Volume 27: Number 153
Sun, 01 Aug 2010
Subjects Discussed In This Issue:
Message: 1
From: "kennethgmil...@juno.com" <kennethgmil...@juno.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 20:19:55 GMT
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Mitzva or Hechsher Mitzva
R' Micha Berger wrote:
> Even the SA (YD 33:12) doesn't clearly permit fruit outside EY
> bizman hazeh w/out hafrashah, as the Tzevi leTzadiq appears to
> limit this heter to cases where final processing was outside EY.
I haven't seen this Tzevi leTzadiq, so I could be totally wrong about this, but...
If you are translating "miruach" as "final processing", this is a serious
error. Miruach does occur some time after the produce is detached from its
source, but it is usually done at some point before it leaves the farm. The
phrase "final processing" could lead someone to think that it refers to
packing the fruit in little boxes, or even cooking it for dinner. In
actuality, it is very rare for something to be grown in one locality and to
have its miruah in another locality, and certainly not in another country.
One notable exception would be grapes which are grown specifically for
their wine, and olives which are grown specifically for their oil. In these
cases, the miruach occurs when the wine and oil are made, and it is
conceivable that someone might export such grapes or olives from Eretz
Yisrael, to make the wine and oil in chu"l. (One could wonder how this
could be a good idea economically, but I suppose I can imagine cases where
one prefers to transport the grapes, since there is no worry about stam
yaynom.)
Akiva Miller
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Message: 2
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 17:00:15 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Mitzva or Hechsher Mitzva
On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 08:19:55PM +0000, kennethgmil...@juno.com wrote:
: > Even the SA (YD 33:12) doesn't clearly permit fruit outside EY
: > bizman hazeh w/out hafrashah, as the Tzevi leTzadiq appears to
: > limit this heter to cases where final processing was outside EY.
:
: I haven't seen this Tzevi leTzadiq, so I could be totally wrong about
: this, but...
:
: If you are translating "miruach" as "final processing"...
I didn't either -- I was repeating RMJBroyde's terms.
Anyway, I think he means beyond miruach -- eg turning grapes into raisins.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger For a mitzvah is a lamp,
mi...@aishdas.org And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (270) 514-1507
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Message: 3
From: T6...@aol.com
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 23:26:15 EDT
Subject: Re: [Avodah] anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism"
From: Micha Berger _micha@aishdas.org_ (mailto:mi...@aishdas.org)
>> They have pain -- it's a stimulus
meaning something is off and ought to be avoided. But without knowing
they are in pain, do they experience suffering?
I'm arguing no, and further, that this lack of possible experience of
suffering is reflected in the dinim of tzaar baalei chayim, as well as
in the prohibition of a chazan saying "al kan tzipor yagi'u Rachamekha."
<<
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger
>>>>>
Animals do suffer. It is a cruel person who deliberately causes pain to
an animal for no good reason, or for fun. We will just have to agree to
disagree about this.
Our literature, our tefillos and so on, are full of references to Hashem's
chessed and goodness to all His creatures. According to you, animals
don't need it because a cat is no more sentient than a stalk of celery. I
can't even understand your point, it seems so bizarre and so self-evidently
wrong to me. So animals cannot possibly suffer? Well, in the words of the
Church Lady on the old Saturday Night Live, "Isn't that conVEEEENient!" You
can do what you like. Test toxic products on animals' eyes, cut up live
animals for surgical practice and don't waste money on anesthesia. I don't
even believe you believe what you wrote. And I know you are far from a
cruel person.
--Toby Katz
==========
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Message: 4
From: Zvi Lampel <zvilam...@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2010 21:16:45 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rishonim and Chazal (was One Opinion)
Re: [Avodah] Rishonim and Chazal (was One Opinion)
On Tue, 27 Jul 2010 Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 26, 2010 at 06:52:00PM -0400, R Zvi Lampel wrote:
>> > (a) Chazal did not have a single viewpoint on the matter, which left it
>> > open to analysis (between the viewpoints offered) for an original
>> > suggestion or, better yet, as the Rambam explains,
>> >
>> > (b) Chazal's principle that "the world follows its natural course,"
>> > based upon the /posuk, "/There is nothing new under the sun," is so
>> > over-arching that it outweighs the opposing/shitta/ implied in the
>> > /Ahvos/ /mishnah/.
>>
> I suggested over a decade ago a broader version of (b). That new
> approaches in aggadita and parshanut were valid if there was any
> mesoretic basis, and only invalid if suggested for reasons other than
> issures [issues?--ZL] raised internal to Torah.
>
I see what you say here as a restatement of (a), except for my
qualification (that the peshat is open to analysis "between the
viewpoints offered").
I did not mention in (a) the possibility of proving that the peshat
moves a Chazal into the non-peshat intended realm (although I referred
to that earlier in the essay); nor did I discuss (or feel qualified at
this point to discuss thoroughly) the legitimacy of proving that peshat
produces an alternative to _any_ peshat proferred by Chazal, at least if
it's a machlokess Chazal. The case in question does not require these
solutions because, as was my thesis, the Ramban under investigation (as
well as Rav Saadia Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Radak and the Zohar, and I think
others) does actually follow a Chazal.
The same can be said about the Ramban on the Ark's rate of descent.
Regarding the Ramban, the only remaining explanation he gives in
apparent disagreement with the one-and-only known peshat given by
Chazal, is regarding the years of Egyptian exile. Given the chazaka
established thus far, I would be very cautious before suggesting that
there was no Chazal upon which he supported himself.
Zvi Lampel
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Message: 5
From: "Chanoch (Ken) Bloom" <kbl...@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 00:00:04 -0500
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh, hashgacha pratit, and
On Tue, 2010-07-13 at 17:50 -0400, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 08, 2010 at 04:08:38PM -0500, Chanoch (Ken) Bloom wrote:
> : How am I to understand Rav Schwartz in light of these issues with his
> : conception of free will and hashgacha? (And how does he understand the
> : Ramchal, and REED?)
>
> I presume as you do, that he doesn't claim to be following REED. I
> also am enthralled with Dr Nathan Birnbaum's idea of Tif'eres, where
> one's mind is so unified that there is no clear line even between one's
> yir'as Shamayim and one's choice of living room end table. Everything
> is influenced by one's Jewishness - even aesthetics. (Which we don't
> need to revisit yet again.)
Though interesting, this idea of a Yirat Shamayim dictating all of one's
actions, even down to the choice of a living room end table isn't the
same thing as Hashem's hashgacha choosing your living room end table in
spite of your decision (yetzer harah?) otherwise.
> The problem you hit WRT the amendation to Chullin 7b "No one bruises
> (or even lifts) a finger down below unless a proclamation is issued from
> above" is one I hit chasing a few of RIS's quotes.
After looking more extensively into the hebrew word used here "nogef",
it seems that the best English translation of this is "strike" (rather
than "bruise") which suggests two possible modes of injury. In one mode,
an object moves to be in the path of the finger, and the finger hits it.
This one clearly comes from Hashem. In the other, it seems that the
person is careless and strikes his finger becuase he wasn't paying
attention to where it was going. Can we say this is truly under the
person's control? If we are to take the Gemara to its logical extreme,
perhaps we must say that Hashem takes over and decides where his finger
should go when he isn't moving it intentionally.
What are your thoughts on this understanding of the Gemara?
> I also have a problem mapping a large number of his many quotes of the
> Ramchal to the way the texts appear to me when I read them. My first
> example (and the only one I bothered keeping track of) from 1:7
> (cut-n-pasted from <http://bilvavi.net/content/view/280/32>):
> As the Ramchal wrote in Mesillas Yesharim (Ch. 1), "The truth is
> that the only true perfection (the true perfection of every single
> person without exception) is deveikus to Hashem." And he concludes,
> "Anything else considered good by people is vanity and deceptive
> emptiness."
>
> This is all a Jew really has in life - closeness to Hashem and
> deveikus to Him....
>
> Here's part of MY ch 1 (from <http://www.shechem.org/torah/mesyesh/1.htm>,
> I think it's R' Shraga Simmon's translation, but my confusion stemmed
> from reading it in the original, and is not due to translation
> subtleties):
In the translation of this chapter, deveikut is translated using the
words words union, unity, and united (depending on the grammatical form
of deveikut in the text).
> Our Sages of blessed memory have taught us that man was created
> for the sole purpose of rejoicing in God and deriving pleasure from
> the splendor of His Presence; for this is true joy and the greatest
> pleasure that can be found. The place where this joy may truly be
> derived is the World to Come, which was expressly created to provide
> for it; but the path to the object of our desires is this world,
> as our Sages of blessed memory have said (Avorh 4:21), "This world
> is like a corridor to the World to Come."
>
> The means which lead a man to this goal are the mitzvoth, in relation
> to which we were commanded by the Lord, may His Name be blessed. The
> place of the performance of the mitzvoth is this world alone.
>
> Therefore, man was placed in this world first - so that by these
> means, which were provided for him here, he would be able to reach
> the place which had been prepared for him, the World to Come, there
> to be sated with the goodness which he acquired through them. As
> our Sages of blessed memory have said (Eruvin 22a), "Today for their
> [the mitzvoth's] performance and tomorrow for receiving their reward."
>
> So, as I read the Ramchal, a Jew does NOT really have in life - closeness
> to Hashem and deveiques to Him". That's what he has in Olam haBa. In
> life, all a person has is the opportunity to become the kind of person
> capable of that closeness, and capable of enjoying it.
But the word deveikut doesn't appear anywhere in those three paragraphs
that you have just quoted.
In fact, the word deveikut appears in active form two paragraphs later:
???? ????? ??? ??? ?? ???? ???????? ?????? ?? ???????? ????
????? ?????? ???? ?? - ?? ?????? ????? ??.
To the extent that he has subdued his evil inclination and his
desires, and withdrawn from those factors which draw him further
from the good, and exerted himself to become united with it, to
that extent will he attain it and rejoice in it.
Look one chapter earlier, to the Ramchal's introduction, and you will
see that lists deveikut as part of a list of other goals that we are
able to accomplish in our lifetime.
?? ?? ??????? ??? ???? ?? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ?????, ??? ????
???? ???? ???? ?? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ????
?? ?? ?? ?????? ?????! ????? ?? ??, ?? ?? ????? ???? ???? ??????
???? ?? ??????? ??????? ????? ??? - ??? ???? ???? ???? ????
?????? ????????? ????????? ??? ????? ??? ?????, ?? ?? ???? ??
?????? ??? ??????? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ???????
?? ?? ????? ?????? ?? ?????? ????? ?? ???? ??????? ??????? ????
??????? ?? ?? ????? ??????, ?? ????? ??? ?????, ?? ?? ???? ??
????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ?????
(Here, he translates deveikut as intimacy.)
If we do not look into and analyze the question of what
constitutes true fear of God and what its ramifications are, how
will we acquire it and how will we escape wordly vanity which
renders our hearts forgetful of it? Will it not be forgotten and
go lost even though we recognize its necessity? Love of God, too
- if we do not make an effort to implant it in our hearts,
utilizing all of the means which direct us towards it, how will
it exist within us? Whence will enter into our souls intimacy
with and ardor towards the Blessed One and towards His Torah if
we do not give heart to His greatness and majesty which engender
this intimacy in our hearts? How will our thoughts be purified
if we do not strive to rescue them from the imperfections
infused in them by physical nature? And all of the character
traits, which are in such great need of correction and
cultivation -who will cultivate and correct them if we do not
give heart to them and subject them to exacting scrutiny?
I haven't compared this to Derech Hashem yet to determine whether he
explains deveikut there differently, but it seems your problem is a
misunderstanding of what the Ramchal means when he uses the word
deveikut.
--Chanoch
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Message: 6
From: Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 10:13:58 +0300
Subject: [Avodah] zecher lechurban
In todays daily halacha from ROY, he is lenient on making
a zecher lechurban in a home based on a Rambam that
the halacha applies only for pure limestone. Since today
the wallis covered with a mixture of materials one can be lenient
except for middat chassidut.
If the wall is covered by wallpaper he requires leaving the amah by amah
empty without any black paint
--
Eli Turkel
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Message: 7
From: Arie Folger <arie.fol...@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 12:10:09 +0200
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Rishonim and Chazal (was One Opinion)
I once analyzed the Gra's reasoning as to when it is warranted to
reinterpret passages allegorically, based on his commentary to the
aggadot of Rabba Bar Bar 'Hanna.
The following paragraph may be germane to the discussion about when
new interpretations are OK:
--------------------------------------------------
The text of the Be'ur HaGra is a reaction to a halachik ruling of
Rabbi Yossef Karo, where the latter cites a ruling from Maimonides
denying the effect of a magical formula. The Gra declares that
Maimonides was fooled by "the damned philosophy" and explains why the
latter's view is incorrect. Namely,
since we find numerous stories in the [Babylonian] Talmud ... and in
the Palestinian [Talmud] ... And the Torah attested "and they became
serpents" and see [what the] Zohar [expounds] there. And so too
amulets [are mentioned] in several places, and la'hashim, [to the
point that they are] too numerous to count them.
Black magic likely exists, since we find numerous occurrences in the
Oral Torah, and even in the Written Torah, that describe events that
came about through black magic.
Now we must ask, if the Gra wouldn't reject allegorical exegesis [his
whole work on those aggadot is allegorical in a way that clearly
supplants the literal reading--arie], on what basis would he reject
Maimonides's view? Neither the Gra nor Maimonides discuss any
rationale for rejecting the existence of spirits and of black magic.
It is possible that the Gra felt that in the light of the absence of
such rationale one could not demand the reinterpretation of countless
verses in the Torah and passages in the Talmud and the Zohar so that
the existence of spirits and black magic would not be necessary.
Indeed, the Gra might have wondered at the absence of such rationale
whether "the damned philosophy fooled him."
==== AD KAAN ====
I generally question the later reinterpretation of the words of our
holy Rishonim in order to make them conform with our own notions. The
Ramban writes in a way that strongly implies he sometimes disagreed
with 'Hazal. It may be that he found support for his position in other
statements of 'Hazal, but that was surely not so important to him,
because he does not always cite those sources supporting his view. In
other words, the Ramban writes in a way that shows he felt he was
disagreeing with 'Hazal or allowed himself to reinterpret them at his
own discretion.
Kol tuv,
--
Arie Folger,
Recent blog posts on http://ariefolger.wordpress.com/
* Brutal Women of Nazi Germany (appears Jul. 26)
* Gibt es in der Unterhaltungsliteratur eine Rolle f?r G"tt?
* If You Work With Garbage, You Will Get Dirty
* Cows moo-ve over: camel milk coming to Europe
* Scharfe Analyse der Gaza-Flotte auf ARD
* The New Face of Jewish Studitainment
* Should Humanity Call it Quits
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Message: 8
From: David Riceman <drice...@optimum.net>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 09:14:35 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] sevara vs. psak
<<Then R' Yochanan says that two who vote zakai because of different
pesuqim -- only one is counted. Not because two sevaros can't both be
valid (as you write, look at Eruvin 13b), but because each ruled out
a different issur. One must be wrong IF we are assuming he is only
standing trial for one of the two issurim -- wrong in the sense of
addressing the wrong topic.>>
I think you misrepresent the sugya here. The point of the sugya is that
votes in a capital case have to be intellectually independent (more about
this below). R. Yohanan is discussing the case of "ta'am ehad mishnei
mikraos" - - not two sevaros but one - - and his objection is that two
psukim are insufficient for independence, we also require two ta'amim. [I
see you make this point in a different context two paragraphs later]
<<Are you citing the fact that 12:2 doesn't mention stating which avreirah
and which pasuq is being violated? Just that it's an aveirah and what
the onesh is? I was under the impression thatnot knowing which pasuq
he's about to violate is the textbook hasra'as safeiq.>>
There are actually a pair of machloksim you are confusing - - one is
whether the witnesses have to cite a pasuk, or even a specific type of
execution, or whether it suffices to say that it's a capital crime, the
other is whether the witnesses need to know which crime the accused is
committing. See Kessef Mishna on H. Sanhedrin 12:2, and see H. Sanhedrin
16:4. The Rambam paskens in both cases to make it easier to convict
(l'humrah?).
Your initial question, however, is a good one. If you hold hasra'as safek
lo shmeih hasra'ah how can you understand the sugya in Sanhedrin? Here's a
tentative answer, which I like but for which I have no evidence:
We find very often in Tanach that the same mitzva, or the same moral trait,
is discussed numerous times (see R. Avraham ben HaRambam's book "Sefer
HaMaspik l'Ovdei HaShem" for lots of examples of the latter). If, indeed,
the Torah is parsimonious, why does this happen? I suggest that it happens
because there are many different perspectives on a mitzvah or a deiah, and
each passage is displaying a different perspective about its subject.
[You'll notice, for example, that you and I often agree on conclusions, but
we use very different methodology.]
The reason we require courts to be staffed by multiple judges is so that
they, too, can display multiple perspectives (its not a coincidence that
"70 panim laTorah" and 70 judges sit on the Sanhedrin). The requirement of
different mikraos and ta'amim is precisely to ensure that they are
performing their function of displaying different perspectives. But they
can all still be talking about the same issur.
For example, the passuk "kol d'mei ahicha tzo'akim elay min ha'adamah" shows a different aspect of murder than does "lo sirtzah".
Hasra'as safek is when the witness doesn't know which prohibition is being
violated; here we know the prohibition, it's just that each judge is
emphasizing a different aspect of it. The poor criminal not only gets
executed, he's forced to hear 13 mussar schmoozes first!
IIRC the Maharal says something a little like this when he discusses Hacham adif minavi.
<<But I'm talking about
multiple of the 613 from the same phrase.>>
I don't know if you've ever read Ibn Ezra's little book "Yesod Mora". He
argues that there can't be a unique enumeration of the mitzvos; I think
pashut pshat in the gemara in Sanhedrin is like him.
David Riceman
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Message: 9
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 16:01:49 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] Bilvavi Mishkan Evneh, hashgacha pratit, and
On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 12:00:04AM -0500, Chanoch (Ken) Bloom wrote:
: Though interesting, this idea of a Yirat Shamayim dictating all of one's
: actions, even down to the choice of a living room end table isn't the
: same thing as Hashem's hashgacha choosing your living room end table in
: spite of your decision (yetzer harah?) otherwise.
In fact, it's quite different -- opposites.
For such a person who acheived tif'eres, "chutz meyir'as Shamayim" would
exclude every decision. Therefore, Hashem's hashgachah is withheld,
because everything this person does is touched by his yir'ah.
I think this is true of all people, to varying degrees. No one's mind
is so absolutely compartmentalized that two topics in the same head have
absolutely no connecting associations.
:> The problem you hit WRT the amendation to Chullin 7b "No one bruises
:> (or even lifts) a finger down below unless a proclamation is issued from
:> above" is one I hit chasing a few of RIS's quotes.
: After looking more extensively into the hebrew word used here "nogef",
: it seems that the best English translation of this is "strike" (rather
: than "bruise") which suggests two possible modes of injury. In one mode,
: an object moves to be in the path of the finger, and the finger hits it.
: This one clearly comes from Hashem...
Unless you follow the Rambam, and the person's yedi'ah is insufficient
to get such levels of HP (hashgachah peratis). But since I don't know
too many people today who hold like the Rambam on this, I would
agree. (Just not use the word "clearly".)
: In the other, it seems that the
: person is careless and strikes his finger becuase he wasn't paying
: attention to where it was going. Can we say this is truly under the
: person's control? If we are to take the Gemara to its logical extreme,
: perhaps we must say that Hashem takes over and decides where his finger
: should go when he isn't moving it intentionally.
This touches on R' Dessler's position that only decisions that require
a conscious battle are included in bechirah chafshi. Thus, unconscious
decisions about where one's finger is aren't part of bechirah.
You also need to analyze the Kuzari's (5:20) types of events in a
person's life: E-lokis, Tiv'is, Miqreh and Bechirah. The actions
of a child, a sleeping person or someone insane are miqreh, not
product of bechirah. See my post at
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n142.shtml#10>, part of
a discussion about things that happen to us do to others' bechirah,
and how it relates to hashgachah.
To get back to my problem... None of this is actually muchrach from
the gemara, and we're backreading the position we're associating with
the Bilvavi back into shas. That's still not what the sefer itself is
doing -- using the gemara as a proof for the position as though the
gemara itself were incontravertably saying what he was.
And now the same, on MY ch 1:
: > I think it's R' Shraga Simmon's translation, but my confusion stemmed
: > from reading it in the original, and is not due to translation
: > subtleties):
...
: In the translation of this chapter, deveikut is translated using the
: words words union, unity, and united (depending on the grammatical form
: of deveikut in the text).
...
: > So, as I read the Ramchal, a Jew does NOT really have in life - closeness
: > to Hashem and deveiques to Him". That's what he has in Olam haBa. In
: > life, all a person has is the opportunity to become the kind of person
: > capable of that closeness, and capable of enjoying it.
: But the word deveikut doesn't appear anywhere in those three paragraphs
: that you have just quoted.
: In fact, the word deveikut appears in active form two paragraphs later:
: ???? ????? ??? ??? ?? ???? ???????? ?????? ?? ???????? ????
: ????? ?????? ???? ?? - ?? ?????? ????? ??.
: To the extent that he has subdued his evil inclination and his
: desires, and withdrawn from those factors which draw him further
: from the good, and exerted himself to become united with it, to
: that extent will he attain it and rejoice in it.
... in the world to come, as per the paragraphs I quoted that lead into
this one. Not that kibush hayeitzer is itself attaining closeness to HQBH.
Not that deveiqus /is/ the kibbush hayeitzer. Rather, as he was saying
until now, more kibbush now and even more attempts at deveiqus now means
actually acheiving enjoyment of His presence later.
(I don't like the "it" in this translation, and would have said "united
with Him ... rejoice in Him".)
But the question isn't so much defining deveiqus, it's whether the Ramchal
sees the task of olam hazeh in terms of closeness to Him in some vague
sense altogether. And he doesn't. He says that the more one searches for
sheleimus in this world, the more he will be able to attain and rejoice
in HQBH in the next. And yes, sheleimus INCLUDES tzam'ah nafshi lEilokim.
: Look one chapter earlier, to the Ramchal's introduction, and you will
: see that lists deveikut as part of a list of other goals that we are
: able to accomplish in our lifetime.
And in this paragraph that you quoted "nishtadel lidvoq bo". But that's
saying that part of a program of sheleimus is trying to cleave to the
A-lmighty. Not that "all we have in this world" is such closeness. Just
your words "as part of a list of other goals" is enough to contradict
the Bilvavi's interpretation.
Which is why I am not clear on the reason for your whole detour into
exactly what deveiqus means. It's not so much what is deveiqus as
much as whether he sees this life's goal in terms of wholeness or
in terms of closeness (keeping that vague) to Hashem.
If in a situation where you're forced to choose between davening bekavanah
or davening earlier but before you have the yishuv hadaas for kavanah,
would the Ramchal choose connecting to the Almighty, or developing the
middah of zerizus? We saw this become a pragmatic difference between
chassidim and misnagdim.
The Bilvavi portrays the MY as one who would tell you to go for the
kavanah. The MY himself doesn't look like that to me.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger "I think, therefore I am." - Renne Descartes
mi...@aishdas.org "I am thought about, therefore I am -
http://www.aishdas.org my existence depends upon the thought of a
Fax: (270) 514-1507 Supreme Being Who thinks me." - R' SR Hirsch
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Message: 10
From: Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 17:43:11 -0400
Subject: Re: [Avodah] anti-meat rhetoric "according to Judaism"
On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 11:26:15PM -0400, T6...@aol.com wrote:
: Animals do suffer. It is a cruel person who deliberately causes pain to
: an animal for no good reason, or for fun. We will just have to agree to
: disagree about this.
I think you simply don't see the basic chiluq I'm making. So, I'll try
to make it in a very different way.
An animal can feel pain. Conversely, it can get positive feelings when
aided.
: Our literature, our tefillos and so on, are full of references to Hashem's
: chessed and goodness to all His creatures.
Yes, as above.
: According to you, animals
: don't need it because a cat is no more sentient than a stalk of celery.
Not that they are no more sentient -- they are no more self-aware.
Level 1: Feeling pain. Pain is an input to an animal's psyche. It's not an
input to a stalk of celery's psyche, because there isn't even a psyche
to talk about.
Level 2: Feeling the fact that it's feeling pain. This requires
self-awareness, which in turn is a property of free will. With free
will, people have their thoughts as inputs to our psyches, so that
we can adjust our thoughts and decisions. But animals don't have
fee will, they don't have self awareness, so it doesn't go to level 2.
There is no level 3. Level 2, self-awareness, is the ability to look at
oneself. The loop is closed and can be chased infinitely without positing
any more structure to the mind or soul. Feeling the fact that one feels
the fact that one is feeling pain is just another self-awareness.
"Pain" was what I used to describe the level 1 phenomenon; "suffering"
is what I used to describe the level 2.
An animal's pain doesn't rise to a level of suffering. Our needs are
therefore qualitatively different than theirs.
What obligates us in sheluach haqein isn't the avoidance of the mother
bird's pain, because without suffering the pain is insufficient to
create such an obligation. If it were so, we couldn't shecht calves in
the presence of their mothers either. (And oso ve'es beno has nothing
to do with the animals knowing they are both dying on the same day --
it's totally not parallel.) What makes the obligation is our need not
to learn cruelty.
Like the stereotype of the mass murderer who as a boy would hurt small
animals for fun. The damage to the boy is far more significant than the
damage to the small animals.
Tir'u baTov!
-Micha
--
Micha Berger I have great faith in optimism as a philosophy,
mi...@aishdas.org if only because it offers us the opportunity of
http://www.aishdas.org self-fulfilling prophecy.
Fax: (270) 514-1507 - Arthur C. Clarke
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Message: 11
From: Eli Turkel <elitur...@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Aug 2010 14:40:13 +0300
Subject: [Avodah] davening on a plane
see
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3925879,00.html
--
Eli Turkel
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