Avodah Mailing List

Volume 33: Number 87

Fri, 05 Jun 2015

• 1. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (H Lampel)
• 2. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin ()
• 3. MB (Eli Turkel)
• 4. More on Standing at a Chupah (Prof. Levine)
• 5. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (Micha Berger)
• 6. ashtei-asar (saul newman)
• 7. Re: ashtei-asar (Micha Berger)
• 8. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (H Lampel)
• 9. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (Micha Berger)
• 10. Right/Wrong (Micha Berger)
• 11. Re: Rav Elchanan Wasserman & Why People Sin (H Lampel)
• 12. Science and Halachah - The Trumpeting Stone (Micha Berger)

:
> From: Micha Berger via Avodah<avo...@lists.aishdas.org>
>
> [Rambam's statement (''And know that one of the strongest proofs for Creation ex nihilo, //for
> :: //one who ismodeh al ha-ememmes// ...
> :: is his confirming the fact that every one of all natural entities
> :: serves a specific purpose, with each one benefiting still another;
> :: and that this fact is a proof for the purposeful intent of an
> :: [I]ntender...'') is not an informal argument, akin to R' Aqiva's or REW's appeal
> to the obviousness of a design and thus Designer. Rather,] it is a
> recap of a formal proof The Rambam made in 2:19-20... 2:20 marks the
> end of an Argument from Design. As it opens: "According to Aristotle,
> none of the products
> of Nature are due to chance. His proof is this: That which is due to
> chance does not reappear constantly nor frequently, but all products of
> Nature reappear either constantly or at least frequently..."
>
> This is a formal argument, unlike R' Aqiva's or REW's own appeal
> to the obviousness of a design and thus Designer.
Philosophers may disagree with classifying the argument made in 2:20 
from ''frequency of appearance'' as ''an argument from design.'' But 
even if it is ''an'' argument from design, it's a different argument 
from the ''modeh al ha-emmess'' proof from the hierarchy of entities 
benefiting others. So the latter is not a recap of the former. And it 
does not necessarily follow that one who is modeh to the ''frequency'' 
argument considers the hierarchy argument ''one of the strongest.''


RZL, continued:
: He explicitly describes this/modeh al ha-emmess/  statement /as a
: tangential interruption/: After that statement, he says, "I will now
: return to the subject of this chapter, viz., the ultimate cause [i.e.
: the purpose behind the universe being as it is--ZL]."

: My point was that we nevertheless see that the Rambam recognizes that
: there is another approach to verifying truth, namely that which follows
: the non-formal mindset of those who are/modeh al ha-emmess/...

RMB: >Agreed it's tangential, which is why I doubt that if the Rambam did want
to say something that signficant, this would be its only mention.<

Again: Here, where the Rambam, for the first time, is about to bring up 
the hierarchy proof, he parenthetically mentions that it is intuitively 
understood by anyone unbiased. He does then go on to state the proof in 
a formal philosophic form. This is the most proper place to insert such 
a parenthetical remark parenthetically, and only once. It's not ''that 
significant'' for his purposes, because, as I had written, the entire 
purpose of the Moreh is to address people (including himself) concerned 
with hearing formal philosophic proofs and confronting the challenges 
that formal philosophic proofsbrought to the mesorah. Those interested 
in hearing an expanded version of the argument in informal form could 
find it in the Rambam's introduction to his his Mishnah commentary.

Zvi Lampel
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From: Eli Turkel via Avodah  <avo...@lists.aishdas.org>


>>  I have a book "The  Goldilocks Enigma" by Paul Davies (cosmolgist) on 
why is
the universe just  right for life. Most of the book is to show how unlikely
it is that the  universe has exactly the right properties for existence.
The second part is a  discussion as to why this happened. He goes through
all the theories  including the watchmaker etc. One possibility is a
"creator" . He admits that  it is logically consistent but finds it highly
unlikely. His own preference  is for the multi-verse.

The idea is not whether you agree with him or  not. Rather here is an
intelligent human who has thought deeply about these  problems and does not
see any obvious signs of a designer.....  <<
 
 
Eli Turkel

 
 
>>>>
 
On the contrary, he sees many signs of a Designer and he is so  desperate 
to avoid the obvious conclusion -- because of his own prior  philosophical 
biases -- that he adopts the currently trendy and absurd idea of  "many 
universes" to escape from what he does not want to face.  
 
You see, if this is the only universe then it is so fantastically  
improbable that it can only be a miracle.  But if it is only one of many  universes, 
then it is not so strange that just one out of millions  of universes would 
happen to have the conditions necessary for life.
 
Normally the definition of "science" includes things like capable of  
observation or experiment, falsifiable, etc.  But if you are desperate  enough to 
escape G-d (and His moral demands) you will take something as  airy-fairy, 
non-observable, not subject to any possible experiment,  non-falsifiable as 
a "multi-verse" -- a product of the human mind that is as  real as 
leprechauns --  and you will crown it with the noble name of  "science"!
 
I have a wonderful book in my house called *The Privileged Planet* that  
should be a science textbook in every yeshiva high school and Bais  Yakov.   
Please please read it. It's by Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay  Richards.
 
Here's the website with more information about the book and a video:
 
http://www.privilegedplanet.com/
 

--Toby Katz
t6...@aol.com
..
=============


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The entry in wikepedia in Hebrew on Mishna Brura contains much of the
information that we have been discussing. In particular it discusses the
authorship of MB (ie the quote from his son) . MH vs AH and the change
after the holocaust and other comments

-- 
Eli Turkel
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The following is from today's Hakhel email bulletin.

FROM A READER: Further on the point on standing at Chuppahs:  Many 
think/say that it is because of Choson Domeh L'melech that they stand 
up for the Chosson. Yet, they should be aware that to my knowledge, 
HaRav Moshe Feinstein, Z'tl, never stood because he used to say, 
Doi-meh (L)melech NOT (Ke)melech.  HaRav Yaakov Kamenetsky, Z'tl, 
stood but for a totally different reason. The question of L'melech or 
K'melech never entered into consideration as the Chosson is not a 
true Chosson until AFTER the Chuppah. Rather, HaRav  Yaakov stood 
purely because of the Mishna in Bikurim (3:3), that discusses the 
bringing of Bikurim and the rule of standing Lif-Nai Oisei Mitzva, 
and since the Chosson is entering into a Chupah which will enable him 
to be mekayeim the mitzvah of P'ru U'revu, we stand. As to why we 
don't stand for everyone doing a mitzvah, it's for a mitzvah that is 
mei-kama zman l'zman, not a regular occurrence. The question remains 
as to a justification for why people stand for the Kallah, since she 
is not K'Malka (see HaRav Moshe and HaRav Yaakov above) and is 
peturah from Mitzvas Peru U'revu. HaRav Avraham Kamenetsky, HaRav 
Yaakov's son, told me that one can say that since the Chosson cannot 
be mekayeim the mitzvah without her, she has a chelek in the mitzvah 
and thus qualifies for Lif-Nai Oisei Mitzvah.

YL

llev...@stevens.edu 
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On Tue, Jun 02, 2015 at 05:39:33PM -0400, H Lampel wrote:
: But even if it is "an" argument from design, it's a different argument
: from the "modeh al ha-emmess" proof from the hierarchy of entities
: benefiting others. So the latter is not a recap of the former. And
: it does not necessarily follow that one who is modeh to the
: "frequency" argument considers the hierarchy argument "one of the
: strongest."

I think our point of contention is simple:

You seem to be treating "modeh al ha-emes" as referring to a kind
justification that isn't a proof.

Whereas I see the Rambam as saying more like: this doesn't work as proof,
but if you already agree to the emes, look how nicely it works out. And
therefore there is nothing in the Rambam about a justification that
isn't a philosophical proof. For that matter, I would take his words
to say this non-proof, being only meaningful to someone who is already
"modeh al ha'emes", is not valid justification -- an instance of what
I believe would be his general rule.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             It's never too late
mi...@aishdas.org        to become the person
http://www.aishdas.org   you might have been.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                      - George Eliot

could someone explain please the ibn ezra in last weeks  parsha ?

someone asked about the origin of  'ashtei'  and noted the this week
mikshah  is  translated as eshet---   which  must mean one solid piece so
 that must mean ashtei= one  . but why not say achad asar ?      [ he
 pointed out that 'eshet'= 770 , a number of  completion ]
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On Wed, Jun 03, 2015 at 10:58:33AM -0700, saul newman via Avodah wrote:
: someone asked about the origin of  'ashtei'  and noted the this week
: mikshah  is  translated as eshet---   which  must mean one solid piece so
:  that must mean ashtei= on...

The Akkadian for 11 is ishteneshret, ishten (one) + shret (ten). It is
weird, though, that Hebrew would use a form of isheneshret without
also using ishten.

Then there's the idea in the Radaq (Mikhlol pg 140) that it was two
that was collapsed from "ashtei" to "shtei". Which would explain why
"shtayim" isn't "shesayim". The rule is that a sheva under the first
letter is a sheva na (pronounced schwa), the legacy of the missing "i-"
makes "shtei" an exception -- the sheva under the shin is nach (silent).

Along these line, but presumably without the knowledge of
Akkadian, the IE (Bamidbar 7:72, citing his own Sefer Me'oznayim)
writes that "ashtei asar" is like "eshtenosav" -- that which were born
from his thoughts. As though the 10 gave birth. "Vehu sod gadol".

He then goes on to dismiss R' Yonah haSefaradi's theory that it means
"el shtei asar". Because
1- "al shetei asar" would refer to the number AFTER 12, not before;
and
2- "asar" (masc) would get "shnei" (masc), not "shtei" (fem).

The gemara doesn't explain peshat, but interestingly R' Ashi's
example (Sanhedrin 29a) of "kol hamosif goreia'"  is how adding
an ayin turns "shtei esrei yeri'os" into "ashtei esrei".


Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             For those with faith there are no questions.
mi...@aishdas.org        For those who lack faith there are no answers.
http://www.aishdas.org                     - Rav Yaakov of Radzimin
Fax: (270) 514-1507

On 6/3/2015 9:57 AM, Micha Berger wrote:
> I think our point of contention is simple:
>
> You seem to be treating "modeh al ha-emes" as referring to a kind
> justification that isn't a proof.
I thought I was clear that I was taking it to be the same informal kind 
of proof as R. E. Wasserman's and R. Akiva's. The kind of proof not 
delineated in formal Aristotelian format, but clearly recognized and 
accepted by a healthy and unbiased mind.
>
> Whereas I see the Rambam as saying more like: this doesn't work as proof,
> but if you already agree to the emes, look how nicely it works out.
I did not see this in your previous remarks that characterized the 
''modeh-al-ha-emmess" as a formal proof/argument:

:> There is here an actually a reference to a formal proof. The Rambam
:> recaps a point made in 2:19-20.

> 2:20 marks the end of an Argument from Design, which is what I was
> referring to. ...This is a formal argument, unlike R' Aqiva's or REW's own appeal
> to the obviousness of a design and thus Designer.
And I don't see how one can possibly interpret (MN 3:13 [not 3:15 as I 
mistakenly typed previously])  ''And know that one of the strongest 
/proofs/ (min /ha-gedolah sheh-b'ra'ayos/) for Creation ex nihilo, for 
one who is /modeh al ha-ememmes/, is his understanding the /proof/ (/hu 
mah sheya'amod alav ha-mofase/)...'' as meaning:

> ''this doesn't work as proof, but if you already agree to the emes, 
> look how nicely it works out.''


Zvi Lampel

On Wed, Jun 03, 2015 at 06:16:59PM -0400, H Lampel via Avodah wrote:
:> You seem to be treating "modeh al ha-emes" as referring to a kind
:> justification that isn't a proof.

: I thought I was clear that I was taking it to be the same informal
: kind of proof as R. E. Wasserman's and R. Akiva's. The kind of proof
: not delineated in formal Aristotelian format, but clearly recognized
: and accepted by a healthy and unbiased mind.

Then I did understand you correctly.

When I say, "a kind justification that isn't a proof", I believe I mean
the same thing as your "informal kind of proof". To me, the word "proof"
implies formality. "Justification" is a general term for how we know
something is true. (From Plato's definition of knowledge: "a justified and
true belief.")

:> Whereas I see the Rambam as saying more like: this doesn't work as proof,
:> but if you already agree to the emes, look how nicely it works out.

: I did not see this in your previous remarks that characterized the
: "modeh-al-ha-emmess" as a formal proof/argument:

Because that's not what I am saying is the formal proof. I overused the
word "this", which led to confusion.

In addition "modeh al ha'ames" refers to a person, not an argument,
so you lost me on that bit. AISI, it refers to the person who accepted
the proof in 2:20, would find this point compelling. But since the point
he's making here is not a formal proof, he doesn't expect it to convince,
only to reinforce belief in those who already accepted the related proof.

: And I don't see how one can possibly interpret (MN 3:13 [not 3:15 as
: I mistakenly typed previously])  "And know that one of the
: strongest /proofs/ (min /ha-gedolah sheh-b'ra'ayos/) for Creation ex
: nihilo, for one who is /modeh al ha-ememmes/, is his understanding
: the /proof/ (/hu mah sheya'amod alav ha-mofase/)..." as meaning:

:> "this doesn't work as proof, but if you already agree to the
:> emes, look how nicely it works out."

You are taking a sentence that says "One of the greatest proofs for
creation for someone who accepts the truth is his understanding the
wonder..." He is discussing a ra'ayah that someone who already believes
would find compelling. Not a proof that would convince an unbiased
seeker.

Because I don't think the Rambam accepted that an informal justification
other than philosophical proof could be a sounds reason to embrace a
belief as true.

(I see you consistently double the "s" in "emess". Why? If the sav had
a dageish, it would be a tav, not "ss".)

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             We are what we repeatedly do.
mi...@aishdas.org        Thus excellence is not an event,
http://www.aishdas.org   but a habit.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                   - Aristotle

An Areivim conversation moved in topicality so that my reply really
belongs here. Some background....

At some point, one person wrote, in part:
| Right is right and wrong is wrong,...

Speaking about moral correctness.

To which someone else replied:
> Really? ISTM that there is lots of grey in our world. People disagree
> about right and wrong like they disagree about assur and mutar...

And my reply, from Areivin:
} This is why disputes about eilu va'eilu are so significant. Machloqes
} can be between two approaches, two paths, one may take. Between different
} strategies to obtaining the same goal.

} Or it could be between a correct vs an incorrect understanding of the
} halakhah. A process by which something becomes law, regardless of which
} is right.

} Or...

} But if there is one right and one wrong, human decision-making wouldn't
} change which is which.

That second person wrote later in the conversation:
> Sure am. Women learning Talmud was wrong, then it was right. In fact,
> now it's both right (MO) and wrong (Hareidi).

My response:
} I don't consider that a good example. It is possible for something to
} be right in one settting and wrong in another. Such as whether learning
} Talmud is a good idea may depend on how women are being educated to relate
} to knowledge in general. Since they aren't obligated to learn halachic
} theory, such as gemara, they may be better off with a naive mimetic
} faith. But if we have universal education, and an economic system that
} demands a certain wordliness in both genders, such that naivite isn't
} an option, then our choices are different.

} Morality is like a Faucault's Pendulum; it keeps swinging the same
} direction. The pendulum only looks like the direction changes over time
} because the world rotates beneath it.

Them again:
>                                                 Zionism is right (DL)
> and wrong (Satmar). You see the world as black and white; I see lots of
> colors, including grey (and black and white sometimes as well).

Me:
} But gray too objectively exists. We may need to choose a response,
} and thus have to fit it into a boolean black-white category. And then
} someone may choose a strategy that categorizes it as white and someone
} else as black.

} But the grayness is not a matter of opinion.

And also, from the same person, in an email between the two:
> And my point was, the topic under discussion was not gravity ...
> it was an issue that what people think about it is, in fact, relevant.

My response, continued:
} Is that true?

} As far as I know, it's pretty basic to Judaism that the Creator has an
} "Opinion" of what is moral and what isn't. That things run more smoothly
} for everyone involved if we run with the design rather than do something
} else.

} Not only that, G-d put us on the same page once.

} People may not be sure if there is an absolute moral standard, and those
} who agree there is one, may not agree about what it looks like.

} It's out there and as objectively real as gravity.

} Even if you cannot prove it to others, and therefore will always be
} subject to conflicting opinions -- some more right in some ways, some
} more right in others, some simply wrong.

} Your position implies an Empiricism that rules out revelation as a valid
} source of truth! In which case, what's left of Torah?

Futher down in the conversation, Lisa wrote of halakhah:
: There are actually cases where opinions can establish right and
: wrong.  Tanuro shel Akhnai illustrates one.  Actual reality is
: *created* by the informed and considered opinions of the Sanhedrin.

To which I responded:
} Law, not reality.

And Lisa, post #2:
: I disagree.  Torah *is* reality.

Finally, some new material.

R Chaim Brisker links "vechayei olam nata besokheinu" and "emes mei'eretz
tatzmiach". Torah is the seed from which Emes grows, and not (leshitaso,
but I bought into it) Emes itself.

The Qetzos says something similar on the use of "emes mei'eretz" in the
medrash about the 2 forces -- Emes and Shalom -- opposing the creation
of humanity. Emes is thrown to the ground, to which the tanna says
"emes meieretz tatzmiach". Emes will come out through the process
of history. It's not with us yet. Torah is how HQBH leads us there.

But in any case, I didn't speak of Torah, of "divrei E-lokim chaim",
I spoke of halakhah.

Or as RMF put it, I spoke of emes lehora'ah, not Emes as it is kelapei
shamay galya.

Continuing my reply to Lisa's 1st post:
} And the reason why we only let the Sanhedrin vote is because the law is
} expected to be consistent with the objective reality. There may be many
} ways up Har Hashem, but you really only want people who know mapreading
} and reconteuring figuring out which one is best.

} And the mountain and its altitude are unchanged by people's decisions.

Lisa's 2nd post, cont:
: And what Hashem wanted the halakha to be was determined by people's
: decisions.

New material again:

If we combine your insistance that halakhah is Truth with the idea that
it is determined by people's decisions, you end up with Constructivism.
Halakhah as a man made reality.

Which makes sense -- you tend to side with the Rambam on this kind of
thing.

But if dinim bein adam lachaveiro define or at least shape morality,
you are left with the OP's claim that opinion determines what is moral.
Opinion as informed by kelalei pesaq, but still, morality isn't
entirely absolute or objective.


The position I was suggesting that there is an objective Morality that
is part of Emes. Emes, with a capital "E", as in something that exists in
Shamayim (a/k/a the Olam haEmes) but can't fit in this world among human
minds. We have approximating models (Maharal), getting ever closer to the
Emes (Qetzos). Halakhah is our means of approaching it, and the existence
of multiple correct pesaqim reflects their being more than one viable path
(R Chaim Brisker). Or more specifically: The path is on the meta-level,
the evolution of the Oral Torah and its pesaqim is part of getting to
Emes, not "only" the path taken by a life that follows that pesaqim.

So that halakhah is not morality, it is a means of producing ever more
moral people.

Which makes sense in terms of my own Mussarly tendencies.

Tir'u baTov!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             We are great, and our foibles are great,
mi...@aishdas.org        and therefore our troubles are great --
http://www.aishdas.org   but our consolations will also be great.
Fax: (270) 514-1507                        - Rabbi AY Kook

On 6/3/2015 7:37 PM, Micha Berger wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 03, 2015 at 06:16:59PM -0400, H Lampel via Avodah wrote:
> :> You seem to be treating "modeh al ha-emes" as referring to a kind
> :> justification that isn't a proof.
>
> : I thought I was clear that I was taking it to be the same informal
> : kind of proof as R. E. Wasserman's and R. Akiva's. The kind of proof
> : not delineated in formal Aristotelian format, but clearly recognized
> : and accepted by a healthy and unbiased mind.
>
> Then I did understand you correctly.
>
> When I say, "a kind justification that isn't a proof", I believe I mean
> the same thing as your "informal kind of proof". To me, the word "proof"
> implies formality. "Justification" is a general term for how we know
> something is true. (From Plato's definition of knowledge: "a justified and
> true belief.")
Got it.
> :> Whereas I see the Rambam as saying more like: this doesn't work as proof,
> :> but if you already agree to the emes, look how nicely it works out.
>
> : I did not see this in your previous remarks that characterized the
> : "modeh-al-ha-emmess" as a formal proof/argument:
>
> Because that's not what I am saying is the formal proof. I overused the
> word "this", which led to confusion.
I''m even more confused now. What "this" that led to confusion was 
overused? I took you to mean that the ''emmess'' that a ''modeh al 
ha-emmess'' person was modeh to was the conclusion of a formal proof 
stated somewhere in 2:19-20. (And such a person would consider, as one 
of the strongest proofs for Creation ex nihilo, the proof from the 
hierarchy of benefit of entities.)
> In addition "modeh al ha'ames" refers to a person, not an argument,
> so you lost me on that bit.
When I wrote

''I was taking it to be the same informal kind of proof as R. E. 
Wasserman's and R. Akiva's. The kind of proof not delineated in formal 
Aristotelian format, but clearly recognized and accepted by a healthy 
and unbiased mind''


I was responding to you statement:

:> You seem to be treating "modeh al ha-emes" as referring to a kind
:> justification that isn't a proof.

which was in response to my writing:

: My point was that we nevertheless see that the Rambam recognizes that
: there is another approach to verifying truth, namely that which follows
: the non-formal mindset of those who are /modeh al ha-emmess/...

I meant to say I was taking Rambam's remark to mean that someone whose 
thought process is normal and unbiased (i.e. a modeh al ha-emmess) 
recognizes (without the aid of formal proof)  the fact of the hierarchy 
of benefit as compelling the conclusion of a freely intended Creation ex 
nihilo.

Another way to crystallize our differing interpretations: You are taking 
the "emmess'' that the ''modeh al ha-emmess'' is modeh to, to be the 
correct fact.
I'm taking it to be the correct process of thinking.
>   AISI, it refers to the person who accepted
> the proof in 2:20, would find this point compelling. But since the point
> he's making here is not a formal proof, he doesn't expect it to convince,
> only to reinforce belief in those who already accepted the related proof.
>
> : And I don't see how one can possibly interpret (MN 3:13 [not 3:15 as
> : I mistakenly typed previously])  "And know that one of the
> : strongest /proofs/ (min /ha-gedolah sheh-b'ra'ayos/) for Creation ex
> : nihilo, for one who is /modeh al ha-ememmes/, is his understanding
> : the /proof/ (/hu mah sheya'amod alav ha-mofase/)..." as meaning:
>
> :> "this doesn't work as proof, but if you already agree to the
> :> emes, look how nicely it works out."
>
> You are taking a sentence that says "One of the greatest proofs for
> creation for someone who accepts the truth is his understanding the
> wonder..." He is discussing a ra'ayah that someone who already believes
> would find compelling. Not a proof that would convince an unbiased
> seeker.
>
> Because I don't think the Rambam accepted that an informal justification
> other than philosophical proof could be a sounds reason to embrace a
> belief as true.
Your first paragraph is just restating your position and denying mine. I 
am saying otherwise, pointing out that saying that this person considers 
the hierarchy factor ''one of the greatest proofs for
creation'' means '"this doesn't work as proof, but if you already agree 
to the emes, look how nicely it works out"  is incompatible with the words.

And /l'fi ta'amych,/ of your second paragraph:
  If the Rambam considers an informal justification vs philosophical 
proof an unsound reason to embrace a belief as true,
then one would think he would not consider noteworthy a non-ra'ayah 
found compelling only by someone who already believes in the conclusion 
(stated or implied somewhere in 2:19-20, or in that previously stated 
formal ra'aya  which /is/, or is not, compelling--I'm not sure which of 
these you're saying, but my objection applies regardless.)

I think it may be productive for us to examine the 4 or 5 other places 
in MN where the Rambam uses the expression ''modeh al ha-emmess.'' 
(Curiously, the search of the Hebrewbooks.org MN in my Adobe Reader 
skips over the instance in 3:13!)

>
> (I see you consistently double the "s" in "emess". Why? If the sav had
> a dageish, it would be a tav, not "ss".)
It's to duplicate the /sound/ (not the lettering) of the word as it 
would be in English, for a careful English-reading person. (Not that I'm 
sure there are many of those around...) In contemporary English 
spelling, one "s" at the end of a word that ends in ''e'' is pronounced 
hard, like a ''z'' (shines, pines, processes); the soft ''s'' added to 
words that end in "e" is indicated by two ''s'' 's (process, ingress, 
mess). But we digreSS....

Zvi Lampel

This stone, at the excacations south of the Kotel, apparently marked
a location where the shofar would be blown on Fri afternoon to warn
people about the approaching and arrival of Shabbos.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trumpeting_Place_inscription

It says "lebeis hateqi'ah lh[k?b?]" and was at the corner of Har haBayis.

My obaervation is about the font. Notice the base of the lamed, which
is a diagonal. The same is true of the Qumran texts and of texts from
the Cairo Geniza. but this pushes the date for this tradition of script
back to Herod's rebuilding of the BHMQ.

This kind of lamed is also found in Kesav Vellish, that used in Sepharadi
sta"m, but not in Kesav Beis Yoseif or the other Ashkenazi variants.
http://sofercenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/different-ksavim.jpg

Now, the stone is in far from the formal Ashuris required for Sifrei
Torah, but if Kesav Beis Yoseif is correct, why aren't other fonts from
the period more similar?

If this does indicate a preference for one script over the other, we
could discuss how the various approaches to Halakhah and Science would
handle this case.

{In terms of being yotzei, I think the only problem Ashkenazim have with
the Sepharadi kesav is that variants that predate the Chida lack Rabbei
Tam's qutzo shel yud. And since the popularity of the Ben Ish Chai,
this issue has become very rare. Lehalakhah, the Tur, Noda biYhudah,
Tzitz Eliezer and R' Ovadiah all alow using the other's sefer. Even with
the spelling differences!)

:-)BBii!
-Micha

-- 
Micha Berger             Man is equipped with such far-reaching vision,
mi...@aishdas.org        yet the smallest coin can obstruct his view.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Rav Yisrael Salanter
Fax: (270) 514-1507


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