but without that self-awareness, they could never think "I am in pain",
and thus the pain never translates to what people would call suffering.

: I specifically denied that "self-awareness" was necessary in  order to 
: experience suffering....

I don't see how this sentence is meaningful. In particular how does one
"experience suffering" if suffering is a mental state, and the animal
isn't aware of its own mental states?

To put it another way, the concept of "suffering" is by definition being
self-aware of being pained.

...
: I don't even know where "being aware of one's own  thoughts" comes in for 
: human suffering.  When I was in labor I was  definitely suffering but I never 
: had any thought like, "Well here I am, thinking  about how awful this is 
: and how I can't wait for it to be over."

But you knew you were in pain. Even if you never bothered to consciously
go a third level and think about that knowledge.

I think that in general you're not defining self-awareness the way I am.
E.g. from the conclusion of your post:
: I'm still trying to wrap my head around the question of why you  think 
: the only choices are to be a German philosopher or to be Pavlov's  dog.

: But personally I have not experienced meta-cognizance more than two or  
: three times in my whole life.

When you solve a math problem in your head, are you aware of the steps
you took to find the solution?

Let's shift tracks from steam-of-consciousness type thought to koach
hadimyon...

Say I asked you "Does an elephant have hair?" The verbal way to resolve
it would be something like this: Elephants are mammals, all mammals have
hair, and so unless elephants are the exception to the rule, they must
have hair. Elephants are well known and discussed animals. Could they
be an exception to the rule and I don't know it? Nah, they must have hair.

On the other hand, when I think about someone, and realize he has red
hair, I don't simply pick up another fact about the person, I have the
experience of seeing red hair. I can remember and reproduce the image
of him and his red hair in my mind. The knowledge isn't reducable to
words, it involves qualia, attributes of internal experience. And when
I imagine what he would look like with black hair, I manipulate an
image, not simply reason with concepts reducible into the words of my
seikhel. There is a shared feature to seeing and hearing something when
it happened, remembering the event, and imagining what the event would
be like. When I remember my son's face, I do not simply remember facts
about it translatable into my seikhel, the flow of words in my head. I
actually recreate the experience of seeing it. When I remember last Yom
Kippur's Kol Nidrei, I reproduce the experience of hearing the Chazan
sing it, the congregation singing along.

This is the "koach hadimyon", "the ability to make likenesses". It
is usually translated as "imagination", but this translation is
anachronistic -- the word "imagination" changed meaning since first
coined by Aristotilians (such as the Rambam). Dimyon is the laboratory
of my thought experiments.

Solving the elephant problem through dimyon, you can remember elephants
you saw, or saw pictures of. The detail may be blurry, so you may have
to manipulate the picture a bit. Finally, a version of the picture which
has a tuft of hair at the tail, maybe (if your memory is good) some downy
hair around the eyes and ears, strikes you as the most familiar, the most
real. And again you could reach the conclusion that elephants have hair.

Note that both require being aware of one's thoughts: there is no stream
of consciousness without a "listener" hearing the thoughts. There is no
dimyon without an observer (and listener) watching the theater. This
is a kind of self-awareness essential for the idea of "free will" to
be meaningful. Free will is the ability to choose one's actions and
reactions, which is impossible if one can not perceive which thoughts
to choose among.

And therefore, the ru'ach, the seat of will, must be self-aware. Conscious
thought comes from the awareness of our thoughts, including our awareness
of that awareness itself, and so on in an infinite regress. Free will
comes from being able to monitor one's thoughts and edit them based on
judging what one monitors.

I am arguing that this is the ruach memalela -- not merely speech,
but the internal communication whether via words or dimyon.

And it's certainly a critical piece of bechirah. How can one modify
one's thoughts without those thoughts themselves being among the inputs
to our thinking?

Animals, that lack bechirah, do not have there own thoughts as fodder
for further thought. Their entire aparatus is far more like the computer
I'm typing on than like my human soul. They have pain -- it's a stimulus
meaning something is off and ought to be avoided. But without knowing
they are in pain, do they experience suffering?

I'm arguing no, and further, that this lack of possible experience of
suffering is reflected in the dinim of tzaar baalei chayim, as well as
in the prohibition of a chazan saying "al kan tzipor yagi'u Rachamekha."

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes
mi...@aishdas.org        "I am thought about, therefore I am -
http://www.aishdas.org   my existence depends upon the thought of a
Fax: (270) 514-1507      Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch


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