Avodah Mailing List

Volume 32: Number 13

Thu, 23 Jan 2014

• 1. Women wearing Tefillin (Micha Berger)
• 2. Re: Women wearing Tefillin (Micha Berger)
• 3. Re: Women wearing Tefillin (Zev Sero)
• 4. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Zev Sero)
• 5. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Marty Bluke)
• 6. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Lisa Liel)
• 7. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Zev Sero)
• 9. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Chesky Salomon)
• 10. Is there one halachic truth? (Marty Bluke)
• 11. Re: Sotah 8:6 (Zev Sero)
• 12. Upstart.com (Liron Kopinsky)
• 13. Re: Chief Rabbinate Says No To Religious Women in the IDF/ Sotah 8:6 (Chana Luntz)

So, the topic made it to Avodah after all...

On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 03:55:14PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote to Areivim:
> It sounds to me like a case of shikul hada'as.  Everyone knows that there is
> no actual issur here...

AFAIK, one can make sound arguments both ways, actually.

H/T RGS, who pointed me to the Rama OC 38:3 and AhS 38:5.

The Rama says "ve'im hanashim rotzin lehachmir al atzman, mochin beyadam",
citing the Kol Bo. The MA ("mochin") and the MB (s"q 12) say this is
because of guf naqi, but the Rama himself gives no explanation. The MA adds
that guf naqi here is an issue because they are not mechuyavos.

The AhS also says mochin beyadan, and distinguishes it from sukah and
lulav where they can not only do the mitzvos we (of the AhS's communty)
have her make a berakhah. Again, "dekivan tetifilin tzarikh zehirus
yeseirah guf naqi". Also Shabbos 39a, "tefilin tzerichin guf naqi keElisha
ba'al kneafayim", and Y-mi sham. Which (skipping ahead a little), Michal
bas Shaul could. And, like the Rama, but since men are mechuyavim,
we wear tefillin anyway. But for the minimum of Shema and Tefillah,
just as women should wear it for their minimum, zero.

But michu beyadan is quite from "everyone knows that there is no actual
issur".

In http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Personal-Notes/Why
-do-Orthodox-women-not-wear-tefillin-or-tallit
or http://j.mp/1mpS8QM R Shlomo Brody adds more sources against tzitzis
and tefillin (his context is explaining to JPost readers why there is
a halachic question about Women of the Wall wearing them):

    One potential problem raised in an early Bible translation is that
    tefillin and tzitzit might constitute men's clothing, thereby raising
    problems of cross-dressing (Targum Yonatan Deuteronomy 22:5). While
    a few decisors agreed with this sentiment (Levush OC 17:2), many
    rejected this concern since this prohibition only applies to articles
    of clothing worn for style or appearance, not to fulfill a commandment
    (Maharam Schick OC 173).

    While various other reasons were historically raised against women
    wearing tefillin (Piskei Riaz RH 4:3), the primary objection stemmed
    from the requirement that one must maintain a "clean body" to don
    tefillin. As such, one may not wear tefillin if they believe they
    may fall asleep (OC 38:2). (This requirement is why most people
    do not wear tefillin throughout the day.) Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg
    contended that contemporary women could not fulfill this requirement,
    perhaps out of concern for dirtiness from menstrual blood. While
    some demurred, the majority ultimately agreed that women should
    not don tefillin, either by deeming Michal as an exceptional case
    (Aruch Hashulhan 38:6) or citing a different talmudic tradition
    which criticized her action (Beit Yosef 38:3).

    While Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits and non -- Orthodox rabbis claimed that
    women could still choose to vigilantly perform this mitzva, the vast
    majority of Orthodox decisors have determined that this practice is
    forbidden, since we are dealing with an optional commandment which
    women have not historically practiced (Eliahu Raba).

    This latter sentiment greatly impacted women wearing tzitzit,
    which is only required to be attached to a four-cornered garment
    like a tallit. Since women do not regularly wear such garments,
    Rabbi Moshe Isserles (OC 17:2) asserted that donning it would be an
    act of religious arrogance (yuhara). This position became widely
    accepted within Orthodox circles (Aruch Hashulhan), which became
    further emboldened in the face of the feminist critique (Igrot Moshe
    OC 4:49)....

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             The trick is learning to be passionate in one's
mi...@aishdas.org        ideals, but compassionate to one's peers.
http://www.aishdas.org
Fax: (270) 514-1507

I didn't read it yet, but RGS posted his survey of the subject at
http://www.torahmusings.com/2006/11/why-no-tefillin

-Micha

On 21/01/2014 5:36 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> But michu beyadan is quite from "everyone knows that there is no actual
> issur".

I'm assuming there's a missing "far" there, and that "michu" should be
"mochin".  But how is it quite far, or even far at all?  On the contrary,
how do you get from the Rama saying "mochin beyadan", i.e. there is *no*
issur, to an issur?  Who assered it, and under what authority, when the
Rama did not?

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On 21/01/2014 6:29 AM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 11:46:53PM -0500, Zev Sero wrote:
>> Why would this bother anyone more than Devorah, whom the Tanach itself
>> says was "shofetes"?  Whatever it means with regard to Devorah (and it
>> *can't* mean that she sat on an actual beis din, since it is an undisputed
>> de'oraisa law that women are pesulos le'eidus and therefore also ledayanus)
>> it will mean the same for Yael.
>
>>> Personally I don't see why it should vex people any more than the fact
>>> that Shma`ya and Avtalyon were nasi and av beth din of the Sanhedrin.
>
>> That's completely different...
>
> I'm not so sure it is.

Then please address my demonstration of how completely different they are,
which you snipped.  Even if, as you assert,
> It is quite likely that the nasi and ABD were non-voting members of the
> Sanhedrin in that generation
that does not make the two cases at all similar.


> Others suggest that they were both children of converst,

How does this help, unless one of their parents was of Jewish stock?


> which is why Hillel's rebbe
> still had the accent of saying "'in" instead of "hin". But in any
> case, not everyone assumes they were exceptions to the rule made in
> a time of great need

Whether or not an exception was made for them to the issur of "loses
olecho is nochri", it is still a world apart from the psul of women for
dayonus.


> (or public acceptance of their leadership, an
> answer the vaaleo Tosafos give for Devorah).

Public acceptance?  I'm not entirely sure what you're referring to.  If
it's what I *think* you're referring to, it's got nothing to do with
*public* acceptance, which can't turn a posul dayan into a kosher one,
but on the contrary with *private* acceptance, i.e. the consent of both
baalei din in a civil dispute, since they have the right to waive a din
torah and submit their case to anyone they like, even a goy, a machine,
or the toss of a coin.


> Although putting Devorah or Yael in non-voting seats in the Sanhedrin
> would also shock many people today.

It would, but it wouldn't make them shofetos, which is what the possuk
says Devorah was and what Rashi says Yael was, so I don't see how it helps
to suppose it.


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

R' Zev Sero wrote:
<since it is an undisputed de'oraisa law that women are pesulos le'eidus
and therefore also <ledayanus)

It is not undisputed that a woman cannot be a dayan, Tosafos in BK 15a has
an opinion that a woman can be a dayan.
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On 1/22/2014 3:37 AM, Marty Bluke wrote:
> R' Zev Sero wrote:
>> since it is an undisputed de'oraisa law that women are pesulos
>> le'eidus and therefore also ledayanus)

> It is not undisputed that a woman cannot be a dayan, Tosafos in BK 15a
> has an opinion that a woman can be a dayan.

Not as far as I can see. In fact, it's the opposite. Tosfot quotes
about Devorah being a Shofetet, and says "ein l'havi ra'aya d'isha
k'sheira ladun". I assume you're referring to the second Tosfot on the
page, d"h Asher, right?

Lisa

On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 07:35:57AM -0600, Lisa Liel wrote:
: Not as far as I can see. In fact, it's the opposite. Tosfot quotes
: about Devorah being a Shofetet, and says "ein l'havi ra'aya d'isha
: k'sheira ladun". I assume you're referring to the second Tosfot on the
: page, d"h Asher, right?

They also site Niddah 49b and point you to their discussion there,
BQ 88a, and Shevu'os 30a. "Ishah pesulah ladun".

However, look at their answer: "Maybe they accepted her [as an authority]
over themselves because of [the] Shechinah". One could take that to mean
that there is an exemption for nevi'os. But more literally, it seems the
pesul is WRT her being appointed dayenes, not a leader the people pick by
acclamation. (And in this case, the cause for that public acclamation
was the Shechinah.) That take also better fits the Q&A of the rest of
the Tosafos.

On a different front, where do we know that the shofeit was a member of
a beis din? Tosafos appear to assume it, otherwise why consider Devorah
as an example to be even a hava amina to argue against?

A shofeit is more like a regional king, and "vehi shafetah es Yisrael"
could simply be in a quasi-melekh role, like Shelomo judging who was
the mother. The question of Devorah and Tosafos' answer would work
WRT serarah in general, rather than being about dayanos.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             None of us will leave this place alive.
mi...@aishdas.org        All that is left to us is
http://www.aishdas.org   to be as human as possible while we are here.
Fax: (270) 514-1507            - Anonymous MD, while a Nazi prisoner

On 22/01/2014 3:18 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> However, look at their answer: "Maybe they accepted her [as an authority]
> over themselves because of [the] Shechinah".

Your bracketed insertion is not correct.  Nor is your unstated assumption
about the referent of "they".  What Tosfos suggests is that they, i.e. the
litigants in civil cases, waived their right to be heard by a proper beis
din, and accepted her as an arbitrator between them.  Litigants, of course,
have the right to agree to any procedure and arbitrator they like.


> But more literally, it seems the pesul is WRT her being appointed dayenes,
> not a leader the people pick by acclamation

It's got nothing to do with leadership.


> On a different front, where do we know that the shofeit was a member of
> a beis din? Tosafos appear to assume it, otherwise why consider Devorah
> as an example to be even a hava amina to argue against?

Because that's what the word means.  "Shofet" in Leshon Tanach is an exact
synonym for "Dayan" in Leshon Chazal.   Whether she sat on a beis din or
was "danah yichidah" isn't addressed and isn't relevant.  Her function was
"shofetah", and Tosfos's question is how this could be, since women are
pesulos for that role.  And, apart from an initial tentative "yesh lomar"
that we're mistaken about that, and women really are kosher for dayonus,
all the answers Tosfos advances boil down to that despite the name she
wasn't a real shofet in the technical sense after all.  She was either a
teacher, a posekes, or a popular private arbitrator.


> A shofeit is more like a regional king

No, it isn't.  If it were then Pilegesh Begiv'ah wouldn't have happened,
because the "regional king" would have stopped it.  The last posuk in Shoftim
says that the reason it happened was because all of EY was a literal anarchy,
just like medieval Iceland, with a judicial system but no government.  Anyone
could do whatever they wanted, and the only recourse anyone had was to sue
them afterwards.

> and "vehi shafetah es Yisrael"
> could simply be in a quasi-melekh role, like Shelomo judging who was
> the mother. The question of Devorah and Tosafos' answer would work
> WRT serarah in general, rather than being about dayanos.

It could work, except that none of the proof texts Tosfos raises on either
side of the question would then be relevant.  Tosfos is absolutely not
discussing "melech velo malka".  For one thing, because then the question
would not be "how *could* she fill this role", but "how was she *allowed*
to be appointed to it".  As I pointed out earlier, the difference between
"can't" and "mayn't" is fundamental.

-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 5:23 PM, Zev Sero wrote:

> On 22/01/2014 3:18 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
>
>> On a different front, where do we know that the shofeit was a member of
>>
> a beis din? Tosafos appear to assume it, otherwise why consider Devorah
>> as an example to be even a hava amina to argue against?
>>
>
> Because that's what the word means.  "Shofet" in Leshon Tanach is an exact
> synonym for "Dayan" in Leshon Chazal.

<snip>

> A shofeit is more like a regional king
>>
>
> No, it isn't.  If it were then Pilegesh Begiv'ah wouldn't have happened,
> because the "regional king" would have stopped it.  The last posuk in
> Shoftim
> says that the reason it happened was because all of EY was a literal
> anarchy,
> just like medieval Iceland, with a judicial system but no government.
>  Anyone
> could do whatever they wanted, and the only recourse anyone had was to sue
> them afterwards.


And yet, all of the actions of the Shoftim which are explicitly recorded in
Tenach are those of civil (& religious) leadership. I suspect the word
*shofeit* has a broader range of meaning than *dayan*; more akin to
?magistrate? than ?judge?.

And that the incident of *pilegesh beGiv?ah* happened is no contradiction
to the idea that the Shoftim operated *in loco regis*, since (a) their
authority was limited both in space (not necessarily over all *shevatim*)
and in scope and (b) there was no defined transition or inheritance of
power so there were times and places where no Shofeit ruled.

?Chesky
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As a followup to our previous discussion, this point just came up in Daf
Yomi. The Gemara (Yoma 74a) has a dispute between R' Yochanan and Resh
Lakish whether chatzi shiur is assur min hatorah or not. R' Yochanan brings
a proof from a Baraisa that learns from a pasuk that a chatzi shiur of
cheilev and cheilev from a Koy (an animal that we don't know whether it is
a behema or a chaya) is prohibited. Resh Lakish answers that the pasuk is
an asmachta and proves it from the fact that the Gemara brought the pasuk
with regards to Koy as a Koy is a safek and why would we need a pasuk to
prohibit a safek?

Rashi explains the Gemaras answer as follows.

"Bitmiya atu kamei shmaya sefeka hee ee behema ee chaya havey".

My rough translation, Is there a safek in shamayim what a Koy is, whether
it is a behema or a chaya?

Rashi is saying that the pasuk can't be coming to assur a Koy because in
shamayim there is no doubt what a Koy is, if it is a behema it is already
assur and if it is a chaya it is already mutar.

We see clearly that Rashi is assuming that there is one halachic truth and
we simply don't know it.

Rashi would seem to be agreeing with the Geonim that the halachic system is
retrieval and not constitutive.

Others understand the Gemaras answer differently that the Gemara meant that
it is assur because sefeka d'oraysa l'chumra and therefore you don't need a
pasuk (of course that assumes that sefeka d'oraysa l'chumra is itself
d'oraysa). This answer would work with the constitutive theory as well.
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On 22/01/2014 8:52 PM, Chesky Salomon wrote:

> And yet, all of the actions of the Shoftim which are explicitly recorded in
> Tenach are those of civil (& religious) leadership.


Well, what did you expect?  A record of all the court cases they decided?!
Shofet was their job, what people went to them for every day, and there were
probably shoftim who did nothing but judge cases, but when there was an
emergency there was no king to raise an army, so the only people who could
raise armies were those the people were used to treating with deference, i.e.
the judges.  Then the emergency was over, the enemy was defeated, the army
disbanded, and the judge went back to judging.


> I suspect the word shofeit has a broader range of meaning than dayan;
> more akin to ?magistrate? than ?judge?.

A magistrate is a kind of judge.  And "dayan" includes all of that too.
Beis din is in charge of the administration of the law; it appoints
trustees, guardians, bailiffs, inspectors of weights and measures, morals
police, etc.   And of course the Beis Din Hagadol sets the calendar.
"Dayan" is not a word found in Tanach; it's simply Chazal's term for what
the Tanach calls "shofet".


-- 
Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and
z...@sero.name          substantial reason' why he should be permitted to
                        exercise his rights. The right's existence is all
                        the reason he needs.
                            - Judge Benson E. Legg, Woollard v. Sheridan

https://www.upstart.com/how_it_works

Heter Iska?

Kol tuv,

-- 
Liron Kopinsky
liron.kopin...@gmail.com
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On 20/01/2014 6:17 PM, j...@m5.chicago.il.us wrote:
>
>> Someone who has not read Sotah 8:6 (or 8:7, depending on whether you
>> split the first long Mishna into two pieces), or has read it but does
>> not believe that we pasqn according to it, posted the following:

And RZS replied:

 

>Though it would surprise me if RTK had learned that mishnah, or the
>Rambam who quotes it, that conclusion doesn't actually follow from her
>post.  It's obvious that neither the mishnah nor the Rambam mean that
>women actually go to war.

 

I don't think it is as obvious as all that.  To help those for whom the
Mishna is not necessarily easily accessible, the relevant texts are as
follows:

 

Meseches Sotah perek 8 halacha 6

With respect to what is this said [discussing those who can return from war,
eg built a house and not lived in it], with a milchemes reshus.  But with a
milchemes mitzvah - all go out, even a chasan from his room and a kala from
her chuppah (Yoel 2:16). Rabbi Yehuda said, with respect to what is this
said, with a milchemes mitzvah, but with a milchemes chova, all go out, even
a chasan from his room and a kala from her chuppah.

 

And the Rambam consequently rules:

 

Hilchos Melachim Perek 7 halacha 4

With respect to what are we speaking, that men can return from the
arrangement of wars, this is a milchemes reshus, but a milchemes mitzvah -
all go out, even a chasan from his room and a kala from her chuppah.

 

Note by the way that the Rambam defines a milchemes mitzvah as follows:

 

Rambam, Hilchos Melachim Perek 5 halacha 1

...  And this is a milchemes mitzvah - the milchama of the seven nations,
and the milchama of amalek, and to help Israel from an enemy that comes on
them. ..

 

The fact that the Rambam himself understands the Mishna in Sotah k'pshuto
would seem difficult to dispute, because he states, in the introduction to
the count of the mitzvos in the Sefer Hamitzvos- 

 

"And know that women do not judge, and do not give testimony and they do not
bring a korban by their hands, and they do not fight [nilchamos] in a
milchemes hareshus and each mitzvah that is dependent upon beis din or eidim
or avodah or milchemes hareshus it is not necessary to say regarding it that
this women are not obligated in it ."

 

And that this is the view of various meforshim can be seen by those who
quote the Mishna in Sotah in support of a position that women are required
to hear pashas zachor, on the basis that they are obligated in the milchemes
mitzvah of uprooting Amalek (such as the Minchas Chinuch (Parshas ki tezei
603), the Mitzvos Hamelech (daf 55a), the Maharil Diskin in kuntrus acharon
(siman 102) etc).

 

 >  The Torah makes it clear in many places that it is not the way of women
to make war, 

 

I am not sure it is so clear direct from the Torah, but certainly the gemora
states in Kiddushin (2b) "it is the way of a man to make war and it is not
the way of a woman to make war."  And of course your reference to pru u'rvu
(Yevamos 65b) -  that women are exempt from  pirya v'rivya "as it says, pru
u'rvu and fill the earth and conquer it, it is the way or a man to conquer
and it isn't the way of a woman to conquer."  

 

However, those who learn the sources differently can understand the first as
a reference to milchemes reshus - ie women only fight when they have to, and
when they need to protect what they have, not for kibosh purposes, so these
sources are not definitive.

 

On the other hand, the Radvaz clearly feels as RZS does, and is bothered by
what appears to be the straight psak of the Mishna, and he comments as
follows:

 

Radvaz Hilchos Melachim Perek 7 halacha 4

With respect to what are we speaking that they return etc: The braisa is
like the language of the Rambam but there is a question in that is it the
way of women to make war? as it is taught "and a kala from her chupah" but
behold it is written kol kavuda bas melech penima?  But it can be answered
that this is what is being said, that since the chassan goes out from his
room, the kala goes out from her chupah that the days of the chupah do not
apply to her, [or alternatively] it is possible that with a milechemes
mitzvah the women are preparers of water and food for their husbands and so
is the custom today amongst the Arabs.

 

Now the second suggestion of the Radvaz would seem something of a half way
house.  In modern terms he seems to be saying, women should go to the army
in a milchemes mitzvah situation, just they should be the cooks and the
cleaners and do the jobs that enable more men to be in the front  line
units.

 

It is interesting though that he quotes "kol kavuda" and not, as RZS later
refers to Nazir 59a (although for some reason, only to Rashi, not the main
text, which states):

 

Talmud Bavli Meseches Nazir 59a

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'akov says: from where do we know that a woman does not
go out with weapons [klei zayin] to war?  The Torah teaches:  lo yiyeh kli
gever al isha, v'lo yilbosh gever simlas isha.

 

Most people generally understand that Rambam as paskening like Rabbi Eliezer
ben Ya'akov (because he is kav v'naki) when he brings this halacha in which
he states as follows:

 

Hilchos Avodah Zara perek 12 halacha 11

One should not witness [tedah] a woman with the witnessings  [edei] of a
man, like she puts on her head a turban or a hat, or she dresses in armour,
and similar to it or she shaves her head like a man, and one should not
witness  a man with the witnessings of a woman, like that he dresses in
coloured clothing and gold adornments - in a place where they do not dress
in these clothes, and where they do not put on them adornments except women:
all is like the custom of the state.

 

 The language of the Rambam here is reproduced exactly by the Shulchan Aruch
in Yoreh Deah  siman 182 si'if 5.

 

However, you always need to consider the question of beged ish in the light
of the Bach.  I was going to summarise the Bach and then apply it here, but
I see that Rav Ovadiah has already done it for me, so I can only quote him:

 

Shut Yechave Da'at chelek 5 siman 55

... 

And greater than this we find that the gaon Beit Chadash in Yoreh Deah
(siman 182) that he writes that it is forbidden that there should be a klei
gever on a woman etc, that this does not apply except for a thing that is
for noy and kishut [beauty and adornment], and like it is proved from the
words of the Rambam (in perek 12 of Hilchos Avodah Zarah).  And even a thing
that is for noy and kishut isn't forbidden except when a woman dresses in
the dress of a man in order to be like a man, and so for a man who dresses
in the garments of a woman in order to be like a woman, but if they dress in
order to protect themselves because of the sun or because of the cold it is
permitted.  And so rules the Turei Zahav (siman 182 si'if katan 4).  And
even though in the book Yad Katana (page 279b) he goes at length to push
aside the words of the Bach and the Taz, because even though the halacha is
settled in the matter that something that is ano miskaven is permitted, this
is davka when he does a permitted action, and in any event when he does not
intend that he does melecha, but a man who dresses in the garments of a
woman, and a woman who dresses in the garments of a man, even if they do not
intend to be like, behold this is in the category of psik resha, and we rule
(Shabbat 75a and 150a and other places) that Rabbi Shimon admits regarding
psik resha v'lo yamus.  And thus one should not rely on this argument to be
lenient regarding an issur Torah.  But in the Shut of the  Meharam Shik
(Chelek Yoreh Deah siman 173) he establishes the correctness of the words of
the Bach and the Taz, according to the words of the Rashba (Shabbat 133a),
and thus the law is here that which the Torah concludes that it is an
abomination of HaShem your G-d all who do this, that the Torah does not
forbid except when the man intends for a matter of toevah that is to be like
to a woman, and so the opposite.  And so writes the Arigas HaBoshem (Chelek
Yoreh Deah siman 178 letter 4) to establish the words of the Bach and the
Taz that I brought before.   And so it appears in the Shut Avnei Tzedek
(Chelek Yoreh Deah siman 74).  And so agrees the Gaon HaNetziv in his book
Emek HaDavar on the Sifri (Parshas Ki Tetzei).  And see further in this in
the Shut from the Meharsham chelek 2 (siman 243) and in the Shut Yemei Yosef
Yadid medorah basra (Chelek Yoreh Deah siman 6).  And according to this also
in our case that it is not the intention of the teachers in carrying guns in
order to be like to men, but only to protect their lives and the lives of
their students, that are entrusted to them and supervised by them it seems
that the matter is clear that there isn't in this any issue of lo yiye kli
gever al isha. [And so I found just now that HaGaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in
Shut Iggeros Moshe Kruch 6  (Chelek Yoreh Deah siman 75) allows to permit
according to his words.]

 

As can be derived from the portion I quoted, the issue at hand was whether
certain kindergarten teachers could carry weapons to help protect their
charges from terrorist attack, with Rav Ovadiah ruling, no problem.

 

With regard to Ya'el, he comments earlier in the teshuva:

 

...And that which Ya'el did not kill Sisera with the sword, because Sisera
was tired and sleepy, and it was possible to kill him easily by way of a
tent peg, but when the time is pressing and it is necessary to act quickly,
like when the terrorists come with weapons .. for sure it is necessary to
hurry to precede them with a gun and similar to it.

 

What Rav Ovadiah did not bring, but could also be brought in support, is the
fact that we have in our history not just one but two women famous for
killing the leaders of our enemies. And while Ya'el may have used a tent
peg, Yehudis (as in das Yehudis ) famously used Holefornes own sword.

 

Interestingly what appears to be assumed here, in allowing kindergarten
teachers to carry weaponry, is that they have been or will be taught to use
them, which as I understood it, is one of the primary goals of basic
training in the army.  As far as my limited knowledge of the Israeli army
extends, there is no assumption that just going through basic training will
equip anybody, male or female, for front line duty, but merely assist them
if they encounter the kinds of pikuach nefesh situations that Rav Ovadiah
was contemplating in his teshuva (earlier he deals with pikuach nefesh, and
the need to carry weapons in these circumstances for pikuach nefesh reasons,
ie he clearly deems carrying guns in case of a possible terrorist attack in
the light of Israeli reality as a pikuach nefesh situation, even though no
terrorist was imminently threatening at any time the woman would put the gun
on).  It was only once he had dealt with that question that he turns to the
understanding of the Bach which would seem to permit women to carry weapons
for protection (as opposed to for noy or kishut and to be like men) even in
situations that might fall outside a pikuach nefesh psak.

 

So it seems difficult to assur the army based solely on the fact that
everybody gets put through basic training, if they then end up making coffee
for the army officers and doing a bit of typing (which is a major complaint
of many women who do go to the army).  Indeed, such a job would seem to fall
within the position of the Radvaz.  Others, however, would seem to justify
even front line positions for women in a milchemes mitzvah situation.

 

>> Personally I don't see why it should vex people any more than the fact
that Shma`ya and Avtalyon were nasi and av beth din of the Sanhedrin.

>That's completely different.  "Mikerev achecha" can be waived if necessary,
and presumably so can "melech velo malka",...

 

So can eidus and dayanos, if both parties accept eg a certain karov as an
eid as per [Mishna Sanhedrin 3:2] "ne'eman alai aba..".  Indeed one of the
justifications for allowing a waiver of melech velo malka and mikerev
achecha is based on it being similarly structured on a national level to
that mishna in Sanhedrin on an individual level.   

 

>Zev Sero               A citizen may not be required to offer a 'good and

 

Regards

 

Chana

 

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