Avodah Mailing List

Volume 38: Number 41

Mon, 25 May 2020

• 1. Re: BAmidbar or BEmidbar? (Alexander Seinfeld)
• 2. Re: BAmidbar or BEmidbar? (Zvi Lampel)
• 3. Re: Simchas Torah, post-covid19 (Michael Poppers)
• 4. Re: Street Minyanim/sh'as hadchak (Chana Luntz)
• 5. "shemo"s" as an acronym for shenayim miqra (SBA)
• 6. The tallit without tzitzit (Joseph Kaplan)
• 7. Re: Street Minyanim (Chana Luntz)
• 8. Re: The tallit without tzitzit (Rich, Joel)
• 9. Re: zoom minyan (Chana Luntz)
• 10. Re: Street Minyanim (Rich, Joel)

Fine, so the 2nd sefer of our Chumash (and its 1st parsha) should be
called ?Sheimot? (or Sheimos), not ?Sh?mot?. Our custom is inconsistent.


>...
>>While you are correct that in context the word is read Bemidbar, the name
>>of the parsha is clearly Bamidbar. The custom has been to isolate the
>>word
>>or words that are the title and conjugate accordingly. This is why we
>>have
>>Tazriyah and not Sazriyah. Mishpatim and not HaMishpatim... Devarim
>>and not HaDevarim...
>
>Shemos, Behar?
>
>Tir'u baTov!
>-Micha

 On  Thu, 21 May I copy and pasted from the blog "The Dikdukian,"

... the name of the parsha is clearly Bamidbar. The custom has been to
>> isolate the word
>> or words that are the title and conjugate accordingly. This is why we have
>> Tazriyah and not Sazriyah. Mishpatim and not HaMishpatim (since we do not
>> use v'aileh and clarify it with asher ...). Devarim and not HaDevarim.
>> Since the reference is to a specific desert (Sinai) the hay hayediyah is
>> implemented. The names, according to tradition, are clearly not just the
>> word or words of the beginning phrase.
>>
>
However, this would entail that instead of Sefer Shemos, we should call it
Sefer Sheimos (the non-possessive form of the word used repeatedly in
parshas Bamidbar).

Zvi Lampel

PS--I see that this was pointed out by RMB and JFS, and that the latter
added Sefer Mshalim and Parashath Axarei HaMavveth.
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(Replying onlist after clearing my thoughts w/ RAMiller offlist.)
In Avodah V38n38, RAMiller responded to me:
>> Fn2 at
https://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Shnayim_Mikra_V%27Echad_Targum
>> tells me that *l'chulei alma*, individuals are obligated even when
>> there's no communal reading.
> No. Halachipedia's words are "that there's an obligation of Shenayim
Mikra even for someone who heard Torah reading in shul." That's pretty much
the same as the words of both Rambam Tefilah 13:25 and Mechaber 285:1 -
"Even though one hears the whole Torah each week b'tzibur, he must read it
to himself each week."
> One could easily interpret it to mean "Even though he hears it b'tzibur,
and certainly if he doesn't hear it b'tzibur," but it's NOT explicit in the
text. One could just as easily say that "Yashlim adam parshiyosav im
hatzibur" would not apply if there's no tzibur reading it.
> It is worthwhile to note that Halachipedia points to an interesting
Hagahos Maimoniyos on Rambam Tefila 13:25. He quotes the Raavan as holding
that Shemo"s applies ONLY to those who live in villages and don't go to the
shul to hear the parsha. The Raavan understood "IM hatzibur" to mean that
those yechidim should be reading the parsha at home at the *same time* as
it is being read in shul, but the Hagahos Maimoniyos disagreed.
Please have a look at the Hagahos yourself (
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=9713&;st=&pgnum=197, start at the
6th narrow line); or, if you wish, BY 285:1b (at
https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14265&;st=&pgnum=475, it's
*d'h'* "aval"
and start at the 2nd wide line).  The RaAVaN
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliezer_ben_Nathan> holds that BT
B'rachos "l'olam yashlim" does not apply when someone hears the *sedra* read
at a *minyan* but rather only applies to someone who has no Shabbos-morning
*minyan* to attend [so *yashlim* at the time that a Torah reading is
occurring] -- that has been our pandemic-related situation! -- and the
Hagahos argues that "yashlim" applies to that someone whether or not he can
attend a *minyan* that Shabbos (i.e. not only when he has no *minyan* but
also when he does), so sounds to me like l'chulei alma, all someones are
obligated l'hashlim when they cannot attend a *minyan*.  Does that help, or
do you still disagree?  Thanks.
(RAMiller responded, "Thank you for pushing me to review this. It seems
that I had missed the Hagahos's words 'b'chol inyan', explicitly meaning
whether there's a tzibur or not.")

Gut Chodesh and Yuntef!
and all the best from
*Michael Poppers* * Elizabeth, NJ, USA
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RSS wrote:

RSZ wrote, re: RnChL:
> I would argue that in all those cases, the fact that we can rely on an 
> opinion in an emergency means that we *really* hold that the halacha 
> permits this, but since there is so much opposition to it we may not 
> rely on it in normal circumstances.  If it is at all possible we 
> should do better than that, and satisfy more opinions.  Only when we 
> have no other choice will we fall back on the basic halacha...

<<That is my understanding, too. In my limited understanding, the Rema, in
his intro to Toras Chatas, his sefer on Yore Deah, on the phrase "k'dai hu R
so-and-so l'smoch alav b'sh'as had'chak" (me: this phrase only appears once
(al pi Sefaria) but perhaps the concept comes up a number of times?), he
asks: what does this mean? Something is either ossur or it isn't. Rema
suggests that perhaps ikkar hadin is like the meikel opinion, but many
instances we are choshesh for the kavod of the machmir opinion, at least
l'chatchila. (Note: (a) I am unsure if the word "kavod" belongs in
there,because: (b) I have not seen this inside).>>

I have not seen this piece from the Rema either, but it seems somewhat
surprising, because the Rema in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat siman 25
si'if 2 writes:

"and if he is ruling in issur v'heter, and this is a matter from the Torah,
he should go stringently, and if a rabbinic matter, he should go leniently,
and davka if the two that disagree are equal, but we do not rely on the
words of the small one against the words of the one who is greater than him
in wisdom and in number even in a sh'as hadchak, unless there is also a
hefsed meruba, and so if he is an individual against the majority, we go
after the majority in any place (Rashba)"

As mentioned the Rema is quoting the Rashba which is found in Shut HaRashba
Chelek 1 siman 253 where he sets out rules of poskening, and says:

"that we do not say it is appropriate to rely on ploni in a time when there
is one who is greater than him in wisdom and number.  And the halacha pesuka
[CL: is this not the same as ikar hadin?] is that they go after the one
greatest in wisdom and number.  And even in a sh'as hadchak we do not rely
on the small one in wisdom or in number.  And so in a place of disagreement
between an individual and the many unless there is a sh'as hadchak that
there is in it a hefsed meruba or similar to this.  And like that which is
said in the first perek of Nida (9b) [CL This was one of the key sources I
brought regarding sh'as hadchak, see previous post]

... .  That not all poskim and chachamim are equal, and not all places are
equal from the law.  How do we rule the din if with two of the poskim one
forbids and one permits?  If we know that one is greater in wisdom and
number, and it goes out his name so we go after him whether for stringency
or leniency.  If there are two that are equal and we do not know which one
is greater of the two of them.  For Torah we go after the stringent one that
it is like a safek d'orisa and of the rabbis we go after the lenient one and
like it says at the beginning of the first perek of Avodah Zara (7).  And
one who relies on the lenient one when it is from the Torah sins. ... .  But
if there is one Rav in his place, and he teaches them they go after his
words. ..."

And he goes on to discuss the question of giving honour to a Rav in his
place (like Rabbi Yosi hasGalili where they ate chicken with milk, and Rabbi
Eliezer where they cut the trees to make the knives on shabbas for the
bris), but that seems to be where the question of honour comes in in the
Rashba's piece.

Now it is noteworthy that the question of a piece of tahor chatas meat
falling into 100 pieces of tahor chulin meat (which might be the place on
which the Rema you quote is commenting) does come up in the subsequent
discussion of this Rashba.  Because the Bach commenting on this Rema and
hence Rashba derives from the Rashba that he holds that the principle of
sh'as hadchak applies even to a d'orisa, a position that seems proved by the
Rashba's comment on Yevamos daf 91b d'h "chatichas chatas" - talking about
this chatas meat (ie the only reason that sh'as hadchak is not applied there
is because there is only a small loss, not a large one, as it can be sold to
a kohen).  So maybe the Rema in the piece you are quoting is trying to deal
with this question. 

But note that the Shach Pilpul b'hagahos Hora'os b'isur v'heter (at the end
of siman 252) rejects this idea that sh'as hadachak applies to d'orisas, and
rather understands that (as I mentioned previously in the name of the Piskei
Teshuva) sh'as hadchak only applies to d'rabbanans, and gives the
justification of "hem omru v'hem omru" - ie the rabbis in setting up the
system specifically set it up so in a sh'as hadchak situation one could rely
on minority opinions.  So at the very least it seems to me that the Shach
understood the situation with sh'as hadchak as I do, that it is a rabbinic
meta halachic rule that is applied, and not that the halacha is in essence
like the minority opinion (other than in the more general sense of elu
v'elu).

Note also when the Bach is discussing the way the Shulchan Aruch is
structured (in the piece I mentioned above), he describes what the Shulchan
Aruch brings as the stam - as the "ikar" halacha and when he follows it by
"v'yesh mi sheomrim" as that being the "tafel" - with the tafel perhaps to
be relied on in a sh'as hadchak.  It seems to me therefore from the Bach's
description that he too holds that the ikar halacha is the straight Shulchan
Aruch that we are expected to generally follow, and that if we rely on a
minority opinion in a sh'as hadchak ,we are relying on a halacha that can be
labelled the "tafel".

<<R Sholom Rosner asks: Where do we see a source for such an idea? He points
to Demai 3:1 where an oni can eat demai. So, really, ikkar ha'din, demai is
not ossur.>>

Or you can understand that demai is assur (rabbinically), but when the
rabbis banned demai, they allowed for sh'as hadchak situations, of which
being an oni is one of them, and that pushed aside the ikar halacha that
demai Is assur.


-- Sholom

Regards

Chana

From: Micha Berger < >

(Note, I learned about "shemo"s" as an acronym for shenayim miqra from a
chassidishe rebbe in Jr High. 

Personally, I have only encountered that acronymn inside the chassidish
veldt.)

See the first Baal Haturim in Parshas Shemos.

 

SBA

 

 

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I wish people would stop telling this story. It does no one proud; not the
rabbi, not the woman, not the storyteller. Not every story ? even if true
(an important issue in stories told for the first time after the subject?s
death or incapacity) ? deserves to be retold. And stories that were not
told during the lifetime of the main character, where he could have the
opportunity to deny it happened or, if it did, explain his reasoning so he
should not be misunderstood, should have to meet a higher bar to be retold.
This story does not meet that bar. 
Joseph

Sent from my iPhone

R' Marty Bluke  writes:
 
<<R?n Chana Luntzs point reminds me of what Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik wrote
about derech hapsak in a footnote in Rupture and Reconstruction

Rupture and Reconstruction footnote 20 - The crux of the Gaon?s approach
both to Torah study and pesak was its independence of precedent. A problem
was to be approached in terms of the text of the Talmud as mediated by the
rishonim (and in the Gaon?s case even that mediation was occasionally
dispensed with). What subsequent commentators had to say about this issue,
was, with few exceptions (e.g. Magen Avraham, Shakh), irrelevant. This
approach is writ large on every page of the Biur ha-Gra, further embodied in
the Hayyei Adam and the Arukh ha-Shulhan, and has continued on to our day in
the works of such Lithuanian posekim, as the Hazon Ish and R. Mosheh
Feinstein. The Mishnah Berurah rejects de facto this approach and returns to
the world of precedent and string citation. Decisions are arrived at only
after elaborate calibration of and negotiation with multiple ?aharonic?
positions

I think this issue of porch minyanim is a good example of the 2 approaches
mentioned above by Dr. Grach. The MB goes with his approach of precedent
etc. and therefore would allow porch minyanim based on the the precedent of
the Pri Megadim etc. while the Gra and his ideological descendants like the
Aruch Hashulchan simply reject the Rashba.>>

Fascinating. It has been a long time since I read Rupture and
Reconstruction, and I certainly had not remembered that footnote.  And there
is some logic to sourcing the change in Ashkenazi psak to the Gra (despite,
from what I can see, us rarely following him halacha l'ma'ase).  But, while
the Gra himself might fairly be said to involve an absence of precedent (and
oddly, I have a similar sense when reading the commentary of the Chazon Ish,
which is rather at odds with his image), I don't think that is true of the
Hayyei Adam, Aruch Ha-Shulchan or more modern poskim who follow that derech.
More accurate, it seems to me, is the statement that it is the text of the
Talmud as mediated by the rishonim collectively that form the basis of the
precedent.   That is, you go back to the rishonim in the original (because
we can!) and not just one or two that have been picked out by key achronim.
And the Shulchan Aruch is then understood in the light of the collective
rishonim (including ones that he did not see, like the Meiri, but that if he
had seen, might conceivably have altered his psak).  

Here, the Magen Avraham picks out (albeit not by name) the second
possibility of the Rashba, and uses that to understand the Shulchan Aruch.
The Pri Chadash and the Pri Megadim quote the Rashba explicitly as the
source of the Magen Avraham's position.  They do not appear to go look at
other rishonim or the Talmud directly.  They do not look in detail at the
teshuva of the Rashba, or bring that this is only one of two explanations he
gives for the actual question he is answering (why can the chazan on the
bima be included in the minyan).  Here they do seem to go to the rishonic
source of the Magen Avraham's idea.  In other cases I have seen the Magen
Avraham (or the Rema) quote X rishon in the name of Y rishon in the name of
Z rishon.  And if you take the time to track back, what Z rishon actually
said doesn't always seem fully consistent with the way Y rishon or X rishon
is then quoted in the Magen Avraham or Rema.   The more modern approach
would be to make sure you read Z rishon, and the underlying Talmudic text Z
rishon was commentating on, and so break down the chain a bit (although
there is still a tendency to say, particularly if this is in the Rema, that
it is halacha l'ma'ase, based on the chain - which is why it is cleaner in
Sephardi psak).

I thus suspect that while the Gra might be the poster boy for the change in
Ashkenazi psak, he was not really what is driving it, but rather the reality
of modernity.  I can access, from my computer, on places like Hebrew
books.org if not on Bar Ilan, rishonim that it is clear the Rema and Magen
Avraham could not.  I don't believe that the Rema or Magen Avraham would not
have gone back and read the original Z rishon if they could have, just that
they didn't have access.  (In one particular case I am thinking of, the Z
rishon in question is quoted by the Rema as the SmaG, when actually it is
clearly, once you look through both books, the SmaK, so not surprisingly he
had  to quote a chain, and if you chase the chain back you can see where a
misprint or miscopy resulted in a misquote).  This is one of the ways that
modernity has influenced and is influencing psak.  In that sense it is even
more fully within Rupture and Reconstruction than this footnote would
suggest.  There is a level of rupture with the achronic past, because we can
access rishonic precedent that the achronim couldn't.  And what do we do
with that?  Because of the extraordinary reach of the Beis Yosef, we are
less able to do that with the Shulchan Aruch itself, which is why I would
hazard a guess it is weathering the blasts of modernity rather more easily.

Regards

Chana

I wish people would stop telling this story. It does no one proud; not the
rabbi, not the woman, not the storyteller. Not every story ? even if true
(an important issue in stories told for the first time after the subject?s
death or incapacity) ? deserves to be retold. And stories that were not
told during the lifetime of the main character, where he could have the
opportunity to deny it happened or, if it did, explain his reasoning so he
should not be misunderstood, should have to meet a higher bar to be retold.
This story does not meet that bar.
-------------------------------
It is my least favorite story, yet it is attested to by a highly reliable
source and deals with a very important (IMHO) question.  Hence I raised it
without the details to discuss the application today to zoom minyanim
KT
Joel Rich
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Thank you.

RJR writes:

<<As I understood the story the rabbi told her to do this as a first step
I would assume she understood it as part of a mitzvah process>>

I assume she probably did.  But while we can have an interesting discussion
about whether the rabbi, whose halachic knowledge dwarfed hers, was engaging
in a form of geneivas da'as, and when this kind of geneivas da'as might be
acceptable, and with what motivation (I think a discussion of Chagiga 16b
would be the place to start, if we are discussing women, and perhaps Shabbat
31a - the person who came to Hillel seeking conversion on condition that he
will become the kohen gadol, might be another), I am not sure that the woman
with talis without tzitzis sheds much light on the zoom minyan question.
That said, Chagiga 16b itself might provide some useful pointers to the zoom
minyan question, if one can extrapolate from nachas ruach d'nashim, to
nachas ruach of people more generally.

The gemora in Chagiga 16b states:

"Rabbi Yosi said Abba Elazar told me that "once we had a calf of an
offering, and we brought it to the women's courtyard and the women leant on
it", not because leaning is obligatory for women but in order to give
"nachas ruach" [a good feeling] to the women.  And if you would think that
one requires leaning with all one's strength because of nachas ruach for
women would we [allow them to do] work with offerings?  Rather, derive from
this that we do not need [leaning] with all one's strength - No, I can say
to that we do need [leaning] with all one's strength [for men], but they
said to them [the women] float your hands [i.e. they told the women not to
lean with all their strength, even though that is what the men were doing]
- if so, it was not because of [real] leaning by the women [that they took
the calf to the courtyard].  [Rather] let him [Rabbi Abba Elazar], explain
that they [the women] did not lean at all.  Rav Ami said, one and another
thing, one that they did not lean [properly] at all [merely floated their
hands] and further, it was done to give nachasruach [a good feeling] to the
women."

Now the understanding of Tosfos (see Chullin 85a) is:

- leaning with all one's strength is forbidden d'orisa (but the chiyuv of
leaning on korbanos required for men pushes aside that prohibition, aseh
doche lo ta'aseh).  For women therefore full leaning is prohibited.
- merely floating one's hands is forbidden rabbinically (as it looks like
one is working with korbanos, even though one isn't).  For the sake of
nachas ruach d'nashim a rabbinic prohibition can be pushed aside.

Hence women can do something that (i) is not even an actual mitzvah
(floating of hands is not the leaning that is required for the mitzvah);
(ii) violates a rabbinic prohibition - in order to give them nachas ruach.
If one wanted to extend this to people feeling upset because they could not
say kaddish for their parents, one might say that because of the nachas
ruach that this gives them, we can push aside a rabbinic prohibition (not
saying kaddish except when there are ten), even though saying kaddish in a
zoom minyan does not really, Halachically, fulfil any actual mitzvah. Noting
that if you hold that seeing is enough to constitute a minyan, then maybe
you could hold that seeing over zoom counts too (even though most poskim
have rejected electronic seeing or hearing as being Halachically
meaningful), and that by combining these two factors, you might say that in
a sh'as hadchak situation, such kaddish is permitted. (noting further that
the mourner's kaddish, itself, is just a minhag - and one that it would seem
likely arose because katanim cannot take the amud - ie it is already a way
of giving comfort to vulnerable mourners without access to other halachic
mechanisms).

That does however require an extension of a concept that in the gemora only
appears to be applied to women.  

Note btw that the Ra'avid in the Toras Kohanim (Vayikra 2:2), has a
different understanding of Rabbi Yosi in Chagiga 16b, understanding the
situation to be as follows:

- leaning with all one's strength is forbidden d'orisa (but the chiyuv of
leaning on one's korbanos required for men pushes aside that prohibition as
does the permissibility of women fulfilling this mitzvah, aseh doche lo
ta'aseh).  
- merely floating one's hands is forbidden rabbinically (as it looks like
one is working with korbanos, even though one isn't).  There was a common
situation where women felt they had a connection to the korban, and should
have been allowed to lean on it, but where in fact there was not the
necessary connection, namely when they were married women and the korban was
brought by their husband.  In such a case, because the woman in question did
not own the korban, she could not lean on it Halachically, not because women
could not lean on korbanos according to Rabbi Yosi, but because she wasn't
the real owner of the korban.  But since women felt they were a partner in
their husband's korban, they wanted to lean, and for that the chachamim
allowed them to float their hands (ie violate rabbinically) for the sake of
nachas ruach d'nashim.

And Rav Moshe (Igeros Moshe Orech Chaim chelek 3 siman 94) has yet another
explanation:

- leaning with all one's strength is forbidden d'orisa (but the chiyuv of
leaning on korbanos required for men pushes aside that prohibition, aseh
doche lo ta'aseh).  However this is a special mitzvah where the ownership of
the korban (ie by a male or female) changes the essential nature of the
korban itself (different to all other mitzvos aseh), so that a woman's
korban is one where the cheftza does not require leaning, and hence there is
no aseh to push aside the lo ta'aseh.  This he contrasts to the other
mitzvos aseh shehazman grama, where Rav Moshe holds there is a genuine
underlying mitzvah being performed if it is done optionally by women.
- merely floating one's hands is forbidden rabbinically (as it looks like
one is working with korbanos, even though one isn't).  For the sake of
nachas ruach d'nashim a rabbinic prohibition can be pushed aside allowing
floating of the hands over these korbanos that do not in fact require
leaning.

In any event, the relevance to zoom minyanim is whether one can take the
Talmudic concept of nachas ruach and apply it beyond women to, say, avelim
in our current circumstances.  But that is a separate question to the one
raised above.  As I have written before, it does seem to me that the gemora
in Chagiga is a serious challenge to the underlying assumptions of the
"woman wearing a tallis without tzitzis" story, but that is independent of
any question of zoom minyanim.

>Joel rich

Regards

Chana

Fascinating. It has been a long time since I read Rupture and
Reconstruction, and I certainly had not remembered that footnote.  And there
is some logic to sourcing the change in Ashkenazi psak to the Gra (despite,
from what I can see, us rarely following him halacha l'ma'ase).  But, while
the Gra himself might fairly be said to involve an absence of precedent (and
oddly, I have a similar sense when reading the commentary of the Chazon Ish,
which is rather at odds with his image), I don't think that is true of the
Hayyei Adam, Aruch Ha-Shulchan or more modern poskim who follow that derech.
More accurate, it seems to me, is the statement that it is the text of the
Talmud as mediated by the rishonim collectively that form the basis of the
precedent.  
------------------------------------------
R'HS alludes to the psak revolution in litvishe circles somewhere in this shiur:
https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/956878/rabbi-hershel-schachter/inyonei-shavuos/
Rabbi Hershel Schachter-Inyonei Shavuos
IIRC he states it as going back to the GRA and his successors vs. going back to old style psak methodology(Pre-Gra)
KT
Joel Rich 
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A list of common acronyms is available at
        http://www.aishdas.org/lists/avodah/avodah-acronyms
(They are also visible in the web archive copy of each digest.)