Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 133

Tue, 23 Jul 2013

• 1. Re: Abortion isn't Murder (Chana Luntz)
• 2. Re: Abortion is not Murder? (Yonatan Kaganoff)
• 3. Self Cleaning Oven (Prof. Levine)
• 4. Re: Grape Juice (Kenneth Miller)
• 5. Grape Juice (Prof. Levine)
• 6. Open Orthodoxy, again (Lisa Liel)
• 7. Re: Open Orthodoxy, again (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Open Orthodoxy, again (Rich, Joel)
• 9. Re: Grape Juice (martin brody)
• 10. Re: Self Cleaning Oven (Eli Turkel)
• 11. Re: Self Cleaning Oven (Gershon Dubin)
• 12. Traditional Methodologies (Rich, Joel)
• 13. Re: Open Orthodoxy, again (Micha Berger)

I wrote:
>>   (Although I do confess that while it seems pashut to me that the 
>> uber is a k'rodef, and not rodef mamash, that seems to me to have 
>> little to do with the question at hand.  A rodef mamash has to have 
>> intend to kill (or rape or whatever).  If I chase after you to kill 
>> you, I am a rodef.  If I accidently fall out of a tall building, or 
>> are pushed by somebody wanting to hurt me, and you happen to be 
>> underneath where I am falling, you might get killed, but I can't see 
>> how you can say that I am a rodef mamash.  A baby has no intent to 
>> kill its mother, quite the opposite, if it had an intent, it would be 
>> to save her.  Therefore it cannot be described it as a rodef mamash, 
>> the most it might have is a halachic status like a rodef).

>A literal rodef is someone who is chasing the victim. Someone standing in
one place and shooting is not >literally rodef, but he is "kerodef", i.e. he
has the same halacha as a rodef, since the actual chasing is >irrelevant.
"Rodef" is just an example Chazal gave of the underlying halacha.

>And the *law* of rodef (or "kerodef" if you want to be hypercorrect) does
not require intent. The person >falling off the roof and about to fall on a
person and kill him is kerodef and may be killed.

Do you have a source for this (other than the gemora/Rambam regarding an
uber)?  One might want to argue that of the Rambam's three categories of
those who kill without kavana (perek 6 of hilchos rotzeach), at least those
who are considered karov to meizid should be within this category (but where
do you find it?) - but to take the extreme case of the shogeg karov l'ones -
wouldn't a more standard halachic analysis be shev v'al ta'aseh adif.  The
pasuk of al ta'amod al dam re'echa is described in the gemora (Sanhedrin
73a) using the examples of drowning in a river or being attacked by wild
beasts or by bandits (who can surely be assumed to have intent).  On what
basis are you able to extend this to somebody who inadvertently falls off a
roof, or otherwise is about to kill without intent? - ie situations where if
brought to beis din, the person would at most be exile to the irei miklat,
or even be deemed patur.

>> Note also, getting back to Tamar, that even were you correct in your 
>> position regarding the gmar din falling also on the uber vis a vis 
>> Yehuda (who believed she was guilty and hence would therefore be 
>> justified in putting her and the two ubarim to death, since the gmar 
>> din fell on them too), but that doesn't work for Tamar herself.  Tamar 
>> knows she is innocent, and hence her deliberately putting Peretz and 
>> Zerach into the fire (via
>> herself) to be killed, would clearly be a violation of the issur of 
>> rechitza if indeed issur of rechitza there was.

>She wouldn't be deliberately putting anyone into the fire. If she were,
then forget about her children, she >would be murdering herself, which is
just as bad as murdering someone else. She would merely be failing to
>prevent others from killing them, and she had no more duty to prevent them
from killing her children than she >did to prevent them from killing her.

The Rambam (the same Rambam you are holding up as the halacha for a BN)
doesn't agree with you (assuming you read him as regarding abortion as
murder, as you have been doing up until now).  He says in Hilchot Melachim
perek 9 halacha 4:

?? ?? ???? ??? ????? ???? ???? ??? ???? ????, ??? ?? ??? ????? ?? ?????
????? ???? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ?? ???, ????? ????? ??? ???? ????

A Ben Noach who kills a soul even a fetus in his mother?s womb is put to
death for it, and so if he kills a treifa or he captures him and puts him in
front of a lion or he places him in a [situation of] starvation until he
dies, since one who causes death in any event is killed...

You can't have it both ways.  If, according to the Rambam, abortion is
murder, then so too is the putting of someone in front of a lion, or placing
them in a situation of starvation, or allowing them to be cast into a fiery
furnace when one word could have released them.

Hence the assumption is that Tamar's equation was causing her own death as
against the murder of Yehuda, given that embarrassing in public is equated
with murder (plus, it would seem from Avos 3:11, losing her chelek in olam
habah for embarrassing Yehuda in public).  

BTW, I am not doctor, but I am sure that abortions could be arranged (if
they are not already done this way) by some sort of causation mechanism (the
giving of drugs, the cutting of the umbilical cord or something) - following
the Rambam, that would still be a problem, but it would seem from your
defence of Tamar, that it would not be to you.

>Zev Sero

Regards

Chana

I was thinking about this lately and would like to float the following idea:

There is a significant machlokes haposkim if Bnei Noach have to follow the
rules and details of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach outlined in the seventh perek
Gemara Sanhedrin.

One position is that they have to while the other is that they can create
their own rule-system within the general category of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei
Noach as long as such a system is just. I believe that the former is the
position Rambam and the latter is the position of the Ramah.

IMHO the second position makes sense, as one would not expect every society
to give the death penalty for stealing one perutah.

If one is working within the framework of the second opinion, could one
suggest that a society could determine what is and is not murder as long as
such a position was just.

Given the significant legal, moral and scientific debates about abortion a
society could either conclude that abortion was murder or abortion was not
murder with substantial basis to their conclusion.

Therefore, perhaps, even though Jewish law paskens that abortion if murder
for Bnei Noach, a Bnei Noach society can determine for itself whether or
not abortion was murder and if they determined that it was not, they would
be justified within the framework of the rules of the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei
Noach.

Any thoughts or reactions?
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130723/48515018/attachment-0001.htm>

At 11:27 AM 7/23/2013, R. Eli Turkel wrote:

>Is there anyone who says that the heat inside a self-cleaning oven does not
>reach libun gamur?
>I find it hard to imagine that chazal had means to reacher higher
>temperatures

When we visited a matza bakery before Pesach, I asked the fellow 
working the over how hot the oven was.  He replied, "Between 1200 and 
1300 degrees (Fahrenheit)."

If what he told me is true,  then certainly Chazal had the means to 
reach higher temperatures. YL
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130723/1255c1b7/attachment-0001.htm>

I wrote:
> In other words, regardless of how we would define "mevushal",
> it seems from your post that "modern day cooked grape juice"
> is not permitted in your home for kiddush and other rituals,
> because the cooking is done in a manner which prevents the
> fermentation from even beginning. I am curious from where you
> know that this is a halachic requirement.

R' Martin Brody answered:
> Any mevushal wine is not permitted by me for sacremental
> purposes. We are supposed to use best wine.That is the opinion
> of several decisors
> Cooked wine is deliberately destroyed. Grape juice is NOT wine
> and cannot become wine.
> Yes, decisors do permit cooked wine but not as not ideal, and
> even grape juice. My original claim in this thread is that it
> is a huge leniency, taken by people that are very strict on
> everything else. That they do it, is none of my business. I
> was just pointing out factual information.

I'm glad you included the phrase "very strict on everything else". It
highlights that it's not always possible to be "very strict on everything
period". Sometimes one has to choose which mitzvah he will be strict on,
and which he needs to be lenient on. If someone wants to be machmir on Dina
D'Malchusa Dina, and not serve wine to minors, he may choose to make
Kiddush on grape juice or on challah. Another person might simply not enjoy
any of the Non-Mevushal wines that are available, and the Halacha
explicitly allows him to choose a Mevushal wine for the occasion.

I am still hoping you'll bring a source which shows how grape juice which
is no longer able to ferment is in a different halachic category from grape
juice which *is* still able to ferment. (Or was that simply your way of
separating Mevushal Grape Juice from Raw Grape Juice?)

Akiva Miller

You can't always get what you want
But if you try, sometimes
Well, you just might find
You get what you need
____________________________________________________________
Refinance your home now
Loans under 729K usually qualify for US GOV backed refinance programs
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/51eeb5bb4d0ec35bb2fc2st02vuc

At 11:27 AM 7/23/2013, Martin Brody wrote:


>"In other words, regardless of how we would define "mevushal", it seems
>from your post that "modern day cooked grape juice" is not permitted in
>your home for kiddush and other rituals, because the cooking is done in a
>manner which prevents the fermentation from even beginning. I am curious
>from where you know that this is a halachic requirement."
>
>Any mevushal wine is not permitted by me for sacremental purposes. We are
>supposed to use best wine.That is the opinion of several decisors
>Cooked wine is deliberately destroyed. Grape juice is NOT wine and cannot
>become wine.
>Yes, decisors do permit cooked wine but not as not ideal, and even grape
>juice.
>My original claim in this thread is that it is a huge leniency, taken by
>people that are very strict on everything else.
>That they do it, is none of my business. I was just pointing out factual
>information.

What is the definition of "best wine"?   My office mate who is not 
Jewish is an expert on wine,  and I am sure he can tell you what he 
and other experts consider to be the best wine.  It may well be that 
there will be some kosher wines on his list.

However, I do not like dry wine,  and I am sure that many (if not 
all)  of the "best" wines are dry.  What I consider the best wine to 
use for kiddush for me based on my taste preferences would definitely 
not fall into the category of "best wine" as determined by 
experts.  Thus it seems to me that the terminology "best 
wine"  cannot really be defined.

And then there are those who prefer grape juice to any wine.  Does 
this mean for them grape juice is to be considered "best wine"?

YL


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130723/671159bd/attachment-0001.htm>

 From what I understand, YCT has given Yadin Yadin smicha to only one 
person: Zev Farber.  He is also the coordinator of the Vaad HaGiyur of 
the IRF (the Open Orthodox rabbinic group) and a board member of the IRF 
and Yeshivat Maharat.

R' Avraham Gordimer wrote the following article on Cross-Currents:  
http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/20
13/07/21/torah-min-hashamayim-a-reply-to-rabbi-nati-helfgot/

It contains lengthy citations from material Farber has published online 
(and I apologize for not according him his title, but given that what he 
has written, I don't see how it's possible to do so truthfully), in 
which he denies the historicity of Avraham and Sarah, denies that 
shivtei Yisrael were in fact common descendents of anyone, denies Torah 
miSinai...

According to one of the comments on this page:

    It should be noted that Dr. Farber's Academic Bible studies at
    Hebrew U, at which point he had already rejected the traditional
    understanding of Torah min HaShamayim (by his own admission), took
    place BEFORE he entered YCT.

    In other words, his holding of these views, which was readily known,
    was not an impediment to his being accepted in the YCT program, nor
    was it an impediment to his receiving two semichot from them.

    Although Dr. Farber's "real" beliefs about Torah min HaShamayim were
    not known to the Orthodox public until now, they were certainly
    well-known at YCT both before he was accepted and prior to their
    bestowing him with semicha.

    I believe that both YCT and Dr. Farber need to be more transparent
    about this.


Whether this is true or not, as their sole dayan, the fact that YCT and 
IRF and Yeshivat Maharat have not distanced themselves (let alone 
condemned as apikorsut) these positions makes me wonder how anyone can 
justify continuing to include these institutions, and in fact the entire 
Open Orthodox movement, under the label of Orthodoxy.

I know we have some people on this list who are sympathetic to OO, and 
I'd honestly like to hear how what appears to be kefira b'ikkar can be 
justified by them.  Shtika k'hoda'a, and the shtika in this case is 
striking.

Lisa



-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130723/63aac035/attachment-0001.htm>

On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 07:59:19AM -0500, Lisa Liel wrote:
> From what I understand, YCT has given Yadin Yadin smicha to only one  
> person: Zev Farber....
...
>
> It contains lengthy citations from material Farber has published online  
> (and I apologize for not according him his title, but given that what he  
> has written, I don't see how it's possible to do so truthfully), in  
> which he denies the historicity of Avraham and Sarah, denies that  
> shivtei Yisrael were in fact common descendents of anyone, denies Torah  
> miSinai...

The actual paper, in full is at
http://thetorah.com/torah-history-judaism-introduction

As well as Yetzi'as Mitzrayim.

So aside from the question of defining kefirah, which I cannot see possibly
permitting the position here, I was wondering how many of the mitzvos that
are lema'an tizkor es yom tzeisekha meiEretz Mitzrayim and the like would
kavanah be me'aqev.

Also, I found it interesting how far R' N Helfgot's position shifted on
the subject in the past year.

Mikra and Meaning: Studies in Bible and Its Interpretation (Maggid Books,
2012), page 40:
    The more complex issue relates to people who maintain that the
    Torah is a composite work from the hand of various human authors in
    different historical settings, but that these authors were divinely
    inspired -- that is, those who view the Torah as equivalent to
    the writings of the prophets. This perspective, while arguably not
    technically rendering one as "denying the divine origin of the Torah"
    as articulated in the mishna in Sanhedrin (90a), undermines the
    uniqueness of the Torah in contrast to the rest of the Bible, as well
    as the uniqueness of the Mosaic prophesy. According to some views in
    [Ch]azal and some of the Rishonim, belief in the latter is an article
    of faith, and denial of it potentially shatters the foundation of
    the entire structure of the binding nature of Torah. There clearly
    were Rishonim, such as the Sephardic exegete Rabbi Abraham Ibn
    Ezra and the Ashkenazic pietistic scholar Rabbi Yehuda HaHasid, who
    maintained that an isolated section of the Torah was post-Mosaic,
    a gloss from the pen of a subsequent prophet. However, the notion
    of the entirely composite makeup of the Torah has no precedent in
    classical Jewish sources, and it is therefore impossible to term
    such a theological understanding as Orthodox in any meaningful sense.

And on Morethodoxy http://morethodoxy.org/2013/07/21... or
http://j.mp/1aGUiY8 written this past Sun (21-Jul-2013):
    6. The more challenging issue is the attitude towards the view
    that expands and builds upon the view of these medieval rishonim to
    include wide swaths of the Torah....

    Given all this, and my general inclusivist inclinations, I would argue
    that we not write, people who maintain this more radical position,
    out of traditional Judaism. This is especially the case given the
    fact that if I were to look at large swaths of Orthodoxy today,
    there are hundreds of thousands of Jews who believe things about
    God and His actions, or His emotions and feelings or about prayer to
    intermediaries or the nature of the sefirot that would clearly put
    them outside of the pale in the eyes of the Rambam. I, of course,
    realize that the 8th principle of the Rambam was one of the central
    points of contention between Orthodoxy and heterodox movements in
    the last two centuries and thus has greater resonance and emotional
    power. However, if we are not going to read out of orthodoxy those who
    directly violate the fifth ikar of the Rambam or his clear words in
    the Guide to the Perplexed -- Section 1:36 than I am reticent to do
    so in the case of those who do not adopt the Rambam's formulation in
    the 8th ikar, especially if they conform to the notion of the Divine
    origin of the Torah, a principle that has been rejected in-toto by
    so many modern Jews.

I think part of the issue, on a sociological level, is that there is a
consequence to yelling "apiqoreis" and "kofer" in non-rigorous settings.
Once the labels become a tool for ostracization more than objective
halachic standards (even if subject to machloqes), it becomes difficult
to apply the categories to people you know.

It's the Rambam's 8th iqar, and R' Yosef Albo's 2nd iqar, 3rd shoresh.

To explain for those who haven't seen Seifer haIqarim. RYA uses the term
"iqar" only when speaking of first principles. So he only has 3 of them.
Shorashim are those beliefs necessary to Judaism that can be derived from
the iqarim. And anafim are derived beliefs that are true, but won't make
Yahadus meaningless if one were to deny them.

So the Seifer haIqarim lists 10 articles of faith altogether, but he
covers pretty much the same space as the Rambam's 13, minus mashiach,
which the Iqarim considers an anaf. The parallel is even more pronounces
when looking at Hilkhos Teshuvah pereq 3 and the definitions of
apiqursus, kefirah and meenus -- they divide up along similar lines to
RYA's 3 Iqarim. And FWIW, of the three, wrong beliefs about the Torah
are kefirah. (An apiqoreis has a broken notion of G-d, and a min errs
in matters of hashgachah, din and le'asid lavo.)

But I think this goes beyond the bounds even according to those, like R
Melech / Dr Marc Shapiro, who define iqarim as those beliefs necessary to
logically justify shemiras Shabbos. After all, the criterion historically
hasn't been checking people's beliefs, but assuming that any shomer
Shabbos must have the right ones. I don't buy into this position, as I
think they're confusing the pragmatic check with the beliefs being
checked. But leshitasam...

But...

Farber's G-d has no way of revealing law. The whole notion of DeOraisa
gets deprecated. Derashah becomes a word-game, a way to insert ideas
the human author couldn't have intended, rather than relying on Divine
Wisdom to provide hooks for us to develop into ideas. Halakhah shifts
from RYBS's creative partnership between Hashem and man and becomes a
merely human construct.

I do not think this philosophy supports a more rigorous legal process
than the Conservative movement's. Which is, indeed, buttressed by a
variety of philospohies quite like this one.

There is nothing in his writings that makes the difference between
"taking the bad from the good" and "taking the good from the bad" on
Shabbos an expression of Divine Will. It's too nit-picky for inspiration,
if G-d didn't relay words or very specific concepts.

So I think that even if you accept RMS's thesis, it's /still/ a
clearcut case of kefirah.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             With the "Echad" of the Shema, the Jew crowns
mi...@aishdas.org        G-d as King of the entire cosmos and all four
http://www.aishdas.org   corners of the world, but sometimes he forgets
Fax: (270) 514-1507      to include himself.     - Rav Yisrael Salanter

> According to one of the comments on this page: 
> It should be noted that Dr. Farber's Academic Bible studies at Hebrew U,
> at which point he had already rejected the traditional understanding
> of Torah min HaShamayim (by his own admission), took place BEFORE he
> entered YCT.
 
> Lisa 
 
I would just point out that one man's comment on Cross Currents, without
any sourcing, does not make it a fact.

KT 
Joel Rich 

All "best wine" is of course personally subjective, but it cannot be
something that has been deliberately spoiled by cooking. Therefore, the
best wine is non-mevushal.That's what it means There are many fine sweet
and semi sweet wines that are non-mevushal. Pasteurised Grape juice is NOT
wine. It cannot ferment into a potable product. That people enjoy that
taste does not magically make it wine. That it is permitted by poskim for
sacramental purposes still doesn't make it wine.
Cheers,
Martin Brody


"What is the definition of "best wine"?   My office mate who is not Jewish
> is an expert on wine,  and I am sure he can tell you what he and other
> experts consider to be the best wine.  It may well be that there will be
> some kosher wines on his list.
>
> However, I do not like dry wine,  and I am sure that many (if not all)  of
> the "best" wines are dry.  What I consider the best wine to use for kiddush
> for me based on my taste preferences would definitely not fall into the
> category of "best wine" as determined by experts.  Thus it seems to me that
> the terminology "best wine"  cannot really be defined.
>
> And then there are those who prefer grape juice to any wine.  Does this
> mean for them grape juice is to be considered "best wine"?
>
> YL "
>
>
>


-- 
Martin Brody
310 474 1856
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130723/e46dda0a/attachment-0001.htm>

Was the matzoh oven run by chazal? Todays ovens also use modern technology
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.aishdas.org/pipermail/avod
ah-aishdas.org/attachments/20130723/0bf2b033/attachment-0001.htm>

From: "Prof. Levine" <llev...@stevens.edu>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 13:41:29 -0400
> At 11:27 AM 7/23/2013, R. Eli Turkel wrote:
>> When we visited a matza bakery before Pesach, I asked the fellow working
>> the over how hot the oven was. He replied, "Between 1200 and 1300 degrees
>> (Fahrenheit)."

> If what he told me is true, then certainly Chazal had the means to
> reach higher temperatures.

Did you ask him how he knew? Gershon
gershon.du...@juno.com

> It should be noted that Dr. Farber's Academic Bible studies at Hebrew U,
> at which point he had already rejected the traditional understanding
> of Torah min HaShamayim (by his own admission), took place BEFORE he
> entered YCT.
 
> Lisa 
 
Is it the contention that simply by studying Academic Bible one has
rejected the traditional understanding of Torah Min Hashamayim?

On a related (in my mind) topic -- if time viewing were invented so that
one could observe (but not impact) prior events, would we accept the
"testimony" of the tannaim and amorayim as to what was actually said or
would this be considered a nontraditional methodology?
 
KT 
Joel Rich 

On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 03:25:44PM -0400, Rich, Joel wrote:
: Is it the contention that simply by studying Academic Bible one has
: rejected the traditional understanding of Torah Min Hashamayim?

Actually, it's in the bio included in the paper I linked to, in
the section http://thetorah.com/torah-history-judaism-part-3

    Since my teenage years, I have been aware of the tension between
    academic biblical studies and Torah mi-Sinai as presented by some
    of my teachers. For years, as I was mastering my yeshiva studies,
    I put these concerns aside with the implicit understanding that I
    would return to them when I became more grounded in traditional
    learning. Eventually, in my mid-twenties, I signed up to study
    biblical history at Hebrew University.

    As I began my studies, I started to learn Tanakh with the
    historical-critical approach. As I deepened my facility with this
    methodology, I realized that I was constantly engaged in apologetics
    with myself, subscribing to readings of texts and theories that I
    would not be included to subscribe to if it were any other subject
    and if my beliefs were not at stake. This was intolerable to me
    since if I could not be honest with myself, I was lost before I
    started. At that point I made a fundamental methodological decision:
    I would compartmentalize my thinking for a while. When I studied
    history and text I would do so without any preconceived notions,
    no matter what the conclusion, and I would not let that effect my
    religious thinking until I felt I had a real grasp of the subject.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Nearly all men can stand adversity,
mi...@aishdas.org        but if you want to test a man's character,
http://www.aishdas.org   give him power.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                      -Abraham Lincoln


------------------------------


Avodah mailing list
Avo...@lists.aishdas.org
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah
http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org


End of Avodah Digest, Vol 31, Issue 133
***************************************

Send Avodah mailing list submissions to
	avodah@lists.aishdas.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
	http://lists.aishdas.org/listinfo.cgi/avodah-aishdas.org
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
	avodah-request@lists.aishdas.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
	avodah-owner@lists.aishdas.org

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Avodah digest..."


A list of common acronyms is available at
        http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/acronyms.cgi
(They are also visible in the web archive copy of each digest.)