Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 99

Sat, 21 Jul 2012

• 1. The Vilna Gaon?s Theorem ? Fact or Urban Legend? (Rafi Hecht) (Joel Schnur)
• 2. Re: Raising Nitzotzos (Akiva Miller)
• 3. Re: bittul torah for a talmid chochom's levaya (T6...@aol.com)
• 4. Re: [Areivim] what proportion would return to the yeshiva (Ben Waxman)
• 5. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (hankman)
• 6. Re: [Areivim] what proportion would return to the yeshiva (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Micha Berger)
• 9. Re: [Areivim] what proportion would return to the yeshiva (Zev Sero)
• 10. Re: bittul torah for a talmid chochom's levaya (Zev Sero)
• 11. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Chana Luntz)
• 12. Re: The Main Idea of Judaism (Chana Luntz)
• 13. iyov (Eli Turkel)

The story is that his uncle was a storekeeper-a kramer(Yiddish)-hence the
legend of it being his last name. He was Reb Eliyahu, HaGaon, HeChosid,
Rashkebehag, etc., but no last name.

 

If anyone is interested, I have a email blast list on many items dealing
with the Vilna Gaon and also on dikDuk. Email me offline, if you care to be
put on it.

 

___________________________

Joel Schnur

Senior VP

Government Affairs/Public Relations

Schnur Associates, Inc.

1350 Avenue of the Americas

Suite 1200

New York, NY 10019

 

Tel. 212-489-0600 x204

Fax. 212-489-0203 

j...@schnurassociates.com 

www.schnurassociates.com
<http://www.schnurassociates.com/>  

 

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R' Micha Berger offered some interesting and useful general ideas on
dealing with the yetzer hara. I'd like to add my own. RMB referred to some
approaches in martial arts, and similarly, I adapted my idea from a lesson
from one of my high school phys. ed. teachers.

He taught us to always praise the strength and skill of our opponent, most
especially *after* the game (or, in our nimshal, the battle). If one
unfortunately lost, he can console himself with, "I put up a good fight,
but he was stronger than me." And if he wins, he can proudly say, "He was
very strong, but I was stronger." Either way, there is very little to be
gained by deprecating the opponent.

(I do not mean to deny the idea that in some situations there can be great
value in saying that the opponent is an easily-defeated gornisht. I'm just
suggesting another approach.)

Akiva Miller

____________________________________________________________
Woman is 57 But Looks 27
Mom publishes simple facelift trick that angered doctors...
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/50095620538bd56207c27st52vuc

 
 
From: Rafi and Shifra Goldmeier  <goldmeier.fam...@gmail.com>


>> there is an obligation to  stop learning torah for a talmid chochoms 
funeral, until he has at least  600,000 attending.

My question is does that include creating a situation  when people will 
also not learn the next day? People didn't get home until 3  am, or 5 am, 
and clearly would not be able to learn the next day after being  up all 
night. My kids all went late to school and missed enough learning to  
prompt my question. I did not work efficiently today - if not for the  
fact that i work mostly for myself, I would have had a shailoh of  
short-changing a boss. So, is the next days bittul torah also included  
in that halacha or only the bittul torah at the time of the funeral?  <<

kol tuv
Rafi Goldmeier




>>>>>
 
Everyone should make up the missed learning (due to missed  sleep) during 
the hours that they would not have otherwise been  learning.  They should 
give up their Shabbos nap this week if  necessary.
 
As for "creating a situation when people will also not learn the next day"  
it was not human beings who "created" this situation.  It is not in  the 
hands of any human being to determine what time a tzaddik will die, and  since 
it is a long-standing rule that a body is never left overnight in  
Yerushalayim, the midnight levaya was also not really in the hands of human  beings.
 
Your kids will remember all their lives that they were at the levaya of Rav 
 Elyashiv.  The crowds they saw will engrave in their memories a picture  
of the kovod that Klal Yisrael gives to its great ones.  This is  a rare 
opportunity that must be taken when it comes.  Instead of sourly  expressing 
regret at the late start to the school day, you should emphasize to  your kids 
the amazing zechus they had to be in Yerushalayim at such a time and  to 
witness what they witnessed.
 
I reject completely the validity of this subject line:  "bittul torah  for 
a talmid chochom's levaya."  The mitzva of halvayas hames  especially in 
such a case is not bittul Torah, and the time it takes  to get home from the 
levaya also is not bittul Torah. 
 
Some people consider basketball or other exercise to be an unwarranted  
waste of time when youngsters could be learning every moment of every day.   
Others believe that a break from learning can help youngsters go back to their 
 learning later refreshed and healthy, with a new enthusiasm.  I am with 
the  latter group.  And if a break for exercise is worthwhile, kal vechomer a  
thousand times a break from learning in order to have the inspiration of  
seeing crowds of people being melave a great tzaddik to his final resting  
place.  The fact that this all took place in the middle of the night when  
people would otherwise have been home in their beds adds all the more to the  
inspiration and mystique of the event.  Everyone who saw this levaya will  
return to their learning with a fresh infusion of inspiration and enthusiasm 
for  Torah learning.
 

--Toby Katz
=============
Romney -- good  values, good family, good  hair


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As a followup question, do we really have rabbanim who have the din of 
the local rav today? With everyone able to get into a car and drive to 
see some gadol or write him a fax or call transatlantic, is there such a 
thing as a local rav?

Ben

On 7/20/2012 12:50 AM, Daniel M. Israel wrote:
>
> But the question I wanted to raise here is something else.  To what 
> extent is an army unit a kahilah in the sense that someone joining 
> such a unit would be obligated to accept the local mara d'asra?  Is 
> there a difference between a charedi soldier and a charedi who is 
> forced for health or parnassa reasons to move to a town where the Rav 
> ha'ir is RZ?  In general in such a case the typical response is to not 
> use the local Rav, and speak to a more charedi Rav by phone, but there 
> really is not halachic justification for this, is there?  (And I write 
> this as someone who is as guilty of it as everyone else.)
>

RDMI wrote:
I would argue that the main idea of Judaism is kol haTorah kulah. 

CM notes:

I agree, but that is just another way of saying the main idea of Judaism is
Ratzon Hashen, as ?kol haTorah kulah?  is the detail of the expression of
Ratzon Hashem.

Kol tuv
Chaim Manaster
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On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 10:50:24PM +0100, Daniel M. Israel wrote:
: But the question I wanted to raise here is something else. To what
: extent is an army unit a kahilah in the sense that someone joining such
: a unit would be obligated to accept the local mara d'asra? ...

If you plan on returning to your community of origin, you are not bound
by minhag hamaqom. I understand that minhag and pesaq are not the same
thing, but it would appear to be indicative.

-Micha

On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 04:49:36PM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:> If so, then perhaps we can just create a new parent ideal which 
:> combines those hierarchies into one. Starting with something like: 
:> Hashem made us to be autonomous creative beings who...

:> If you believe Hashem made us so that we should value other pursuits as 
:> ends in themselves (and I'm not asserting that, just paraphrasing my 
:> understanding of your point), then that too is part of the ideal of 
:> being what He made me to be.

: This is a different ideal than being an oveid hashem.  Part of being an 
: oveid hashem is precisely to abandon those aspects of one's personality 
: which don't fit into the mold.  In fact, as I tried to point out in 
: earlier posts, this ideal is so general as to raise the question of how 
: one can fail to meet this particular aspiration.

Let me recast my earlier thought...

Mimah nafshach. Either:

You believe that the pursuit of personal interests and creativity
is not part of Hashem's plan for your life. In which case, how can
one justify defying Hashem's plan?

Or:

You believe that HQBH making us creative and curious beings is a
positive, and that He expects us to pursue our own interests. If
so, then one /is/ following Hashem's plan for their life. He wants
us to pursue our own interests, and you are.

:            Why should there be a central message? The Abarbanel (in Rosh 
: Amana IIRC) denies that Judaism has ikkarim, and I think one can argue 
: plausibly that Western ethical theorists have gone wrong partly because 
: they spend too much effort looking for single unifying principles.

On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 10:02:06PM +0100, Daniel M. Israel similarly:
} I've been review this thread from the beginning, and unless I missed
} something, it seems like there hasn't been much (or any) argument against
} the idea that there is a "main idea" of Judaism.

Actually, RDB already asked this question back on the 5th
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol30/v30n085.shtml#10 :
> I'm still not 100% sure I understand what you are getting at, since what
> Hashem wants from people, broadly, is to transform their will to His Will.
> He has many things He wants us to accomplish, and the goal is for us to
> want to accomplish them all.

As I replied the next day:
= I think the gemara that introduces the whole notion of 613 mitzvos does
= just that -- tries to then sum them up with a Mission Statement for Life.

Does R' Simlai not start with 613 mitzvos, and then show how various
nevi'im consequently shrink them down to fewer and fewer principles?

For that matter, there is also not only Mikhah's "Mah tov umah H'
doreish mimekha KI IM...", as per R' Simlai, there is also MRAH's.

And the gemara lists various tanna'im's shitos on what is the "kelal
gadol".

Continuing that quote, I then gave a functional answer:
= People find Mission Statements useful, and I think one's avodas H'
= suffers if they can't contemplate a mental image of the forest rather
= than focusing on the various branches.

People need Mission Statements in order to stay inspired and on
target. That's why organizations craft them.

Back to RDR's current post:
:= Actually, RSS says qedoshim tihyu is *it*, not just /a/ mitzvah. Which 
:= can make sense, "qedhshah" isn't as specific as "akhilas matzah", after 
:= all. Here's the relevent quote, right after discussing the Toras Kohanim 
:= and the Ramban on "Qedoshim Tihyu": And so, it appears to my limited 
:= thought that this mitzvah includes the entire foundation and root of the 
:= purpose of our lives.
...
: I don't think that's what he means.  There is a long exegetical 
: tradition of playing up the significance of particular mitzvos.  In 
: Hazal it takes the form mitzvah X shakul k'neged kol hamitzos. There's 
: an essay attributed to the Ramban (printed in Chavel's Kisvei Ramban) 
: which derives Taryag Mitzvos from asseres hadibros.

RSS takes the Toras Kohanim (qedoshim tihyu - perushim tihyu) and the
Ramban's famous exposision of it and defines qedushah as exclusive
commitment. It's not just the standard pedagogy that would make RSS
say that qedushim tihyu is central, it's inherent in his translation
of the word qedushah.

However, that doesn't answer our question. Total commitment to what?
To some particular mission statement? To "kol haTorah kulah"? RSS
says it's to hatavah. But the mitzvah itself appears to me to explicitly
about making the pursuit of Hashem's Plan exclusive of other interests.
Perhaps one could even say "qedoshim tihyu" is the obligation to make
Hashem's Plan for your life as you understand it as much the sole goal
in your life as possible.

Something similar appears to be the message in Shema, "bekhol levavekha,
uvekhol nafshekha, uvekhol me'odekha". It would seem one isn't supposed
to be spending resources on things that aren't aimed at leading to
ahavas Hashem.

:= Issur and chiyuv are categorical. If they covered every possibility, 
:= there would be no variety, no human component to avodas Hashem after the 
:= poseiq does his job.

: This is the opinion of the Hovos HaLevavos, that Torah, when fully 
: individuated, has no reshus, everything is either obligatory or 
: forbidden.  He argues that the options are to leave room for individual 
: variation.  I find his opinion scarily totalitarian.

I didn't intend to discuss that, though.

I am talking about personal expression in how one worships G-d in
particular. If all of the Torah's desiderata were issurim or chiyuvim,
how a person follows the Torah would have nothing to do with who the
person is.

I am not talking about whether following the Torah is all a person
does, or not.

We touched on something related to that earlier in your post -- the
notion of whether Hashem wants us to follow our own pursuits. But this
isn't the same thing.

:= Picture if one Elul ... we did this for our Avodas Hashem...

: I've used a version of this as a Yom Kippur derasha.  It's not enough to 
: do tshuva for sins or even for dispositions: picture who you are now, 
: who you wish to be next year (or in a Shemita or Yovel), and how you 
: expect to make the transition.  The mechanism of transition is the most 
: important part, and, as you hint, you need to break it down into small 
: steps.

I'm not sure how the two are related. I didn't suggest a way to break
down change into small steps. I gave a way to relate as many of my
daily activities as possible to whatever it is I hope (or better: I
think Hashem Wants for me) to accomplish in life.

: Why doesn't it work just as well for just a little time every day? Not 
: everything you do at work ties directly into the Master Plan.

Again, I think it's supposed to, although I know you don't. So obviously
my tool will reflect my perspective. And no, the whole point of the
tool is to encourage ever more time doing things you believe to be more
important by keeping ultimate goals in mind during life's small decisions.

-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Zion will be redeemed through justice,
mi...@aishdas.org        and her returnees, through righteousness.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On Mon, Jul 16, 2012 at 11:29:16AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> On a more general level I don't understand your point.  The Maharsha  
> construes the gemara as praising "lishmah" in the sense of "having no  
> personal benefit from the act". The Yerushalmi is discussing whether the  
> raped wife of a cohen needs to get divorced.  One would expect different  
> criteria for these very different contexts.

They're not just different criteria for different context, they're
different topics altogether. We're talking about whether a thought can
turn a sin into something positive. A kohein not being married to his
wife the rape victim has nothing to do with whether or not she sinned
altogether. The divorce is not punitive. The whole topic of guilt vs
merit doesn't apply.

-Micha

On 19/07/2012 5:50 PM, Daniel M. Israel wrote:
>
> But the question I wanted to raise here is something else.  To what
> extent is an army unit a kahilah in the sense that someone joining
> such a unit would be obligated to accept the local mara d'asra?  Is
> there a difference between a charedi soldier and a charedi who is
> forced for health or parnassa reasons to move to a town where the Rav
> ha'ir is RZ?  In general in such a case the typical response is to not
> use the local Rav, and speak to a more charedi Rav by phone, but there
> really is not halachic justification for this, is there?  (And I write
> this as someone who is as guilty of it as everyone else.)

A soldier has not "moved" to the IDF's virtual "makom", he is merely
visiting, so if we follow this line of reasoning he's privately still
bound by the minhagim of his home, but he may not publicly be meikil
in something where the local minhag is to be machmir.

There's another twist: his visit is not by his own choice, so to
whatever extent a visitor in a town can be considered to have voluntarily
accepted the temporary authority of the local minhagim, he has not done
so.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

On 20/07/2012 9:57 AM, T6...@aol.com wrote:
> Your kids will remember all their lives that they were at the levaya
> of Rav Elyashiv.  The crowds they saw will engrave in their memories a
> picture of the kovod that Klal Yisrael gives to its great ones.  This
> is a rare opportunity that must be taken when it comes.

I believe this can be included in the rubric of "shimusha yoter milimudah".

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

On Mon, Jul 16, 2012 at 11:29:16AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
> On a more general level I don't understand your point.  The Maharsha 
> construes the gemara as praising "lishmah" in the sense of "having no 
> personal benefit from the act". The Yerushalmi is discussing whether 
> the raped wife of a cohen needs to get divorced.  One would expect 
> different criteria for these very different contexts.

And RMB writes:

>They're not just different criteria for different context, they're
different topics altogether. We're talking about whether a thought can turn
a sin >into something positive. A kohein not being married to his wife the
rape victim has nothing to do with whether or not she sinned altogether. The
divorce >is not punitive. The whole topic of guilt vs merit doesn't apply.

Actually, I think you will find that while the piece of Mishna on which this
gemora is commenting relates to the wife of a cohen, by the time the piece I
quoted is dicussed, the discussion has moved on to the more general din (ie
for the wife of a Yisrael) that rape paturs from compelling divorce, where
ratzon does not.  So indeed the topic of guilt and merit heavily applies.
And it is in this context that the discussion is regarding the case before
Rav Yochanan, where the woman claimed rape, and he initially assumed that
(a) she *must* have enjoyed it (or had a benefit) in the end, and that (b)
since she enjoyed it in the end, she ought to be divorced.  She accepts (a)
in her argument (hence the idea of sticking the finger *with honey* into his
mouth on Yom Kippur, honey being something that everybody enjoys and
benefits from) but argues against (b), which he ultimately accepts.  The
point I am deriving from this story is that Rav Yochanan appears to assume
as the general course that women will enjoy/have benefit, even if forced,
which is why the different context does not matter.  

>-Micha

Shabbat Shalom

Chana

I am rearranging the order of some of RDR's quotes in order to discuss some
items earlier than others:

RDR writes:

>Incidentally, I still find the concept of zuhama cryptic (more below).
...
>I'm at a disadvantage here because I don't know what zuhama is.  As I
implied before, however, I think the gemara's point is that it's not a
situation >where you have to balance advantages and disadvantages - - if
there is zuhama she won't find him attractive.

Zuhama is, according to the midrash, what the snake injected in Chava, ie a
form of impurity, which is then passed down by sexual transmission, but was
lifted from Bnei Yisrael at Sinai. Oddly enough it appears to bear a certain
resemblance to the Xtian doctrine of Original Sin (absent the effect of
Sinai).

Thus my reading of the situation is that she willingly accepted upon herself
a detriment, zuhuma, not the usual benefit that comes with the act of
relations.  But the only reason she was even aware of zuhuma was because she
was such a tzadekes (as the gemora and midrash makes clear when discussing
it in relation to her).  That is, for somebody on her spiritual level, it
was an additional disincentive to have relations, and hence part of what
made the act so clearly lishma - because there was and could be no ulterior
motive in Yael's mind, knowing that she would get no benefit from the
encounter (unlike the Imahos, who also no doubt had the praiseworthy goal of
building up the Jewish people, but in the meantime intended and did benefit
from the encounter).

I wrote: 
> <<Now, again I think you are misreading this Tosphos, but to 
> understand this aspect, you need to go to the gemora in Baba Kama 
> which this is drawn (32a). The gemora there makes a husband liable for 
> any damage that he does to his wife during the course of tashmish. But 
> a query is raised, why is it the husband's problem and not the wife's, 
> since the husband is permitted to have tashmish - answer - but it is 
> only the husband who is doing an act - "kavid ma'aseh", so he is 
> responsible for hurting her, and she bears no liability.>>

RDR:

>Admittedly this is a plausible reading of the gemara there, but, as you say
below, it makes no sense.

I didn't say it made no sense.

I did say:

> <<But the problem with that is if you take it too far, as I suggested 
> in my earlier post, then you ought to get women off scot free from 
> committing adultery, because they never do any act, it is always the 
> man doing it all.>>

And RDR said:

>And here you've made it explicit.

It is not me that is making it explicit, it is the gemora.  The gemora
states, point blank, that a husband is responsible for physical injury to
his wife during tashmish because he does the act, not her.  No ifs not buts,
nor maybes.  And that is how it is brought down in the codes, including in
the Shulchan Aruch.  Now either you assume that the gemora is completely
ignorant as to the nature of tashmish (as are all the codes), and believes
that all women lie back and think of England, or you have to conclude that
they understand that what a woman does in normal tashmish is not deemed a
ma'aseh, but rather is deemed a hana'ah to her (and this is true whether or
not she lies back and thinks of England or whether she takes what we would
consider to be an active part in the proceedings).  The latter seems to me
far more plausible.

But once the gemora concludes in this vein, it has to learn out that it is
the hana'ah that makes women liable for adultery, because women do not act.


Note however that this whole discussion is in the context of women
consenting (the wives presumably are consenting to the tashmish with their
husbands, and the adulterers to the adultery).  Ie first you need consent
(otherwise you are in karka olam territory) once you have consent, then the
hana'ah aspect is what is equivalent to the ma'aseh aspect and creates
liability in terms of onesh, but not in terms of unintentional physical
injury, where the physical reality prevails (absence of an act on behalf of
a woman).

> See Rabbi Heller's comments on the Rosh ad. loc. >(Pilpula Harifta S.K.
reish); he suggests an okimta: that the gemara is discussing only the case
>where she is passive.  

Can you give me a Hebrew books or other cite, as I would like to see this
inside?  However, if such an explanation was normative, then you would have
expected a qualification of this nature to be included in the Tur, Beis
Yosef, Shulchan Aruch etc, but they are not.

>And this suggests that we're arguing about whether the gemara construes
passivity as a normative description of how women behave during tashmish, as
you >imply, or whether it's an option, but by no means an exclusive option,
as I think they imply.

Firstly, it depends on what you mean by passivity.  I may not mean by
passivity what you mean by passivity, or rather, I think the use of the
English term passivity is misleading.  My understanding of what the gemora
is saying is that women do not, as a matter of fact, do an act in the course
of tashmish, as the gemora understands the term act ie ma'aseh.  Ie it is
*not possible* for a woman to do an act in the course of tashmish.  If that
is what you mean by passivity, then yes, I am saying that women are (always)
passive.  But I would not use the English word passive to describe what I
believe the gemora is talking about, because in English we tend to use the
word passive, certainly in this context, to mean a woman not getting
pleasure from the situation, and I don't think this is what the gemora is
talking about at all.  That is, and I am trying to work out how to say this
in an appropriate way on a family list, I think the gemora understands women
to be passive, ie not to be doing any ma'aseh, even if she - well I want to
use the O word, but am not sure it is appropriate on this list.  Ie even
that is not considered a form of ma'aseh.

>  See Rabbi Heller's evidence from Massaches Kallah (evidence, if we needed
any, that he was a hacham, since he cited Masseches Kallah in a halachic
>context).

You will have to be more explicit as to the reference.  But I do not agree
that: 

>And, indeed, the language of Tosafos fits Rabbi Heller's okimta.

Not the Tosphos we have been discussing, nor the Tosphos on the page in Baba
Kama (32a) d"h ihu k'avid ma'aseh:

"v'mahu l'inyan chatas ul'inyan malkos chayaves d'rachmana achshive
l'hana'ah ma'aseh"

Not that it really is a ma'aseh, but that it is equated for the purpose of
chatas and malkos etc

RDR:
>No, I think there are two loopholes.  The first is passivity, and the
second is coercion.  

But if there are two independent loopholes, that would seem to mean that not
only is a woman not liable if she is coerced, she is not liable if she is
passive (whatever that means) even if not coerced.  

So if you take this ukimta, assuming that I have understood it correctly,
and differentiate between a woman who decides to lie back and think of
England, and one who takes physical pleasure from the act, you appear to end
up with the startling proposal that a woman who is caught in the act of
adultery, where it is agreed by all that she was not coerced, can exempt
herself from the death penalty by demonstrating (or perhaps even merely
asserting) that she was passive and didn't find the act pleasurable.  Where
do you have evidence of an additional defence over and above ones (which is
clearly the coercion aspect)?

(And on the flip side, the husband can patur himself from paying damages for
injuring his wife by asserting that she was enjoying it - and given kim li,
that would seem to suggest that he would almost never have to pay).

I wrote:

<<Note by the way that the Tosphos further up on Nazir 23b (d"h "Tamar")
also supports this understanding, the gemora describes Tamar has having
"zinsa" and Tosphos's comment is "niskavanan l'shem shamayim .." that is why
she is praised - it is her kavana that makes it different from the situation
with Zimri, who also zinsa.>>

>I agree that this is a puzzling gemara: it's especially puzzling according
to your opinion, since Zimri was male and Tamar was female.  

Not really, by consenting, Tamar brings herself into the same category as
Zimri.  Just as Yael does, except that she knows that she will get no
benefit, while Tamar was presumably not unhappy to get the benefit.

>Shogeig vs. meizid, however, clearly are defined by what's in a person's
head.

As is mesasek - if the person never intended to do the act at all. But at
least one understanding is that the act it still a form of averah, that of
being mechalel shabbas, but the person is completely patur, because they
never intended the act.  

And so similarly is this in Yael's head - if she had intended to have
pleasure/benefit from Sisera, she would have been guilty of an averah
b'mazid.  But her act was not shogeg (she did not forget that adultery was
assur, or have it happen thinking that he was her husband when he wasn't),
nor was it mesasek, she intended the act to occur.  Thus the gemora
characterised it as an averah, but an averah lishma.  I think one could say
a similar thing about being mechalel shabbas (note the language) for pikuach
nefesh.  The difference being that most of us who are mechallel shabbas for
pikuach nefesh are not doing it lishma - we are doing it out of concern for
the welfare/benefit of the person (or, if a doctor, to advance his/her
professional career - but the existence of this very real benefit does not
stop a doctor being permitted to be mechalel shabbas for pikuach nefesh
reasons).  And if two people do the same act of being mechallel shabbas, the
one doing it because in his head he is intending for pikuach nefesh reasons,
and the other one not, the one would be considered on a high spiritual
level, and the other not, demonstrating that it all is really about what is
in the head, it is the intent that brings it into the mutar category.

In Yael's case, not only was it permissible to do the averah, because of the
overriding goal of saving klal yisroel (just as one is permitted to be
mechalel shabbas to save a person's life), but she was doing it in
circumstances where there was a detrimental side effect, hence the
additional praise (rather like, if somebody was mechalel shabbas for pikuach
nefesh in circumstances where doing the act would get themselves sacked, ie
there was in addition a personal downside to themselves, that would seem
logically to garner them additional spiritual praise).

But it is all about intent, it is the intent that in circumstances where two
halachic principles clash which makes the overriding of one for the sake of
the other mutar.

>David Riceman

Shavuah Tov

Chana

< If you look at that gemara, Iyov is described
as living a very long time. In other words, there is no reason to assume
that when R' Yochanan and R' Elazar puts him in the era of the Shofetim,
or the same R' Elazar places him contempory to the return from Bavel,
it is not clear that they mean *instead* of living in Moshe's day. >>

If you go from the earliest time in the days of Yaakov to the return from
Bavel
it is much longer than 1000 years (I havent worked it out exactly). Hard to
believe that some Jew lived through all of that without any hint in Tanach.
This certainly is much more than Serach who was supposed to carry the
message.
Of course the opinion that Iyov didnt exist certainly conflicts with these
opinions.

BTW if he did live some 1200 years when did the story of iyov occur in his
lifetime?

-- 
Eli Turkel
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