Avodah Mailing List

Volume 31: Number 147

Tue, 13 Aug 2013

• 1. Subject: Synthetic Meat (hankman)
• 2. Re: hakohanim halviim (Jay F Shachter)
• 3. Re: on orthopraxy (saul newman)
• 4. Re: on orthopraxy (Micha Berger)
• 5. Re: Eishet Yefat Toar (Zev Sero)
• 6. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Micha Berger)
• 7. Re: Eishet Yefat Toar (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Must we agree with the Torah? (Zev Sero)
• 9. Re: Eishet Yefat Toar (Zev Sero)
• 10. Ben Noach legal systems (was: Abortion is not Murder?) (Chana Luntz)
• 11. Must we agree with the Torah? (Meir Rabi)
• 12. Re: Eishet Yefat Toar (Ben Waxman)
• 13. Re: Yom Kippur on Shabbos: Kiddush? (Kenneth Miller)
• 14. Re: on orthopraxy (Chana Luntz)
• 15. Whose Bells? (Rich, Joel)

RMGR wrote:

And if the beast is not
Shechted properly, some maintain that it is kosher nonetheless. If we argue
that the Ben Pekuah is Parev, there is no indication that our Sages decreed
that out should be treated as though it is meaty.

CM notes:

AFAIK a ben pakua (min haTorah) is basically MEAT that is already shechted
(even though it is living) with the shechita of its mother. But nowhere is
there a claim that the BP has lost its status as meat ? it is merely meat
that it has already satisfied the requirements of shechita. So no way is it
parev (so far as I know). I will beli neder try to do a search in the
achronim to see if I can find anything different.

Kol tuv

Chaim Manaster
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Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 10:17:16 -0700
From: saul newman <newman...@gmail.com>
> if someone could help me with an ibn ezra-- in shoftim on the above
> pasuk he comments that there are kohanim that are not leviim as he
> wrote elsewhere.  i dont know where the elsewhere is that explains
> the comment...

The citation (which was not given above) is Deuteronomy 17:9, and the
"elsewhere" to which ibn Ezra refers is his comment on Numbers 16:1.

Ktav publishes an English translation of ibn Ezra's commentary on
Deuteronomy, which was used to answer the above question.  It is a
superb book.  It is, in fact, the best book that has ever been written
in the world.  And that includes Moby-Dick and Gone With The Wind.

                        Jay F. ("Yaakov") Shachter
                                j...@m5.chicago.il.us
                                http://m5.chicago.il.us
                        "Quidquid latine dictum sit, altum videtur"

because i think the standard answer would be a C person would say the
system works , keep doing it even if premise false.    the O person
presumed to say  if premise false  , let's eat traif and  drop the whole
system--- no mitzva if no metzuveh...


On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 9:40 AM, Micha Berger <mi...@aishdas.org> wrote:
> If one found observance to be redemptive, then it would make sense to
> become Orthopraxic....
...
> There are also philosophies close to O, or even within O, that accept
> the data that led to Document Theories within O assumptions. (Not that
> I personally think the evidence is sound, but we are talking about
> alternatives for RSN's hypothetical nebich-a-kofer.) I posted about this
> not that long ago.

On Sun, Aug 11, 2013 at 09:39:57AM -0700, saul newman wrote:
: because i think the standard answer would be a C person would say the
: system works , keep doing it even if premise false.    the O person
: presumed to say  if premise false  , let's eat traif and  drop the whole
: system--- no mitzva if no metzuveh...

I referred back to my earlier post for a reason. C legal process's differences
from halakhah are supported by two philosophical ideas we do not share:

1- that studying the historical and sociological forces that shaped halakhah
should be part of that legal process
and
2- documentary theory allows them to apply #1 even to derashos.

Dr Farber also notes that his theory about the origin of the Torah would
have halachic impact. http://thetorah.com/torah-history-judaism-part-4/

    In my view, Judaism is essentially a wave that eternally sends the
    messages of God. However, in order to understand how to apply these
    messages we must understand how any given halacha or ideal functioned
    in any given society, particularly the original society, ancient
    Israel. When we understand this, we can "subtract" the societal
    elements to see the ideas in their relative purity and reapply them
    to our times. Waves, however, require continuity. For this reason, it
    is vital to understand how the Torah functioned in every generation
    since Moshe in order to do this right. This requires serious study
    and thought.

And as I wrote, belief in the reality of derashah and belief in a text
that shows seams and inconsistencies between originating texts are
mutually inconsistent.

The 39 Melakhos are the product of a derashah. Document Theory is
contradicted by the reality that is Shabbos.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Life is a stage and we are the actors,
mi...@aishdas.org        but only some of us have the script.
http://www.aishdas.org               - Rav Menachem Nissel
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 12/08/2013 12:41 PM, Liron Kopinsky wrote:


>>> At what point in the process does the Eishet Yefat Toar become Jewish?

>> Presumably she needs to go through a proper giyur before a beis
>> din. The Torah doesn't say so because it's obvious. But that would
>> be when she becomes Jewish; how *else* could it be?

> The Giyur of an Eshet Yefat Toar is fundamentally different than
> regular Giyur, I think. From what I understood from Rashi, the Giyur
> is "Ba'al korchah". See Rashi on 22A Likuchin Yesh Lecha Bah.
> "Kiddushin Tofsin, Af Al Pi SheHayta Ovedet Kochavim, Sheharei Eina
> MitGayeret MiDa'atah."

So?  There still has to be a giyur, because there's no other way someone
can become Jewish.  And obviously that is the point at which she becomes
Jewish.  The giyur of an eved is also not exactly mida'ato.   And the
giyur of a katan at his father's request is not mida'ato.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 12:51:11PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
> The trouble begins when we start telling ourselves and our children the lies
> that we have to tell those outside, and they -- not knowing any better - come
> to believe them.  The lies become "toras imecha", and when someone tells them
> the truth they're shocked.  And eventually the same thing even happens to we
> who invented the lies in the first place.

OTOH, one can't overapply this theory and deny cases where our values
and the western world's do overlap.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 08:45:33PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>> The Giyur of an Eshet Yefat Toar is fundamentally different than
>> regular Giyur, I think. From what I understood from Rashi, the Giyur
>> is "Ba'al korchah"....

> So?  There still has to be a giyur, because there's no other way someone
> can become Jewish.  And obviously that is the point at which she becomes
> Jewish...

Unless it's more like the geirus of a shifchah, and happens (also baal
korchah) when she is acquired. Not as a separate step.

I understood the original question to be which of those models was
correct.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

On 12/08/2013 8:53 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 12:51:11PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>> The trouble begins when we start telling ourselves and our children the lies
>> that we have to tell those outside, and they -- not knowing any better - come
>> to believe them.  The lies become "toras imecha", and when someone tells them
>> the truth they're shocked.  And eventually the same thing even happens to we
>> who invented the lies in the first place.
>
> OTOH, one can't overapply this theory and deny cases where our values
> and the western world's do overlap.

Of course not.  Western values don't *have* to be wrong, and quite often they
aren't.  But sometimes they are.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On 12/08/2013 8:56 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 08:45:33PM -0400, Zev Sero wrote:
>>> The Giyur of an Eshet Yefat Toar is fundamentally different than
>>> regular Giyur, I think. From what I understood from Rashi, the Giyur
>>> is "Ba'al korchah"....
>
>> So?  There still has to be a giyur, because there's no other way someone
>> can become Jewish.  And obviously that is the point at which she becomes
>> Jewish...
>
> Unless it's more like the geirus of a shifchah, and happens (also baal
> korchah) when she is acquired. Not as a separate step.

No, it is a separate step.  A market transaction does not transform a
nochri into a person who is mechuyav in mitzvos.  An eved has to be brought
before a beis din, and undergo tevilah leshem avdus, and a formal kabolas
ol mitzvos.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

There are so many things on Avodah at the moment that I would like to
respond to - but school holidays are an extremely busy time for me (and my
kids don't go back until just before Rosh Hashana), making proper responses
difficult.  However I hope there will be a little bit more time over the
next few days to tackle just a few things albeit briefly, and at least here
is a response to this:

RYK wrote:

>I was thinking about this lately and would like to float the following
idea:

>There is a significant machlokes haposkim if Bnei Noach have to follow the
rules and details of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach outlined in the seventh perek
Gemara Sanhedrin.

>One position is that they have to while the other is that they can create
their own rule-system within the general category of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei
Noach as long as such a system is just. I >believe that the former is the
position Rambam and the latter is the position of the Ramah.

Do you mean the Ramban (in Breshis parshat V'yishlach 34:13)?  The Remah in
the Yad Rema on Sanhedrin 57a seems to me if anything to take the opposite
position, saying that if BN are warned from the Torah on something "ru'in
hen l'mita" which seems to be the opposite of the position you are
advocating.

>IMHO the second position makes sense, as one would not expect every society
to give the death penalty for stealing one perutah.

>If one is working within the framework of the second opinion, could one
suggest that a society could determine what is and is not murder as long as
such a position was just.

I think this is a very interesting suggestion.  It seems to me though to
hinge on reading the word "neherag" - as used in Sanhedrin 57a particularly
(but throughout the dafim before and after) as not meaning "should be
killed" or "must be killed", but "may be killed".  Ie that what that whole
section is doing is not actually defining the requirements where a court
system *must* implement the death penalty, but the situations where they are
permitted to utilise the death penalty (in all other circumstances it being
illegal to utilise the death penalty).

Interestingly in this way one could justify  -eg the British legal system of
a couple of hundred years ago which had on its statute books hundreds of
hanging offences - many of them what we would today consider to be trivial
(there is a Horrible Histories sketch in which the one character starts
listing off the various offences, and the other adds in "hanged" as the
punishment, and it just goes on and on and on, with most of them probably
falling within at most the shave prutah category).  Ie what one would
therefore say following RYK's suggestion is that the British system was
legitimate, despite having what one might consider to be draconian
penalties. Not that they were required to have such penalties, rather that
they are permitted to do so and still be considered within the dinim mitzvah
of the sheva mitzvos benei noach.

However, while it seems to me on as much of a reading of that section in
Sanhedrin as I am able to spare for the moment that this could work with the
gemora  (if you are comfortable with the grammer), I am not sure one can
really see it in the rishonim.  Perhaps, some support might be found from
those who understand the BN to have been commanded in pshara (ie
compromise)- based on the pasuk in Breishis 18:19 (from which much of BN
dinim are learnt) ie that they are required to do "tzedaka v'mishpat" where
tzedaka is pshara (as learnt out from Sanhedrin 6b) (here the Yad Remah does
help you, as he brings this opinion, but so do numerous others, although
note worthily, I can't see it in the Rambam).  The thing about pshara is
that it is impossible to do if any form of gezel obligates one to apply the
death penalty, as the court would need to apply the sanction of the death
penalty to the party or parties who illegitimately took the other's
property, and therefore could not negotiate any form of pshara.  That is, it
seems to me, pshara is rooted in essence in the concept of mechila, or the
ability of the court to create such, and if you do not allow for even court
created mechila, and require the death penalty for any form of gezel, then
how could the court ever do pshara?  If however your suggestion is right,
and in fact neherag means "may impose the death penalty" not "must", then
that also allows the court to provide pshara as an alternative.

Note  by the way, that even if you held the Rambam's position that the
people of Shchem were legitimately killed, you could still hold to the above
reading - because one could say that while if there was a justice system,
and Shchem had been brought to justice regarding Dina, even if not via the
death penalty, then the people of Shchem would have been exempt. Because
they did not ensure any justice system at all, the default was that all
were, in the language of the Remah, reu'in hen l'mita.  However I agree that
the language of the Rambam, and the way he phrases the relevant section in
Hilchot Melachim perek 9 halacha 14) seems to militate against such a
reading.

RMB then responded to RYK's post as follows:

>I would split this question further: there are the actual issurim of the
other six mitzvos, and there is the penalty the courts are expected to mete
out when implementing the 7th. Even if one >holds that the legal system a
Noachide society has to establish must include every din of the Beris Noach,
that doesn't mean that they all have to be established as dinei nefashos.

This split though is not tenable, as this is specifically discussed in
Sanhedrin 57a, and suggested as a hava mina, but the maskana appears to be
with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak- Azharah shelhen hu mitaten.

>The way I understood it, yes, the Rambam holds that the 7th mitzvah
requires a court that enforces the other 6.

>But, I had thought the Ramah holds that the chiyuv is to have a legal
system that implements an orderly society. Totally unrelated to the other
six mitzvos, except where their purposes overlap >(such as prohibiting
murder or theft).

Again, don't you mean the Ramban?  The Ramban takes the Rambam to task for
legitimising the killing of the people of Shchem, when Ya'akov was so
critical (and saying that while the people of Shchem were worthy of the
death penalty for being idol worshippers etc, it is not our (or Shimon and
Levi's) job to implement it).  As part of that discussion, he outlines his
understanding of the requirement for dinim as involving the wider
implementation of rules that are needed for a society to function.

Note by the way that the Rema (ie of Shulchan Aruch fame, rather than the
rishon the Remah of Yad Ramah fame) has a fascinating chiluk in Shut haRema
siman 10 - in which he argues that Rabbi Yochanan in the gemora here in
Sanhedrin holds, based on the pasuk he learns the obligation of dinim from,
that the obligation is one of upholding the customs and laws of the
particular state in question, but not necessarily in the way that the Torah
mandates for Jews, while Rabbi Yitzchak as a result of the pasuk he learns
the obligation of dinim from, learns that these dinim are required to be
identical to the equivalent details of the dinim in the Torah.  The Rema
then goes on to argue from the continuation of the gemora that the halacha
is like Rabbi Yitzchak.  However, this particular teshuva was rather a
polemic (it was all about the publishing turf wars) and the Netziv in Emek
HaSheila (on the Shiltut 2) explicitly disagrees with the Rema and holds
that everybody holds like the position attributed to Rabbi Yochanan by the
Rema.

Again, that would seem to provide some support to RYK's suggestion that the
dinim that are mandated allow for a certain flexibility of what is permitted
within the discretion of the legal system in question.  Although note that
the Chatam Sofer Chelek 6 - lekutim siman 14 disagrees with the suggestion
that this particular Shut of the Rema suggests he is deciding between the
Rambam and the Ramban in favour of the Ramban, and seems to suggest that one
can hold either way and still have the Rema's chiluk.

Regards

Chana

I gathered through the discussion, that some contributors were suggesting
that the notion of Ma Hu, Af Atta; applies also to those things He
prohibits us from doing. Thus, HKBH forbade us from eating X or doing Y,
and it is accordingly good to train ourselves to be appalled at the thought
of eating X or doing Y.

I don't think this correct. Ma Hu, Af Atta, is illustrated exclusively by
those Middos that are of interpersonal values. Is there any source in
Tanach, Gemara or Medrash that supports anything beyond interpersonal
values within the framework of Ma Hu Af Atta?
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If, by definition, this giyur is done so that they can marry, then this 
giyur is already not a "proper giyur" (even if she does it willingly), 
n'est pas?

Ben
> On 12/08/2013 12:41 PM, Liron Kopinsky wrote:
>>> Presumably she needs to go through a proper giyur before a beis
>>> din. The Torah doesn't say so because it's obvious. But that would
>>> be when she becomes Jewish; how *else* could it be?
>
>> The Giyur of an Eshet Yefat Toar is fundamentally different than
>> regular Giyur, I think. From what I understood from Rashi, the Giyur
>> is "Ba'al korchah". See Rashi on 22A Likuchin Yesh Lecha Bah.
>> "Kiddushin Tofsin, Af Al Pi SheHayta Ovedet Kochavim, Sheharei Eina
>> MitGayeret MiDa'atah."

R' Zev Sero wrote:

> Kiddush, according to many rishonim, is the same: the
> chachamim decreed that one must fulfil ones d'oraisa
> obligation over wine. If one said "mekadesh hashabbos" with
> the specific kavanah of fulfilling ones chiyuv d'oraisa it
> would still *work*, but one would be violating the
> chachamim's decree not to do so. On yom kippur they didn't
> make this rule, so it remains as it was before they came
> along, and one is yotzei with a verbal mention.

I think that your "many rishonim" are Tosfos and Rambam, who we follow, and NOT Rashi.

Rashi hold that the requirement of wine was not something that Chazal added
on later, but is a requirement from the Torah from the beginning. Here are
some excerpts from Aruch Hashulchan 271:2 (which I did point to in my first
post). I concede in advance that I may have misunderstood some of the finer
points, so I'll welcome any correction. But here's what I think the AhS
wrote:

"But according to Rashi in Brachos [20b], he wrote: Kiddush Hayom is a
Mitzvas Aseh Shehazman Grama. Remember the Shabbos day to make it holy -
Remember it with wine!" End of quote. He is blatantly saying that it is
D'Oraisa.  And the Mefaresh at the beginning of Nazir [4a] says the same
thing, the Kiddush on wine was already sworn and in effect [mushba v'omed]
since Har Sinai. See there. And so says the Ran in Pesachim, that the
daytime Kiddush Al Hakos is d'rabanan, but the nighttime kiddush is
d'Oraisa, as it is a genuine drasha..."

I believe that the "genuine drasha" is the one that the AhS mentioned
earlier in 271:1. He refers to Braisa in Pesachim which makes the jump from
"Zachor Es yom Hashabbos L'Kadsho" to "Zochrehu Al Hayayin" (from Remember
Shabbos to Remember it on Wine). The difference is that in Seif 1, Tosfos
and Rambam take that to be a mere asmachta for the mitzvah d'rabanan,
whereas in Seif 2, Rashi takes it to be a "genuine drasha" that the wine is
an absolute requirement without which one is not yotzay the Mitzvah
D'Oraisa.

And that's what leads me to my question: What would Rashi have us do when Yom Kippur falls on Shabbos?

Note: I quoted the AhS as referring to "Brachos [20b]". The AhS actually says "Brachos [2b]", but I could not find it there, and I did find it on 20b.

Akiva Miller
____________________________________________________________
Transformation of America?
This story could bring shame to the White House not seen since President Clinton
http://thirdpartyoffers.juno.com/TGL3131/52099eafefcae1eaf5326st01vuc

RMB wrote a comment responding to Yitchok Adlerstein's take on the subject
<http://www.cross-currents.com/archives/2013/08/11/living-with-questions
>
which he also posted here which said:

    >To accept any document theory r"l is to accept that (for example)
    >the juxtaposition of Shabbos to building the Tabernacle was not
    >necessarily the product of Divine Wisdom. After all, the entire
    >foundation is the claim that one could perceive the seams between
    .documents, that the composition has imperfections. But without
    >attributing that juxtaposition to the Creator, the basis of a Shabbos
    >of resting from 39 specific categories of work becomes human. The
    >basis for (again, one example among thousands) distinguishing between
    >"little things" like whether I remove what I don't want from what I
    do or if I remove the good from the bad is being questioned.

Reading this debate (to the extent that I have had managed to do so over the
summer) had me automatically responding in a manner closest to the paragraph
above, although the examples I was thinking of are, perhaps, more pointed.
The first example that sprang to my mind came out of our discussions here on
the obligations vis a vis a ger toshav on Shabbas.  In the course of those
discussions we noted that there were two key psukim that operated.  The one,
in Devarim 5:13, says:

???? ?????? ??? ??' ????? ?? ???? ?? ????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?????
????? ??? ????? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????

And the seventh day is Shabbas to Hashem your G-d you shall not do any work
you and your sons and your daughter and your manservant and your maidservant
and your ox and your donkey and all your animals and the ger who is within
your gates that they may rest your manservant and your maidservant like you.

And the second in Shemos 23:12:

 ??? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????? ????? ?? ????
???? 

Six days shall you do all your work and on the seventh you shall rest in
order that shall rest your ox and your donkey and the soul the son of your
maidservant and the ger.

And Chazal learn out (Talmud Bavli Yevamos 48b) that the reference to a ger
in Devarim refers to a ger zedek, leaving the second (in Shemos) to refer to
a ger toshav.

But note what we have here - a difference is style, and phraseology and all
the aspects noted by proponents of BC between Devarim and Shemos, precisely
the sort of differentiation that bothered R' Z Farber regarding (for
example) the story of the meraglim.

And yet what these two different psukim do in halachic terms, is provide the
twin supports upon which the halachic edifice of who is obligated in the
observance of shabbas rests.  Without an understanding of a deliberate
interplay between these two psukim, the whole halachic framework of hilchos
shabbas begins to fall apart.

And let's take another and even more famous example: Shemos 20:8 has Zachor,
Devarim 5:12 has Shamor.  And we learn out that Zachor is a mitzvah aseh,
and Shamor a mitzvah lo ta'aseh.  We also learn women's obligations in the
mitzvos aseh of shabbas, despite them being mitzvos aseh shehazman graman,
directly out of the interplay between Shamor and Zachor.  Once you attempt
postulate independent authors for these two different sections of the Torah,
this whole careful and intricate structuring falls apart.

On the other hand, the very way the different psukim from different places
in the Torah, with different linguistic constructs, coalesce to construct a
unified whole in the form of the halacha is what, to me personally, provides
the strongest evidence of divine authorship.  Skilled novelists can and do
write in different linguistic styles (especially when attempting to view a
given story from different perspectives).  But it is a step considerably
beyond this to create different linguistic styled sentences that operate as
supporting struts to one another in the manner that underpins the unity of
structure of the halacha.  

RMB went on to comment:

 >Anyone who has observed a halachic Shabbos, one so different than
intuitive
  >  notions of how to structure a "day of rest", and has felt it heal
  >  his soul, couldn't take such theories seriously.

   > We lived with the questions because, as R' JB Soloveitchik put it,
   > we had "erev Shabbos Jews" -- people who not only kept the laws of
    >Shabbos, but felt its approach on Friday. 

But perhaps my reaction is less about the experiential aspect of living
shabbas,  than about the experiential aspect of learning about shabbas.  The
parts that the BC people focus on, seem more often to be the more narrative
parts of the Torah, perhaps because those are more often learnt without
recourse to the Torah she baal peh, and hence psukim are more likely to be
analysed purely against one another, without recourse to the greater edifice
of which, in the light of the Torah shebaal peh, they are just a part.  To
my mind, answers to the questions raised by setting different psukim from
different parts of the Torah off against one another, can only reasonably
and realistically be found (as they have always been found) in more fully
comprehending the glory of the whole that constitutes the unity of the Torah
shebichtav and the Torah she baal peh.  Any attempt to look solely at the
Torah shebichtav alone is not surprisingly going to throw up problematic
questions, as it did vis a vis the Saddukim and Karaites historically.
Indeed, why should we expect any different?  Isn't this also the way the
Torah was designed?

-Micha


Regards

Chana

"The dispute started after leaders at Touro agreed to sell the bells,
called rimonim, for $7.4 million to the Museum of Fine Arts in
Boston.....................
Congregation Shearith Israel opposes the sale of the bells, saying it
violates religious practice and will remove ownership of the bells from the
Jewish community. "


Interesting- are tashmishei Kodesh forbidden to be sold? Is there a presumption that the original donors donated them al tnai they not be sold....?

KT
Joel Rich

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