Avodah Mailing List

Volume 30: Number 181

Tue, 25 Dec 2012

• 1. Re: Lifnei Iver (Zev Sero)
• 2. Re: Vaccinations (Daas Books)
• 3. Lama Li KeRa, Sevara rules (Meir Rabi)
• 4. Re: Mesora (Meir Shinnar)
• 5. Polygamy (was: Isha raah) (Daas Books)
• 6. Re: Polygamy (Zev Sero)
• 7. Rambam on Allegorizing Pesukim (was: Mesora) (h Lampel)
• 8. Re: Polygamy (Lisa Liel)
• 9. Re: Polygamy (Zev Sero)
• 10. Re: Polygamy (Lisa Liel)

On 24/12/2012 4:41 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 03:56:53PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
>> Indeed, the issur on selling weapons to nochrim who are suspected to be
>> violent criminals is in hilchos nezikin.
>
> And to Yehudim who are similarly suspected -- mesayei'ah PLUS neziqin.
> (Not sure why the word "nakhriim" found its way into the original
> sentence.)
>

Because the halacha is written about nochrim, at a time when every stam
nochri was so suspected.  There are no Yehudim who are "similarly suspected";
it is extended to Yehudim who are *known* to be listim, not just suspected
on general principles.


-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

Micha wants this to go to Areivim but I need to reply to his Avoda-specific editorial comment:

When our oldest child was of vaccination age, we read all the lay
literature (from official sources) which flatly states that there is a
statistical risk - some kids do get sick and some do even die from
vaccines. We met with an RN to discuss the matter. She basically echoed
what Dr. Shinnar has said, namely, there are indeed risks and the main
reason to vaccinate is for the good of the community, even though
statistically that puts some individuals at risk. In other words, she told
us that to be concerned did not make us flat-earth nuts. So that left us
with a dilemma - do we put our child at risk by injecting him with a
vaccine or put him at risk by not injecting him with a vaccine. 

We took this information to Rav Y. Berkovitz shlita who told us that pshia
- negligence - is defined by what most reasonable people do. If most people
vaccinate and Reuven doesn't, and his child contracts that disease chas
v'shalom, he could be considered negligent. Or vice-versa. I asked him
which group of people define the community, he said the greater community,
not your microcosm, including non-Jews.

On Dec 24, 2012, at 5:31 PM, avodah-requ...@lists.aishdas.org wrote:
> 
> [Replies to Areivim. However, given Dr Shinnar's last paragraph, it
> would be foolhardy for me to leave the illusion on Avodah that there
> actually are people who actually study the field who came out against
> vaccinations. -micha]
> 

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> RMeir Rabi writes:

>> Bava Kama 46b. No need for a Passuk that HaMotzi MeChaVeiro carries
>> the burden of proof.

>  What is this quote intended to show?

Just another example, I believe that in an earlier comment on this topic
someone suggested a very limited list of applications of this rule.

>> And from Medrash, one of my favorites, Betzalel figures out for
>> himself that the Mikdash must be constructed BEfORE the vessels since they
>> must have a place to be housed. And so even though Moshe Rabbenu instructed
>> him to first make the vessels, he reversed the sequence so it made sense
...
>> Now here is the real kicker: it is this common sense that is reflected
>> in his name - indeed he was in the shadow of Gd, BeTzeil Keil and thus knew
>> the correct sequence.
...

[REMT:]
> Look in the g'mara.  Hashem told Moshe to make the mishkan first,
> and then the keilim.  Moshe reversed the sequence in his instructions to
> B'tzaleil, who used his common sense to realize Moshe's error.  Chas
> v'shalom to say that common sense can override a direct statement from the
> RbSO.

In your haste you have read more into my observation than I said. I
agree that HKBH can instruct us to do things that are contra-intuitive.
At the same time some Meforshim are troubled by Moshe Rabbenu having
made a mistake, and explain that it was a test to prove the greatness
of Betzalel, and it was proposed by HKBH.

It makes no difference, common sense overrides the instructions that are
communicated from HKBH via Moshe Rabbenu. And this was the test set by
HKBH to prove the greatness of Betzalel.

Best
Meir Rabi

> 
> 
> 
One last try
>> WRT RZL's challenge, one doesn't say hazal were wrong - and one may
>> even believe that one has uncovered the esoteric meaning of hazal.
>> However, the reason to look for the esoteric meaning, rather than
>> what everyone else understands, lies in new information that
>> mandates a reinterpretation.
> 
>> If you want one rishon that practices this - look at Shmuel Ibn
>> Tibbon, translator of the rambam, whom the rambam valued - and his
>> *Ma'amar Yikkawu ha-Mayim - *reinterpreting parshat breshit
>> according to Aristotle's On Meteorology.
> 
> I am relieved that RMS agrees that the Rambam does not legitimatize 
> saying Chazal were wrong. He proceeds to discuss reinterpretation of 
> what /Chazal/ meant based upon new information. However, our discussion 
> was about /rishonim/ reinterpreting what Chazal held /pesukim/ meant in 
> light of alleged facts not known previously. (A nafka minnah would be 
> dismissing the peshat of the Mabul and reinterpreting it as an 
> allegory -- the notion that sparked this discussion.) And that is what my 
> challenge was regarding, as quite clearly stated:
> 
>    "I am interested in seeing an example of a rishon who, based on new
>    information, changed, or posited that we should change, the
>    traditional/conventional way of understanding the basic nature of
>    any Torah narratives from historical to allegorical. As far as I can
>    see, any rishon who posits that a particular narrative is meant
>    allegorically maintains that this was the way Chazal understood it
>    all along."
> 
> In any case, I am delighted that RMS brings to the fore yet another 
> source that overturns his thesis, R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon's /Ma'amar 
> Yikkavu ha-Mayim./
> 
> Now, when serious Torah scholars speak of rishonim, they mean framers 
> and transmitters of the mesorah -- men such as Rashi, Rambam, Ramban, 
> Radak, Ibn Ezra. It is not at all clear that Ibn Tibbon has the status 
> of a rishon, despite the time in which he lived, and despite praises 
> spoken of him at his levaya. And R. KPCH questions whether the praises 
> the Rambam wrote to him of his abilities constituted his final informed 
> opinion. (<http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/mahshevt/more/hakdama-2.htm>)
> <http://www.torah.org/learning/rambam/special/kapach.html>
> 

If RZL wants to argue that the rambam's philosophic approach left few
followers amongst whom he would consider rishonim - ( and there is some no
true Scotsman at work...), hemmmm may be on stronger ground. However, even
there, few who actually read the rambam would have agreed with rzl's pshat
- they actually read what the rambam said (and disagreed) 

However, in any discussion of Jewish philosophy - Rav shmuel bin tibbon is
one of The major ba'ale hamesora -  he created the Hebrew philosophic
vocabulary, and translated the moreh  nevuchim and Shmona perakim - in the
translations which were the standard ( even if not only) for all of
nonarabic Jewry - which is how they knew the philosophic side of the
rambam.  
Yes, Rav kafih disagrees with( and disparages) rsit, but it remains that
for centuries, RSIT was our pathway to the rambam (btw, while I know no
Arabic, I know serious people who prefer RSIT to Rav Kafih)

Therefore, an argument against Rav shmuel ibn tibbon as one of the
"transmitters of the Mesorah" reflects an understanding that does not view
the moreh nevuchim as part of the Mesorah  - and an understanding that
still can't grapple with what the moreh says ( one is again reminded of the
rambam's parable of the palace, and where, in issues of understanding the
true meaning of Torah, ,he placed most of those whom RZL views as the true
rishonim...)

If one wants examples of rishonim who allegorize as RZL wants, one must
therefore look to those  who truly accepted the Moreh - eg, the schools in
Provence.  One can think thereforeof malmad hatalmidim ...( whose author
was defended by many who are accepted as rishonim..., eg, the meiri)

However, if one merely wants a rishon (hopefully accepted as such by RZL -
who is willing to go completely against hazal, albeit from a different
perspective than the rambam, one of the best examples was brought by RMB -
the rashbam's understanding of vayehi  vayehi broker...Completely against
hazal's understanding..

Meir Shinnar

Maybe a different way of asking your question is: what?s the Torah hashkafa
behind the permission of polygamy on the one hand and the prohibition
against polyandry on the other?

One of Dovid?s wives - Maachah the daughter of Talmai, king of Geshur - was
captured in warfare and he married her in order to fulfill that mitzvah
(Sanhedrin 107a).

It seems to me that that sugya in Sanhedrin clarifies that Dovid was able to
marry multiple (18) wives only because he was able to care for them (onah)
fully and equally (even into his old age). It implies that a man who has
that capacity could potentially have multiple wives, but in several other
places the Gamara admonishes us not to try this at home.

R? Tarfon married 300 wives (Yerushalmi Yevamos 4). There was a famine and
as a Cohen he had plenty of food.

But the question remains ? why this heter exclusively for men?


On 12/19/12 4:26 PM, "avodah-requ...@lists.aishdas.org"
<avodah-requ...@lists.aishdas.org> wrote:

> I'm very weak on history. Who do we know of that DID have plural wives, beyond
> Avraham, Yaakov, and David Hamelech? And do we know WHY they (Dovid, for
> example) took the additional ones?


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On 25/12/2012 12:12 PM, Daas Books wrote:
> Maybe a different way of asking your question is: what?s the Torah
> hashkafa behind the permission of polygamy on the one hand and the
> prohibition against polyandry on the other?
>
> But the question remains ? why this heter exclusively for men?

That's very simple: it's the definition of "marriage".   A woman is married
to a man, and what that *means* is that she is forbidden to all others.
If she isn't then by definition it isn't a marriage, any more than a same-
sex partnership is one, or a business partnership is one.  "Kidushin"
means an exclusive reservation; the opposite of "harei at mekudeshet li"
is "harei at muteret lechol adam".  But a man is not married to a woman;
an attempt to force that meaning on a marriage invalidates it, because
it means the parties don't understand what marriage *is*.  (That's the
problem with double-ring ceremonies.)  He is not a married man, but a man
with a wife.  Therefore there is no reason he can't be in more than one
marriage, and be a man with two wives, or three hundred.

-- 
Zev Sero        "Natural resources are not finite in any meaningful
z...@sero.name    economic sense, mind-boggling though this assertion
                  may be. The stocks of them are not fixed but rather
                 are expanding through human ingenuity."
                                            - Julian Simon

On Sun, 23 Dec RMS wrote (Re: [Avodah] Mesorah):

     I had brought two sources.

     One of them, is in the context of a discussion of a particular issue

''A particular issue.'' To be more specific: Whether the wolf and lamb 
prophecy is literally referring to a future change in animal behavior, 
or is an allegorical reference to gentiles and Jews.

The Rambam says that assigning an exclusively allegorical meaning to a 
posuk is valid when doing so is consistent with, and called for by, 
Chazal and their principles (which include specific approaches towards 
peshat, and reason and logic accessible to the original readers and Chazal).

     - RZL argues it only applies to that issue,

No. I argued that it applies to the general issue the Rambam and we are 
discussing: the parameters of the license to allegorize pesukim which, 
the Rambam says, include non-disagreement with Chazal and proper 
understanding of peshat (verses RMS' extension to RE-intepreting pesukim 
as allegorical when their peshat and Chazal indicate they are not 
allegorical.

So yes, only to that broad issue. ''The Rambam does not address, and 
from all evidence did not think possible, the notion that a newly 
introduced, exclusively allegorical reading of pesukim could be 
compelled by new information that had been inaccessible to the original 
readers of the pesukim and/or Chazal. Presumably, he held that Hashem 
would not have deceived generations of Jews since Moses in such a way.)''

      - RZL argues ...[that] that issue has general rabbinic support, 
even if not for the details.

RMS is once again misrepresenting the crux of that argument. As I 
showed, and in a follow-up post to this misrepresentation of my stand, 
emphasized IN BLOCK LETTERS, it is THE RAMBAM HIMSELF, IN THIS PIECE, 
THAT EXPLICITLY INVOKES THE GENERAL RABBINIC SUPPORT for that ''issue'' 
(the principle that the nature of animals will not permanently change 
even in Moshiach's time), and that he invokes specific rabbinical 
principles in support for all instances of allegorizing. The Rambam says 
that although he cannot produce a source that explicitly allegorizes 
this prophecy, he does have principles from Chazal that TAUGHT HIM that 
this prophecy was meant allegorically. Why does RMS continue to make it 
sound like it's my clever discovery of a talmudic source that happens to 
coincide with the Rambam's shittah that is actually based upon his 
personal dislike of the idea of miracles?

      whether or not that is the correct reading, ...

RMS needs to show how there can be any other reading.

     ...how limiting that reading is,  can be argued

But for the argument to be respectable, it needs to be backed by facts. 
This is in direct contrast to RMS "argument" that is nothing but a plea 
to disregard, shrug off, or play down what the Rambam actually says. You 
can ''prove'' anything with such methodology.

RMS claimed that it is clear that the Rambam expanded the license for 
allegorization beyond the parameters he explicitly said he invoked.

RMS' proof, however, assumes without basis the very thing he is claiming 
to prove: that the Rambam expanded the license for allegorization beyond 
the parameters he invoked.

(And asserts, without basis, that the Rambam's invocation of talmudic 
sources is just something the Rambam ''likes to do,'' and has nothing to 
do with the standard scholastic procedure and obligation to cite sources 
for ones stand---a procedure the Rambam himself demands of all, 
especially his opponents.

This constitutes a clear proof?

This, to put it kindly, is circular reasoning that is not a very worthy 
"proof."

      (in some sense, extending what RZL,   as there is a source for 
hazal for olam keminhago holech...

Again, it is getting very frustrating to see RMS repeatedly ignoring the 
fact, despite repeated reminders, IN BLOCK LETTERS, no less, that it is 
the Rambam, not I, who explicitly invokes this principle.

The Rambam explains how the principle of ''Olom k'minhago holeich'' 
relates to miracles. It only relates to those kinds of miracles that 
involve essential changes in things (such as staves into snakes, or 
wolves into vegetarians), and restricts their duration. ''Olom k'minhago 
holeich'' says that such changes can only be non-permanent, and must 
soon revert to their original form and nature. This is in contrast to 
the kinds of miracles that merely tweak the normal intensity, timing or 
location of natural events (such as the unusual intensity of locusts in 
Egypt at the pronounced time), or the repeated tying of certain kinds of 
events to others without a natural connection (such as the rewards for 
righteous behaviors and punishments for evil acts). These can last forever.

RMS portrays an erroneous idea of the Rambam's attitude about biblical 
statements whose face value indicates they are talking about miraculous 
events. He confuses:

a) Concocting the presence of miracles in reports of events when the 
peshat of the pesukim and/or Chazal does not warrant it (or if it is at 
odds with accepted principles),

with

b) Recognizing where the peshat (and/or Chazal) indicates miraculous 
events.

Despite the ability to ''explain away'' the miracles reported in the 
latter category (see Rabbeynu Saadia Gaon in Emunos V'dei'os for several 
examples) the Rambam upholds the understanding that they were indeed 
miracles.

The Torah's depiction of the plagues of Egypt is an example of the latter.

So is the Mabul.

As the Rambam states in Moreh Nevuchim (2:25), ''If we were to accept 
...that Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, 
we should disbelieve all miracles and signs, ... unless the miracles are 
also explained figuratively. The Allegorists amongst the Mohammedans 
have done this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions.''

The only requirement for accepting that a posuk is reporting the 
occurrence of a miracle is the fact that it is indicated by Chazal or 
the peshat of a posuk (unless this would be overturning an accepted 
principle, such as the impossibility that Hashem would enact through a 
prophet a miracle greater than those He enacted through Moshe Rabbeynu). 
RMS is baseless and contra the Rambam's statements in his indication 
that the Rambam demands any stronger support than this before 
maintaining that a miracle took place.

      and that torah is true, ...

By this RMS means that the Torah must be continuously reinterpreted 
whenever it fails to fit the latest ''truths'' accepted by current wisdom.

     there is now rabbinic support for radical allegorization of 
everything that conflicts with those statements..., but I doubt that is 
what he means...)


It certainly is not what I mean, nor what the Rambam meant.

     The second source - where he describes his general approach to 
miracles - has not been dealt with.

Another frustration. I did deal with it (Avodah, Sun, 16 Dec 2012, Re: 
[Avodah] Mesora (was: Rambam's Shittah on [Allegoriaing Pesukim]], 
paragraph beginning with: ''And it is already known that we run far away.''

It is very difficult to carry on a conversation with someone who 
repeatedly both misconstrues, and is oblivious to, what the other 
discussant says. But why should I expect to receive more responsible and 
intellectually honest treatment than the Rambam gets?

Zvi Lampel

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On 12/25/2012 4:37 PM, Zev Sero wrote:
> On 25/12/2012 12:12 PM, Daas Books wrote:
>> Maybe a different way of asking your question is: what's the Torah 
>> hashkafa behind the permission of polygamy on the one hand and the 
>> prohibition against polyandry on the other?
>>
>> But the question remains -- why this heter exclusively for men?
>
> That's very simple: it's the definition of "marriage".   A woman is 
> married to a man, and what that *means* is that she is forbidden to 
> all others.  If she isn't then by definition it isn't a marriage...

Of course, that's a non-answer, because it simply begs the question:
why is that the definition. Why is kiddushin a man being koneh a woman?
And the question was, what's the hashkafa behind it being that way?
Or, presumably, is it just a chok?

There are sources in kabbalah which deal with the concepts of male and
female as parallel to water (male) and a vessel, like pipes (female).
Male exists without female, but has no structure. No order. Female has
structure, but lacks content to fill that structure. It's a complementary
relationship. Taking that metaphor to this question, you might say
(and I don't know if anyone does, but maybe) that while there's no real
limit to the number of pipes that can be filled by water -- particularly
since water doesn't stay still, but flows from one place to another --
but a pipe can only hold so much water. Now... while in theory, water
can fill any number of pipes, it can't fully fill an unlimited number
at the same time. So there's a requirement that if the water wants a
second pipe, it has to be able to fill it. I.e., support a second wife.
Perhaps Shlomo was thinking in these terms, and figured that he had
so much gold and silver that he could afford to fill 700 pipes and 300
sort-of-pipes.

Lisa

On 25/12/2012 7:36 PM, Lisa Liel wrote:
> Of course, that's a non-answer, because it simply begs the question: why
> is that the definition. Why is kiddushin a man being koneh a woman? And
> the question was, what's the hashkafa behind it being that way? Or,
> presumably, is it just a chok?

I don't think you can question definitions. Why is that the definition
of marriage? You might as well ask why is "three" the number between
two and four, or why the definition of "tzon" is sheep and goats, but
not other livestock. That's just what the word means. If you have
something that doesn't meet the definition then it isn't that word,
it's something else. Your offered explanation is very interesting,
and may even be correct in the sense of why such a concept as "marriage"
exists in the first place, but once we have that concept no explanation
is necessary for why it behaves according to its definition.

-- 
Zev Sero
z...@sero.name

On 12/25/2012 7:08 PM, Zev Sero wrote:
> I don't think you can question definitions.  Why is that the 
> definition of marriage?  You might as well ask why is "three" the 
> number between two and four, or why the definition of "tzon" is sheep 
> and goats, but not other livestock.

That's a little silly. We aren't talking about an object; we're talking
about a process. Chazal learn kicha kicha. Without that, they wouldn't
necessarily even have a source for lekichat isha being an actual kinyan.
There's a dynamic involved here that has no parallel when it comes to
defining tzon as one thing and not another.

Lisa



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