Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 105

Thu, 30 May 2013

• 1. Personal Description of RSRH (Prof. Levine)
• 2. Abortion isn't Murder (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Abortion isn't Murder (Zev Sero)
• 4. Personal Description of RSRH (Prof. Levine)
• 5. Re: TALKING IN SHUL (Kenneth Miller)
• 6. non-Jewish housekeeper (Prof. Levine)
• 7. non-Jewish housekeeper (M Cohen)
• 8. Re: nonJewish housekeeper (Chana Luntz)
• 9. Re: non-Jewish housekeeper (Prof. Levine)
• 10. Re: nonJewish housekeeper (Zev Sero)
• 11. electricity on shabbos - Rav Asher Weiss (Eli Turkel)
• 12. Why did Moshe only daven for Yehoshua? (Marty Bluke)
• 13. nonJewish housekeepr (Eli Turkel)

At 12:53 PM 5/29/2013, R. Micha wrote:


>BTW, Graetz was once a student and ben bayis of RSRH's. (I think I
>picked that up from the intro to the volume of Collected Writings that
>is largely a point-by-point refutation of Graetz's history.) Graetz's
>departure from Yahadus was probably particularly painful for the teacher.

Graetz,  after reading the 19 Letters wrote to RSRH asking him if he 
could become his teacher.   From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinrich_Graetz

Graetz received his first instruction at 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zerkov>Zerkov, where his parents had 
relocated, and in 1831 was sent to 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolsztyn>Wolstein, where he attended 
the <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeshivah>yeshivah up to 1836, 
acquiring <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secular>secular knowledge by 
private study. The "Neunzehn Briefe von Ben Uziel" (see 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samson_Raphael_Hirsch>Samson Raphael 
Hirsch) made a powerful impression on him; and he resolved to prepare 
himself for academic studies in order to champion the cause of 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orthodox_Judaism>Orthodox Judaism. His 
first intention was to go to 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prague>Prague, to which place he was 
attracted by the fame of its old yeshivah and the facilities afforded 
by the university. Being rejected by the immigration officers, he 
returned to Zerkov and wrote to S. R. Hirsch, then rabbi of 
Oldenburg, intimating his desire. Hirsch offered him a home in his 
house. Graetz arrived there on May 8, 1837, and spent three years 
with his patron as a pupil, companion, and amanuensis [This word is 
new to me, so I looked it up. This is the first that I hear that 
Graetz played this role for Rav Hirsch].

Graetz kept a diary during the time he was living at Rabbiner 
Hirsch's home, and from it we know Rav Hirsch's demanding schedule 
and the subjects (both Torah and secular)  that he and Graetz studied 
together.

IIRC after Graetz married,  he and his wife came to visit Rav 
Hirsch.  Mrs. Graetz's hair was not covered,  and Rabbiner Hirsch 
made it clear in no uncertain terms that a married woman should have 
her hair covered.  This marked the final break for Graetz with RSRH.

This is all in Klugman's bio of Rav Hirsch.

Graetz treats RSRH most harshly in his History of the Jews.

YL
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I hit a Y-mi that makes a point I've made here in the past, that the
issur behind abortion isn't that it is mamash retzichah. E.g.
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n350.shtml#08 (Oct 2008).

On Fri, Oct 03, 2008 at 01:01:14PM -0400, Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
: Note that Rav Yitzhak Shor (Resp. Koah Shor #20)...
: After a lengthy analysis, however, he concludes that even according to
: Rambam, the primary justification for permitting abortion is, as Rashi
: says, that the fetus is not a 'nefesh', and Rambam only invokes the
: principle of Rodef to imply that if we can save the mother by merely
: amputating a part or parts of the fetus, as opposed to destroying
: it, then we must do so, just as we are commanded to do in a classic case
: of Rodef...

To which I replied then (2:54pm that afternoon):
> More than that, the very same Retzichah 1:9 continues by not applying
> rodeif once the baby's head emerged. If the child really was a rodeif
> WRT retzichah, why does the Rambam shift to "ein dochin nefesh mipenei
> nefesh" after birth rather than just being consistent?

Well, today's Y-mi (Qidushin 13b) discusses the question of whether an
eved can accept a get shikhrur on behalf of another eved. Along the way,
it cites a beraisa in which a man says to his shifchah that he is hereby
freeing her velad, but the shifchah herself stays a shifchah. And they
answer that this is not an example of one eved accepting the shichrur
for another, because the velad is ke'achas mei'eivareha.

An interesting data point for our recurring discussion, no?

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It's nice to be smart,
mi...@aishdas.org        but it's smarter to be nice.
http://www.aishdas.org                   - R' Lazer Brody
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 29/05/2013 5:41 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> I hit a Y-mi that makes a point I've made here in the past, that the
> issur behind abortion isn't that it is mamash retzichah. E.g.
> http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol25/v25n350.shtml#08 (Oct 2008).
>
> On Fri, Oct 03, 2008 at 01:01:14PM -0400, Yitzhak Grossman wrote:
> : Note that Rav Yitzhak Shor (Resp. Koah Shor #20)...
> : After a lengthy analysis, however, he concludes that even according to
> : Rambam, the primary justification for permitting abortion is, as Rashi
> : says, that the fetus is not a 'nefesh', and Rambam only invokes the
> : principle of Rodef to imply that if we can save the mother by merely
> : amputating a part or parts of the fetus, as opposed to destroying
> : it, then we must do so, just as we are commanded to do in a classic case
> : of Rodef...
>
> To which I replied then (2:54pm that afternoon):
>> More than that, the very same Retzichah 1:9 continues by not applying
>> rodeif once the baby's head emerged. If the child really was a rodeif
>> WRT retzichah, why does the Rambam shift to "ein dochin nefesh mipenei
>> nefesh" after birth rather than just being consistent?

Because at that point the baby is no longer a rodef, "mishamayim ka radfi
lah", so the usual law applies that one person's blood is not redder than
another's and we must just leave it in Hashem's hands.


> Well, today's Y-mi (Qidushin 13b) discusses the question of whether an
> eved can accept a get shikhrur on behalf of another eved. Along the way,
> it cites a beraisa in which a man says to his shifchah that he is hereby
> freeing her velad, but the shifchah herself stays a shifchah. And they
> answer that this is not an example of one eved accepting the shichrur
> for another, because the velad is ke'achas mei'eivareha.
>
> An interesting data point for our recurring discussion, no?

No.  It's well-established and not controversial that "ubar yerech imo".
A foetus is part of its mother.  That doesn't mean it's not a person, and
killing it isn't murder.  It's just a person who is part of another person;
in fact that is exactly what the Torah calls it: "ha'adam ba'adam".   It's
not a *separate* person, so e.g. if the mother is chayav missa then it shares
her guilt and sentence, and she can be executed without regard for its life.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

At 12:53 PM 5/29/2013, R. Kenneth Miller wrote:

>So far, two people have pointed out to me off-list that Mendelssohn 
>was *not* an apikores. I offer to them my thanks, and to him my apologies.
>
>In my memory, his name hardly ever comes up except in contexts of 
>reform and haskala, and not as their opponent. With the help of 
>those who have corrected me, I did a little more research, and I 
>stand corrected.

Originally Mendelsohn's Biur (commentary on the Chumash)  was 
accepted by a number of important rabbonim.  However,   today he is 
really not accepted in most Orthodox circles.  IIRC Rav Schwab had 
some rather strong criticisms of him.

He himself was personally observant,  but many of his followers were not.  YL
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Prof. Levine quoted Rabbi Doniel Neustadt:
> DURING PESUKEI D'ZIMRAH - Unless there is an emergency, it is
> forbidden to talk during this time as it would constitute an
> interruption between the blessing of Baruch Sheamar and the
> blessing of Yishtabach.(9)
...
> 9 O.C. 51:4 and Mishnah Berurah 6 and 7.

R' Micha Berger asked:
> ... So how does a minhag Yisrael end up with stricter rules
> for silence than actual dinim derabbanan?

I propose that RDN used the word "forbidden" more literally than he should have, and/or RMB understood it more literally than he could have.

What I mean is that we frequently use the word "forbidden" even in a
context of minhagim, even though we should perhaps use it only in cases of
real halachos (either d'Oraisa or d'rabanan). A common example would be if
one said "it is forbidden to get married during Sefira", when in actual
fact there is no halacha forbidding it, merely a minhag to refrain.

Alternatively, one could criticize the MB's choice of words as well - see
the quoted references for his use of the words "assur" and "oness". (Read:
*One* could criticize, but that one would not be me.)

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
BlackBerry&#174 10
Find out more about the new BlackBerry 10 smartphone.
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/51a64ba29eb794ba2570cst01vuc

At 12:53 PM 5/29/2013, M Cohen wrote:

>Other practical eitzos I thought of are:
>
>1. according to those poskim that solve the bishul acum question
>commercially via a light in the oven remotely activated by the mashgiah
>(which adds some heat like a kisam), you could cook in the oven and have a
>Jew permanently turn on the oven light.
>
>2. if one cannot find a pilot light stove, you can turn off/disconnect the
>electric lighter and light the stove when needed from an existing
>candle etc that was originally lit by a Jew. Ie leave a yartzeit candle
>permanently avail in the kitchen near the stove.
>
>3. not sure if this one works - if a Jew turns off the central power for the
>house and then turns it on, and then the nJ uses the regular electric
>igniter to light the stove. Maybe this would be considered transferring a
>flame. On the other hand, maybe it's more like a Jew fixed the stove and
>then the nJ uses it cook (which wouldn't help the BA problem)

None of these work for Sephardim.  From 
http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1649

Ashkenazim generally follow the view that one may partake of food 
prepared by a gentile if a Jew kindled the flame used for cooking. 
According to this view, kindling the flame is considered involvement 
in the cooking process, and once a Jew is involved in this process, 
the food is permissible. Sepharadim, however, do not follow this 
view, and require that the Jew be involved in the actual cooking.

See the above URL for more.  YL
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RL wrote ..None of these work for Sephardim.  From
http://www.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1649

 

In theory, true.

 

However in practice, the minhag of most Sephardim who all do eat from
Ashkenazi restaurants, Ashkenazi caterers, at Ashkenazi chasunahs, etc

which all rely on hashlachas kisam is like the (minority of) Sephardi poskim
who are lenient

 

(as prev discussed here)

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I  wrote:
>> An elderly gentleman or lady, who is incapacitated, is highly unlikely 
>> to marry the, almost invariably same sex, non Jewish live in care worker.

And RZS wrote:

>In the case of a same-sex worker, in a country where such "marriages" are
not recognised, yes.  But in the case of an opposite-sex worker such cases
are >common enough to be the stuff of legends and tawdry court cases,

I thought of that as I was writing it - but if there is this level of
violation of yichud, bishul akum concerns would seem to be just the tip of a
very large iceberg.  And if there is no violation of yichud, you can get the
other Jew there to stir the food.  The classic "philippino" in Israeli
society is (for an elderly gentleman) - male (and live in).  And in fact the
reason they are generally known "philippinos" is because for some reason the
Philippines appears one of the largest exporters of not just female workers,
but male ones.  

>and something that people often worry about even when there's no reason to.
So Chazal's gezera would apply in its full force

Only if the care worker is the opposite sex.  I agree if we are talking
about opposite sex care workers, there are serious issues, that go well
beyond bishul akum and what they might be doing in the kitchen.

>>  In the case of a non kosher restaurant  [...] the reason for being in 
>> such a restaurant may also come a lot closer to the reason Chazal 
>> instituted the gezera in the first place (although it may not).

>It may be close to that reason, but not with the cooks or kitchen staff! So
the bishul akum aspect would seem to be irrelevant, and if not for lo plug
>Chazal's gezera should not apply. 

Really?  You think that Chazal only made their gezera for the case where the
inviting non Jew was sufficiently impoverished that he cooked his own food?
In Chazal's day, wealthy non Jews invariably had (non Jewish) slaves who
would actually have done the cooking.  Is bishul akum irrelevant in such a
case because the slave sure as anything was never going to marry the Jew?  

> Whatever danger of intermarriage exists in such a dinner, it would be no
different were the entire kitchen run by cohanim meyuchasim. 

Agreed.  If the wealthy non Jew happened to have a Jewish slave (which,
while we might have all these obligations to try and redeem them,
unquestionably happened), who did the cooking, the gezera might technically
not apply.  However I would assume that it was sufficiently not common to
not be worth worrying about (or alternatively see below).  

> Chazal distinguished between pas akum and pas palter, and were restaurants
common in those days they might similarly have distinguished between cooking
>in private homes and in restaurants.

Maybe, but I think it unlikely.  When you are taken out to dinner at a
restaurant, who do you thank afterwards, the cooks and kitchen staff, or the
person who sits at the table with you and pays?  If anything I think Chazal
would have gone down (or maybe did go down) the Machne Ephraim's route in
reverse - ie yad hapoel k'yad ha'adon.  Indeed ROY cites the Machne Ephraim
in relation to bishul akum in Chelek 10 Yoreh Deah siman 6 as yet another
reason to be makil regarding fried donuts - because the yad of the non
Jewish poel, since he does it for wages, is like the yad of the baal
habayit, or owner of the restaurant.  (The Machne Ephraim if you recall
holds this so strongly that he allows one to make a bracha on a ma'akeh
round a roof even if the actual fence was fixed completely in place by your
non Jewish worker (so long as you paid for it)).  If the driving force is
intermarriage, you are worried about the host, not the workers
-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and

Regards

Chana

At 01:32 PM 5/29/2013, M Cohen wrote:
>RL wrote ..None of these work for Sephardim.  From 
><http://w
>ww.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1649>http://w
>ww.dailyhalacha.com/displayRead.asp?readID=1649
>
>In theory, true.
>
>However in practice, the minhag of most Sephardim who all do eat 
>from Ashkenazi restaurants, Ashkenazi caterers, at Ashkenazi chasunahs, etc
>which all rely on hashlachas kisam is like the (minority of) 
>Sephardi poskim who are lenient
>
>(as prev discussed here)

I have no idea how anyone would know what "the minhag of most 
Sephardim"  is in regard to this issue.  Is there some survey or poll 
that was done somewhere.   Is this true for Sephardim who live in 
Brooklyn where there is a large Syrian Jewish community?  What about 
in Queens and Great Neck where there are many Jews whose roots are from Persia?

YL


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On 29/05/2013 2:06 PM, Chana Luntz wrote:
>>> In the case of a non kosher restaurant  [...] the reason for being in
>>> such a restaurant may also come a lot closer to the reason Chazal
>>> instituted the gezera in the first place (although it may not).

>> It may be close to that reason, but not with the cooks or kitchen staff! So
>> the bishul akum aspect would seem to be irrelevant, and if not for lo plug
>> Chazal's gezera should not apply.

> Really?  You think that Chazal only made their gezera for the case where the
> inviting non Jew was sufficiently impoverished that he cooked his own food?

Since their gezera was on the cook and not the host, it would surely seem so.


> In Chazal's day, wealthy non Jews invariably had (non Jewish) slaves who
> would actually have done the cooking.  Is bishul akum irrelevant in such a
> case because the slave sure as anything was never going to marry the Jew?

Most non-Jews were not wealthy, and while in Rome, at least at one point,
slaves were common and cheap enough that most people could probably afford
one, I don't think this was so in EY in Chazal's day, or in Bavel.

In any case, how sure are you that in a household with a slave, the slave
would do the cooking?  I don't know, but it occurs to me that it may not
have been so.  Perhaps for some cultural reason even in the typical slave
owning household (at least ones that only had one or two slaves) the cooking
was the domain of the wife.

Thus I conclude that in the case where slaves do the cooking, Chazal only
forbade it because of lo plug.


>> Whatever danger of intermarriage exists in such a dinner, it would be no
>> different were the entire kitchen run by cohanim meyuchasim.

> Agreed.  If the wealthy non Jew happened to have a Jewish slave (which,
> while we might have all these obligations to try and redeem them,
> unquestionably happened), who did the cooking, the gezera might technically
> not apply.

Only technically?!  Surely it doesn't apply at all.  After all, what is the
fix for bishul akum?  To have a Jew participate in the cooking.  The machlokes
is only about the definition of "the cooking" for this purpose, but everyone
agrees that all a Jew needs to do is stir the pot, or add a pinch of salt, and
it's OK.  So how can there even be a hava amina that it should be assur in a
case where Jews did the entire cooking from start to finish?   This must surely
be not just kosher but kosher limehadrin (at least with reference to this
particular gezera)!


>> Chazal distinguished between pas akum and pas palter, and were restaurants
>> common in those days they might similarly have distinguished between cooking
>> in private homes and in restaurants.

> Maybe, but I think it unlikely.  When you are taken out to dinner at a
> restaurant, who do you thank afterwards, the cooks and kitchen staff, or the
> person who sits at the table with you and pays?  If anything I think Chazal
> would have gone down (or maybe did go down) the Machne Ephraim's route in
> reverse - ie yad hapoel k'yad ha'adon.

But the poel works for the restaurateur, not for the person who's paying the
bill.  And you're not much more likely to marry the restaurateur's daughter
than you are the cook's.  And if you say ein hachi nami, it's the person
paying the bill who matters, then you've turned the entire law of bishul akum
upside down.  Because if that's the rule then the same would apply even in
the glattest-kosher Jewish restaurant, where not only the kitchen staff but
the owner and the entire staff were cohanim meyuchasim!  And on the other hand,
if the Jew is the one who picks up the bill then one could eat anywhere and not
worry about bishul akum!  This surely can't be so.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

<<I suspect R' Eli and Chana find R' Weiss approach strange or difficult
because they are looking for a consistent algorithm that can be applied
a priori to determine the halachic status of an act or device (as I
think many of us would like to view halacha and in fact how it operates
in many/most cases) I think R' Weiss understands that there is a "libi
omer li"/obviously element to halacha that is especially important in
cases of first impression. Much like R' YBS stated in C-C-C [Community,
Covenant and Commitment (?) -micha]:>>

First there is a difference between halacha and haskafa. Even within
halacha obvious
personal feelings (libi omer) plays a part. One example we have quoted is
the psak of RSZA
that the gezerah of kinyiot applies to modern day cakes even made from
potato starch.
RSZA feels that had the rishonim lived today they would have included it
within the gezerah.
Similarly other poskim are not happy about "kosher bacon" and other such
foods.

Nevertheless, I agree with Joel that I am bothered by including in makeh
bepatisch deOraisa
items which the modern day posek feels are important and creative
activities.This is obviously
very subjective. I have no problem if Chazal made that choice but for a
modern posek to make a
subjective choice which then becomes prohibited deOraisa I personally find
disturbing.
I fully admit this a personal feeling.

-- 
Eli Turkel
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Rashi comments that Moshe changed his name and davened that Hashem should
save Yehoshua from the ??? ???????.
This is very difficult for a number of reasons:
1. We see clearly from Rashi that Moshe knew that the Meraglim would sin,
that is why he davened that Yehoshua would not be caught up in it. If so,
why did he send them at all? After all Rashi comments ??? ?? that Hashem
gave Moshe the choice as to whether to send meraglim or not. If he knew
they would sin why didn't he just cancel the mission?2. Why daven only for
Yehoshua? Yehoshua was probably the greatest of the meraglim, why would
Moshe worry that he would sin? At the time that they were picked all of the
Meraglim were tzadikim, why didn't Moshe daven for all of them?
3. How can Moshe daven that Yehoshua shouldn't sin? What exactly was Moshe
asking for, that hashem should take away Yehoshuas free choice?

I did not find any of the meforshim on Rashi that dealt with the first
question that if Moshe knew they were going to sin why send them. The
Netziv does ask this question and because of this question says that
Rashi's pshat is very difficult. In fact, he rejects Rashi's pshat and
offers his own pshat.
The meforshim do deal with the second question but I didn't see any
convincing answers.
Any thoughts would be appreciated.
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First I wish to thank Chana for her response which I found enlighning.
She writes

<<But I think in general it is a mischaracterisation of ROY to understand
him as requiring that Sephardim posken like the Mechaber, no ifs or buts.
 For example, where, as in the case of yesh bishul achar bishul for a d?var
lach, the Mechaber poskens against majority rishonim, ROY assumes that
therefore he only poskened this way because of safek d?orisa l?chumra (see
Yabiat Omer Chelek 10 siman26) (ie he didn?t hold intrinsically that there
was really bishul on a d?orisa level, but he didn?t feel comfortable ruling
in favour of the meikilim in a d?orisa matter like this) and that therefore
if you find some other safek (such as placing it on a cold blech and then
using a time clock) there is no problem warming up cold soup on a blech and
then eating it.>>

This is exactly the point that Ohr Lezion disagrees.He claims that if the
mechaber paskens without giving alternatives then it is a vadai psak and
cannot contribute towards a sfek-sfeka.

BTW it seems that ROY is much more willing to use sfek-sfeka to be mekil
then many other poskim (though I dont understand why others do not tend to
use it very much)

kol tuv

-- 
Eli Turkel
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